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2Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to identify economic and regulatory issues which 
affected the development of the West German capital market and the financing 
behaviour of public limited companies during the early post war period. Following 
the introductory chapter, the thesis summarises literature on the relevance of capital 
structure in imperfect markets and discusses findings on the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth in consideration the historical 
circumstances of the early post war period. Chapter three provides a detailed 
account of the West German currency reform which looks beyond the conversion of 
monetary assets as it incorporates the accompanying conversion of company 
balance sheets. An analysis of the conversion of balance sheets shows that 
companies emerged from the reform with significantly reduced leverage. This 
finding provides an unconventional interpretation of the observed financing 
behaviour of West German companies during the early post war period. Chapter 
four discusses how public policy measures affected the development of the West 
German capital market during the immediate post currency reform period. It is 
argued that the policy of partial price controls coincided with a restriction of the 
capital market in providing funds to private and uncontrolled sectors as public 
authorities introduced measures which favoured funding in public and price 
controlled sectors. After having outlined the economic environment of the 
immediate post war period, the thesis analyses the financing behaviour of a sample 
of 79 non financial public limited companies between 1952 and 1965. The thesis 
argues that exceptional circumstances created by the war and the following policy 
decisions affected companies’ financing behaviour. It shows that companies entered 
the post war period with severely altered capital structures and suggests that 
internally generated funds and bank loans featured no more prominently during the 
early post war years than during the following decades.
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1. Introduction
The West German economy of the two decades following the end of World 
War II significantly differs from more recent decades in at least two respects. First, 
West Germany experienced exceptionally high growth rates during the 1950s and 
early 1960s, with average annual growth rates in real GDP of around 8.2% 
compared to average annual growth rates of around 2.2% between 1973 and 1990. 
Second, the early post war period marked the beginning of a new era still suffering 
from distortions created by the war and its aftermath, and unsettled by an extensive 
redistribution of wealth, whilst the more recent decades are characterised by a 
comparatively stable economic environment. Despite these obvious differences 
between the early post war period and the more recent decades, it is commonly 
assumed that the two periods are similar with respect to companies’ financing 
behaviour. This assumption implies that West German public limited companies 
relied predominantly on internally generated funds, and to the extent they did rely 
on external funds, they were provided in the form of bank loans. Furthermore, the 
German banking system is generally seen to hold a crucial strategic position in the 
German economy and to have played an important part in the remarkable economic 
success Germany achieved in the post war period. In contrast, the German capital 
market is perceived to have played an unimportant role during the post war period.
One of several authors who assign a major role to German banks is Shonfield 
who argues that the German banking system is better described as political 
economic agency rather than a credit organisation. As such he attributes a central 
importance to the role of the German banking system throughout his book where he 
writes, ‘The postwar reassertion of power by the German commercial banks is 
important, because,... they occupy a special position in the organization of German 
industry. ... In this articulated industrial system, the banks played from the 
beginning a major tutelary role. They were perhaps the most powerful force making 
for the centralization of economic decisions. It is broadly true to say that what the 
great public and semi-public institutions are to the French economy, the big banks
12
are to Germany.’1 Shonfield also argues that the importance attributed to the 
German banking system stems from its long standing tradition of encompassing the 
whole range of investment financing. Citing Alfred Marshall’s book on Industry 
and Trade, published in 1919, he writes that commercial banks ‘are inclined ... to 
venture beyond their strength; especially by carrying to excess the locking up of 
their capital in loans, which cannot be called in under grave emergency. This 
[according to Marshall], was the result of their intimate relationship with German 
business firms, to whom banks were over-generous in their grants of long-term 
credits, and whom they supported to the limit of their strength in the issue of shares 
and bonds.’2 Similar to Shonfield, Hallett also believes that the institutional 
characteristics of German banks in interplay with three other distinctive features of 
the ‘German model’ (a decentralised constitution, an independent central bank, and 
a legally enforced system of industrial democracy and industrial training) ‘must be 
given most of the praise, or blame, for West German economic performance.’3 
Mentioning the role of German banks as monitors, next to their role of providing 
funds, Hallett remarks on the great importance of bank loans, saying ‘The banks 
helped to rebuild German industry ... after 1948. Firms rely extensively on loans, as 
against equity finance, and the banks exercise an important monitoring role through 
their representatives on the Supervisory Board. ... the role of the banks tends to 
counter ‘short termism’, and provides a mechanism for reorganizing management in 
good time, when a company starts running into trouble.’4 Whilst Carrington and 
Edwards write, ‘The relative integration of banking and business in West Germany 
has helped create a confidence-creating financial-industrial system, through the 
greater commitment of financial institutions to providing funds for industrial 
growth.’5
1 A. Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance o f Public and Private 
Power, (London, 1965), pp. 241 and 247.
2 Ibid., p. 247.
3 G. Hallett, ‘West Germany’, in: A. Graham and A. Seldon (eds.), Government and 
Economies in the Postwar World, (London, 1990), pp. 80-81.
4 Ibid., p. 83.
5 J. C. Carrington and G. T. Edwards, Financing Industrial Investment, (London, 1979), 
p. 151.
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As much as the central role of banks in Germany and the importance of bank 
loans for investment finance is attributed a crucial role in German economic 
success, the Anglo-Saxon ‘market based’ system has often been criticised of having 
failed to encourage a high rate of long term industrial investment, particularly in 
Great Britain. Carrington and Edwards claim that ‘It can hardly be doubted that the 
sources of industrial investment capital ... are more adequate in [bank based 
systems] than they are in the USA or the UK. It is also difficult to deny the 
observation that those nations with high debt ratios in the capital structure of their 
companies have been most successful in the economic growth league tables.’6
Comparing the role of German banks to the role banks played in Great Britain, 
Shonfield writes, ‘The big banks have always seen it as their business to take an 
overall view of the long-term trend in any industry in which they were concerned, 
and then to press individual firms to conform to certain broad lines of development. 
They saw themselves essentially as the grand strategist of the nation’s industry, 
whereas the British banks, by contrast, were content to act as its quartermaster 
general. There is no doubt that the British banks were, and are, extremely 
responsive to changing business needs, once these needs have been recognized by 
the businessmen themselves and clearly stated. The Germans are probably less 
responsive; but they anticipate, and sometimes no doubt cause the business needs to 
appear.’7 Carrington and Edwards point out that the lower gearing ratios found in 
Anglo-Saxon companies are due to high rates of internal funding and a relative 
absence of debt, rather than a greater reliance on the stock market. According to 
them, ‘... there are two types of capital structure. The Anglo-Saxon capital structure 
seems to rest upon low debt and high equity-ratios, where most new company 
investment is financed from the internal sources of depreciation and retained profits, 
with the stock market acting as a relatively small source of new investment funds. 
The alternative western capitalist tradition, as operated in Japan and West Germany, 
has a high debt and low equity capital structure, where a major source of the new 
long-term company investment is bank loans ... where depreciation of assets
6 Ibid., p. 191.
7 Shonfield, Modem Capitalism, p. 261.
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previously acquired through debt is a large source of internal investment funds, and 
where the stock market also provides a relatively small source of new investment 
funds.’8 Thus, according to Carrington and Edwards the capital structure of 
companies in bank based systems differ from the capital structure prevalent in 
market based systems in that they use more bank debt, but they do not differ 
significantly in their reliance on external equity.
Dyson points out that German companies ‘exhibited a clear preference for 
reliance on internal funds and for a high liquidity position’ since the recession in 
1974. In contrast, he finds external finance had been crucial during periods of 
expansion, reaching 40.4 per cent in 1968. Quoting figures for the late 1960s/early 
1970s, he finds that ‘Most striking is the composition of external funding. German 
industry is traditionally highly ‘geared’, that is equity of German corporations forms 
only a low proportion of their total assets. Shares and bonds are of relatively minor 
importance as means of raising funds, accounting respectively for 6 and 4 per cent 
during the period 1968-73 and 4.4 and 0.4 per cent in 1976. More important have 
been banks loans (60 per cent in 1968-73, and 32.7 per cent in 1976), and in 
particular long-term bank loans (39 per cent in 1968-76) and 21.5 per cent in 1976. 
.... Tax concession have played an important role in encouraging this process [of 
attracting household savings into medium and long-term saving deposits and 
bonds].’9
By contrast, Edwards and Fischer voice a more cautious view about the 
perceived merits of the German banking system. They question the conventional 
wisdom that, ‘The ‘bank-based’ German system of finance for investment... made 
an important contribution to the successful performance of the German economy 
during the ‘economic miracle’ following the Second World War.’10 They point out 
‘the empirical basis for claims made about the significant contribution of the 
German system of investment finance to German economic success in the post-1945
8 Carrington and Edwards, Financing Industrial Investment, p. 191.
9 K. Dyson, ‘The State, Banks and Industry: The West German Case’, in A. Cox (ed.),
State, Finance and Industry, (Brighton, 1986), pp. 128-129.
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period takes the form of simple correlations - German economic performance has 
been superior to that of the UK, German investment as a proportion of GDP has 
been higher than in the UK, and the German system of finance and investment is 
different from that in the UK ... it is impossible to conclude anything about the 
contribution of the German financial system to German economic performance on 
the basis of simple correlations which do not take account of other possible 
influences.’11 They argue that empirical evidence on the merits of the bank-based 
German system of finance for investment suggests that the common view has 
largely overrated the contribution of the German system of business finance to 
economic success.
This thesis looks beyond the role banks might have played in companies’ 
financing decision and in promoting economic growth as it incorporates effects of 
the 1948 currency reform and public policy measures on companies’ funding 
behaviour. The thesis argues that the characteristics of the early post war period 
suggest that West German companies were in greater need of external funds during 
the period of the Wirtschaftswunder than during the comparatively stable and 
modest growth period experienced since the early 1970s. Results of a sample of 79 
non financial West German public limited companies suggest that bank loans 
constituted a smaller proportion of external funds between 1952 and 1965 than 
commonly perceived, whilst capital market funds played a more important role 
during the early post war period than during its succeeding decades. Furthermore, 
the thesis supports findings of studies covering the 1970s and 1980s which suggest 
that internal funds have shown a tendency to increase in importance over the post 
war period, for results suggest that internal funding was relatively less important 
during the immediate post war period than in more recent decades. Thus, the thesis 
argues that retained earnings and bank loans insufficiently portray West German 
public limited companies’ financing behaviour during the early post war period. 
This argument suggests that a wider perspective is required in order to obtain a
10 J. Edwards and K. Fischer, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany, (Cambridge, 
1994), p. 1.
11 Ibid., p. 6.
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more accurate picture of the financing behaviour of West German public limited 
companies, and the role of financial institutions in providing external funds.
The role of financial institutions in promoting growth has become a major 
focus of interest during recent years. However, the common perception that West 
Germany is a ‘bank based’ system in which capital markets only play a minor part 
has narrowed the research interest in the German case on potential benefits of the 
institutional features of a universal banking system. For instance, there exists a wide 
array of literature on the role of bankers’ holding seats on the supervisory board of 
companies and their potential effects on overcoming information asymmetries.12 
Furthermore, it is often stressed that German banks have significant control of the 
equity voting rights in German companies, largely through the proxy votes they 
exercise on behalf of individual shareholders who deposit their shares with banks. It 
is argued that such voting rights give banks the ability to influence the composition 
of other shareholder representatives on supervisory boards. This institutional 
arrangement is seen as having the potential to reduce the agency costs involved in 
the owner-manager relationship for large firms.13 The system of German universal 
banking has also been argued to deter hostile take-overs which have often been 
perceived as inferior mechanisms of monitoring and replacing management 
compared to the German mechanism which operates via the banks through their 
control of equity voting rights and positions on supervisory boards.14
By focusing research attention on the role of banks in Germany, little is known 
about the development of the West German capital market and about the capital 
structure of West German companies. Furthermore, the majority of studies on the 
German financial system omits the crucial early post World War II years as they
12 See for instance, J. P. Charkham, Keeping Good Company, (Oxford, 1994), pp. 22-25; 
Dyson, ‘The State, Banks and Industry: The West German Case’, pp. 121 and 130-131; 
Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, pp. 247-253; J. Kocka, ‘The Rise of the Modem Industrial 
Enterprise in Germany’, in: A. D. Chandler Jr. and H. Daems, Managerial Hierarchies, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1980), p. 91.
13 See for instance J. Cable, ‘Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: 
The Role of West German Banks’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 95 (March, 1985), p. 121; 
as well as literature cited in previous footnote.
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focus either on the period of industrialisation or on the more recent decades starting 
with the 1970s. This approach has opened a gap in literature in the sense that it has 
narrowed our knowledge of the German financial system to the role of banks in the 
late nineteenth/early twentieth and the late twentieth centuries. The study attempts 
to fill this gap by addressing a number of factors which have affected the 
development of West German financial institutions during the early post World War 
II period and by analysing the financing behaviour of West German public limited 
companies. In particular, the thesis seeks to illuminate the interplay between state, 
banks, and the capital market in financing investments during the 1950s and 1960s. 
After outlining the basic function and role of the financial system in a capitalist 
economy, the thesis investigates two major events which greatly affected the 
financial circumstances of the German state, consumers and companies during the 
early post war period: the 1948 currency reform, and the policy of partial price 
controls in combination with public investment programmes.
Most existing literature which touches upon the financing of capital formation 
in West Germany during the early post war period has confined its analysis to the 
role of the government and the importance of public investment programmes in 
providing external funding and in promoting growth.15 However, by restricting the 
analysis to these issues a significant proportion of external financial sources for 
investment remain unexplained. Moreover, these studies have failed to incorporate 
the potential importance of financial institutions in promoting growth. Chapter four 
builds upon the knowledge acquired by the literature on the role of public policies 
and employs its findings in order to obtain an understanding of how governmental 
policies and investment programmes affected the development of financial 
institutions during the early post war period.
14 See references in Edwards and Fischer, Banks, Finance and Investment, pp. 4-5 and p. 
11.
15 See for instance F. G. Reuss, Fiscal Policy for Growth without Inflation: The German 
Experiment, (Baltimore, 1963); K. W. Roskamp, Capital Formation in West Germany, 
(Detroit, 1965); M. Pohl, Wiederaufbau: Kunst und Technik der Finanzierung 1947-1953, 
(Frankfurt a. M., 1973); H. R. Adamsen., Investitionshilfe fur die Ruhr: Wiederaufbau,
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The thesis identifies two major events which affected the development of the 
West German financial system and influenced companies’ financing behaviour: the 
1948 currency reform and the policy of partial price controls which was 
accompanied by a number of public interventions and investment programmes. A 
comprehensive analysis of the 1948 West German currency reform reveals 
essentially three issues. First, it shows that the different conversion of monetary 
assets severely altered the relative wealth composition of the West German 
economy. The conversion procedure turned public authorities from the biggest 
debtor into the biggest creditor and endowed banks with immediate liquidity which 
allowed them to take up their role as financial intermediaries right from the start of 
the post reform period. Second, the currency reform altered companies’ capital sheet 
structure as monetary assets were significantly more devalued than real assets. This 
finding offers an alternative interpretation of the observation that West German 
public limited companies significantly increased their gearing ratios during the early 
post war period, as it shows that companies entered the post war period with gearing 
ratios lowered by external events. And third, the lengthy procedure of converting 
balance sheets from Reichsmark into Deutsch Mark and of identifying the rightful 
owners of capital market securities limited the role of the West German capital 
markets as securities could only be issued and traded when and to the extent balance 
sheets had been converted and owners of securities had been identified. Thus, the 
different speed of converting monetary and real assets provided banks with an 
advantage over the capital market. Since previous studies on the 1948 currency 
reform narrowed their analysis to the conversion of monetary assets, they have 
failed to recognise the wider scope of the currency reform both with respect to its 
effect on the financing behaviour of West German companies and with respect to its 
effect on the development of the West German financial system.
Although the currency reform was accompanied with a lifting of price controls 
for most goods, public authorities decided to keep price controls in place for 
products provided by the basic goods industry, and other industries considered
Verbande und Soziale Marktwirtschaft 1948-1952, (Wuppertal, 1981); and A. S. Milward, 
The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951, (Cambridge, 1984).
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crucial to the development of the economy. The decision of keeping part of the 
economy under price control was taken in response to demands by the occupation 
authorities who controlled most of the price controlled sectors. The occupation 
authorities demanded partial price control out of fear of inflationary pressures and 
as part of their retaliation policy, and the German authorities agreed to them in 
exchange and anticipation of foreign aid. However, it soon materialised that foreign 
aid funds were not sufficient in providing price controlled sectors with their funding 
requirements. Therefore, public authorities introduced a number of discriminatory 
measures which effectively divided the capital market into two sectors, as these 
measures favoured investment in price controlled sectors at the expense of ‘free 
market price’ sectors. Furthermore, it is argued that the political decision of 
compelling free market price industries to divert some of their profits into public 
investment programmes contributed to the assertion that West German free market 
price industries had internal funds in abundance. Within the context of public 
policies particular emphasis is placed on public investment programmes and 
regulatory issues which affected the development of the West German capital 
market and the financing behaviour of companies. As the thesis concentrates on 
investment programmes promoted by the public sector, it does not attempt to 
provide an overall picture of public efforts to further capital formation.
Findings by the thesis that West German public limited companies appear to 
have relied to a greater extent on external funding, and in particular on capital 
market funding, in the immediate post currency reform period than during 
succeeding years seem particularly startling when considering that the capital 
market was only gradually freed from restrictions which had been introduced from 
the early 1930s onwards. However, incorporating issues such as the currency reform 
and considering that West German companies faced extraordinary investment 
requirements in order to overcome distortions created by the war and the following 
turbulences highlights the fact that funding requirements during the early post war 
period differed considerably from companies’ funding situation during the 
following years. With respect to financial requirements of companies, the 
immediate post war period may have more in common with the period of 
industrialisation. For instance, Kocka observes about the period of German
20
industrialisation, ‘... the German corporate banks acted as mechanism for the 
mobilization of scattered savings and channeled them into German industrial 
enterprises, which depended more heavily on the capital market than their 
counterparts in Britain and the United States. Gradually, as expansion and merger 
became more frequent and more significant than the establishment of new 
enterprises, long-term credit became the main basis of the banks’ relationship with 
industry. ... In the early twentieth century, the rate of self-financing - that is, of the 
use of retained earnings, rather than outside capital, to pay for expansion - in the 
large manufacturing firms increased. As a result, enterprises became more and more 
independent of the capital market and thus of banks.’16 However, the suggestion of a 
relative importance of capital market funding during the early post war years should 
not disguise the institutional importance of West German banks. West German 
banks played an important role as provider of bank loans immediately after the 
currency reform and were important institutional investors in capital market 
securities at a time when low liquidity deterred other investors from investing in 
capital market securities.
West Germany’s economic growth process during the early post war period 
was an event for which no simple explanation can be given. As mentioned, most 
previous literature on this period has emphasised the contribution of public 
authorities in this process. This has had the unfortunate effect of camouflaging the 
contribution of the financial system to this rapid economic expansion. A study on 
the role of financial institutions in the economic growth process of the early post 
war period may therefore help fill this gap. It is not claimed that financial 
institutions were the main cause of economic growth experienced in West Germany 
during the period of the Wirtschaftswunder but that it was a cause among many 
which seems to be too important to be overlooked.
16 Kocka, ‘The Rise of the Modem Industrial Enterprise in Germany’, pp. 90 and 92.
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2. The influence of financial development on growth and 
factors affecting capital structure
2.1. Introduction
The following chapter sets out to establish why it is important to understand the 
financing behaviour of companies. The chapter discusses a number of seminal 
papers on the relationship between financial development and economic growth and 
on the relevance of capital structure in imperfect markets in order to investigate why 
the issue of the financing behaviour of companies is an important one. There are 
macroeconomic as well as microeconomic reasons why an understanding the 
financing behaviour of companies is important. At a microeconomic level, modem 
capital structure theory has advanced into various areas since the work by 
Modigliani and Miller who found that capital structure is irrelevant in perfect and 
undistorted markets.1 Since then, studies on capital structure have focused on 
identifying the importance of factors that cause market imperfections, and therefore 
make capital structure relevant. While it has been established that capital structure 
matters in the absence of perfect capital markets, the jury is still out whether there 
exists an optimal capital structure. One of the reasons that make the question on 
optimal capital structure so difficult to answer is the fact that equity consists of two 
components, with the internal component of equity being at the top of companies’ 
funding choice as it represents the cheapest source of funding, whilst the external 
equity component in the form of share issues generally represents the most 
expensive source of funding and is therefore at the bottom of companies’ financing 
choice.
At the macroeconomic level, literature argues that the efficiency of financial 
markets, as reflected in the financing behaviour of companies, might be a significant
1 Modigliani, F. and M. H. Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment’ American Economic Review, Vol. XLVIII (1958), No. 3, pp. 261- 
297; Modigliani, F. and M. H. Miller, ‘Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A 
Correction’, American Economic Review, Vol. LIII (1963), No. 3, pp. 435-443.
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determinant of economic growth.2 In addition, macroeconomic literature 
concentrates around the question whether or when one form of financial institution 
is superior to other forms, rather than restricting its focus on the types of securities 
issued. That is, whether and when banks or stock markets are more efficient in 
providing finance.
2.2. The role of financial institutions in the economic historical setting 
of the immediate post war period - an international comparison
Considering that during the early post war period West Germany achieved 
relatively high growth rates both compared to other post war economies, as well as 
compared to later periods, the question arises whether the structure of the German 
financial system played some role in enhancing growth. The thesis argues that the 
German system of financial intermediation fared better in an economic situation 
which prevailed during the early post war period than for later periods as it 
incorporated mechanisms which made it fail to adjust in time to the changing needs 
of companies. The argument follows to some extent the theme of literature for the 
period of industrialisation until World War I, which commonly argues that the 
German institutional arrangement with its system of powerful universal banks was
2 A relationship between financial development and economic growth has long been 
expected, see for instance R. W. Goldsmith, Financial structure and development, (New 
Haven, Ct., 1969), p. 48, who observes a correlation between economic and financial 
development. One of the greatest challenges this set of literature has had to deal with is to 
establish the direction of causality between financial development and growth. While 
recent work has made some advances on this issue by providing empirical evidence that 
financial development causally affects economic growth, the causality does not run 
unambiguously from financial structure to economic growth. Economic growth and 
innovations also affect the structure and development of financial systems. For empirical 
analyses of the linkage between financial development and economic growth, see for 
instance R. G. Rajan and L. Zingales, ‘Financial Dependence and Growth’ American 
Economic Review, Vol. 88 (1998), No. 3, pp. 559-586; R. Levine and S. Zervos, ‘Stock 
Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth’, American Economic Review, Vol. 88 (1998), No. 
3, pp. 537-558; R. G. King and R. Levine, ‘Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth’, 
Journal o f Monetary Economics, Vol. 32 (1993b), pp. 513-542; and R. G. King and R. 
Levine, ‘Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics Vol. CVIII (1993a), No. 3, pp. 717-737.
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more effective in financing industrial investments than, for instance, the rather 
unregulated British financial system.3
The thesis argues that the immediate post World War II period was similar to 
the period of German industrialisation as both periods are characterised by large 
upfront funding needs which had to be raised from widely dispersed investors in 
order to finance extraordinary investment requirements. During the period of 
German industrialisation large upfront funding needs arose in order to overcome the 
relative backwardness of the German economy, whereas during the immediate post 
war period large upfront funding was required in order to overcome distortions 
created by war related disturbances such as territorial losses and the currency reform 
which got delayed by three years due to disagreements among the occupation 
authorities. Another similarity between the period of industrialisation and the 
immediate post war period lies in the fact that investment funds were widely 
dispersed. A large portion of savings had been wiped out by the currency reform, 
whilst years of war and rationing had left the German public with a huge backlog in 
demand for goods. Therefore, the German public entered the post war years with a 
great propensity to consume and a strong preference to keep their savings in highly 
liquid form. The German banking system, supported by tax incentives for savings, 
was able to pool these savings in the form of liquid deposits, mobilising these funds 
for large scale investments. In addition to these private funds, banks were able to 
provide loans out of their own portfolio which mainly consisted of compensation 
claims which banks had been generously endowed with in the course of the 
currency reform in order to compensate them for losses incurred by the cancellation 
of public debt.4
3 See for instance A. Gerschenkron, ‘Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective’, in idem, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: a Book of 
Essays, (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); W. P. Kennedy, ‘Banks and Industry in Anglo-German 
Perspective’, in R. Tilly and P. J. J. Welfens (eds.), European Economic Integration as a 
Challenge to Industry and Government, (Berlin, 1995).
4 The treatment of bank balance sheets in the course of the currency reform is discussed 
in detail in the following chapter.
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In addition, the public sector, which was the biggest saver at the time, 
concentrated a great deal of effort on capital formation, both directly through public 
investment programmes as well as indirectly through measures such as tax 
incentives and special depreciation allowances.5 Although the German authorities 
initially handicapped the capital market in order to ensure investments in publicly 
favoured sectors, it involved the capital market to some extent in its investment 
efforts even during the early post currency reform years. The German banking 
system played a central intermediary function between public investment efforts and 
the role the capital market was delegated to perform in these efforts. For instance, 
commercial banks played an important role in identifying projects suitable for 
public funding. The joint effort between the public and the private sector to raise 
funds for capital formation, and the special role banks played in this effort reiterates 
the importance of banks during the immediate post war period beyond their function 
of pure financial intermediary. This crucial role of banks during the early post war 
period, before personal savings and a change in public policy allowed a revival of 
the capital market, has been pointed out by literature before. Cox, for instance, 
writes, ‘Since the collapse of the financial system in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, a more consensual approach to state, finance and industry relationships 
has developed. ... [TJhere is little doubt that, in the aftermath of the war, the state 
has had to work more closely with the major banks than it had before. ... The banks 
... played a crucial role. Given that there was no significant domestic saving in this 
period, the banks consciously accepted with the government the need to rebuild the 
industrial base of the economy. The banks therefore took commercial risks and 
provided extensive funds for German industry. The recognition of the need to 
ensure West Germany’s industrial future did not abate in the 1950s and 1960s as 
personal savings revived the capital markets.’6
This central role of (privately owned) German banks working closely with the 
state, is one of the peculiarities of the German institutional system. In France, for 
instance, the unwillingness of the commercial banks to countenance long-term
These issues will be discussed in chapter four.
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lending, made it essential for the state to play a more active role in financing 
investments. The unwillingness of long-term lending by French banks dated back to 
a series of bank failures in the nineteenth century which was largely attributable to 
over-investment in high risk industrial enterprises and which prompted French 
banks to adopt a cautious set of guidelines which laid out that ‘credit should only be 
extended when risks were low and a return was guaranteed.’7 In 1946, the three 
largest French commercial banks were nationalised which provided the state with 
more leverage to persuade the banks to place more emphasis on serving the wider 
national interest. However, the nationalised banks remained reluctant to operate as 
industrial bankers and maintained their penchant for short-term lending.8 Until the 
late 1960s, French commercial banks also differed from their German counterparts 
in that they were handicapped by a rigid separation of banking functions which 
divided the sector into three subcategories: (1) deposit banks which were 
discouraged from taking shares in companies and from offering any more than short 
term loans; (2) banques de’affaires (investment or merchant banks) which were 
discouraged from taking deposits; and (3) the medium to long term credit banks 
which were not allowed to take deposits and were to concentrate on providing 
medium term credit in the form of loan capital.9
Although Japanese banks had a long history of industrial banking, they did not 
enjoy the same degree of independence as the German banks after the Second 
World War. Japan’s post war financial system of Japan formed a chain of 
dependency between the state, the commercial banks and individual companies. 
This dependency allowed the state to influence the flow of credit and to implement 
industrial policies which conformed with the state’s main economic objective of 
industrial expansion.10 The American occupation authorities demanded the 
dismantling of this zaibatsu, i. e. the Japanese history of industrial banking with its
6 A. Cox, ‘State, Finance and Industry in Comparative Perspective’, in A. Cox (ed.), 
State, Finance and Industry, (Brighton, 1986), pp. 28-29.
7 D. Green, ‘The State, Finance and Industry in France’, in A. Cox (ed.), State, Finance 
and Industry, (Brighton, 1986), p. 95.
8 Cox, ‘State, Finance and Industry’, p. 21.
9 Green, ‘The State, Finance and Industry in France’, pp. 91-92.
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combination of commercial, financial and industrial capital through interlocking 
directorships and holding companies. The dismantling of the zaibatsu and the 
discrediting of the military in the aftermath of the war left a gap in the relationship 
between finance and industry. The state bureaucrats stepped into this gap 
introducing detailed controls over the provision and price of credit. The 
independence of Japanese commercial banks was further hampered by a liquidity 
crisis after the war which forced them to rely increasingly on the Bank of Japan. 
The newly established Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) which 
played an important part in the state’s effort of rebuilding the Japanese economy 
and in keeping the commercial banks subservient to the state’s investment 
objectives ensured that commercial banks continued to face liquidity problems as it 
restricted their ability to retain deposits while at the same time encouraged banks to 
provide long-term loans to those large firms and industrial sectors - initially in 
capital intensive production - which it had earmarked as the future driving force of 
the Japanese economy. By moulding a financial system which kept savers and 
investors separated state agencies and in particular the MITI reserved themselves a 
key intermediary role. In other words, Japan did not nationalise its financial 
institutions but created a situation in which the MITI could act as financial 
intermediary between savers, banks and industry.11 Japan behaved similar to 
Germany in the early 1950s in that it adopted an industrial strategy which 
emphasised the growth potential of large firms in capital intensive manufacturing 
processes. However, in contrast to Germany, Japan whose financial system had 
been altered by the dismantling of the zaibatsu imposed numerous indirect control 
mechanisms on its banking system to ensure investments in earmarked projects. 
Japanese banks were encouraged to over-lend to maintain the rate of expansion of 
industry and in the process they became dependent on the Bank of Japan. 
Meanwhile, German authorities trusted in a close cooperation with the banking 
sector, with its long established relationships to industry, and in its efforts to rebuild 
the economy. As such, German banks faced comparatively little dirigisme by the
10 B. Eccleston, ‘The State, Finance and Industry in Japan’, in A. Cox. (ed.), State, 
Finance and Industry, (Brighton, 1986), pp. 60-61.
11 Cox, ‘State, Finance and Industry’, p. 17-18 and Eccleston, ‘The State, Finance and 
Industry in Japan’, pp. 62-65.
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state during the immediate post war period other than limits imposed on interest 
rates, loans and deposits.
2.3. Financial development and economic growth
The following section discusses theories on the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. It identifies the prime functions of financial 
institutions and shows how financial services can expand the scope and improve the 
efficiency of innovative activity.12 Financial institutions affect growth by providing 
funds which alters the rate of physical capital accumulation and by evaluating 
projects which leads to productivity growth. Financial institutions enhance capital 
accumulation because they are able to pool funds from many small individual 
savers, mobilising sufficient funds for large scale projects, and because they reduce 
the fraction of savings held in the form of unproductive liquid assets. By accepting a 
large number of deposits, the demand for withdrawals becomes more predicable, 
which allows financial intermediaries to economise on liquid reserve holdings that 
do not contribute to capital accumulation.13 In other words, the fraction of saving 
which does not reach investment is reduced.14
However, raising funds, though necessary, is not sufficient to enhance growth. 
When financing investments it is also important to identify those projects which 
appear to be promising. Financial institutions can provide these research and 
evaluative services more effectively and less expensively than individual investors.
12 The following discussion of the role of financial institutions has benefited most from 
studies by R. Levine, ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’, 
Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 35 (1997), No. 2, pp. 688-726; M. Pagano, ‘Financial 
Markets and Growth: An Overview’, European Economic Review, Vol. 37 (1993), pp. 613- 
622; and V. R. Bencivenga and B. D. Smith, ‘Financial Intermediation and Endogenous 
Growth’, Review of Economic Studies Vol. 58 (1991), pp. 195-209.
13 In addition, by providing external funding, the self financing requirement is reduced, 
which prevents liquidation of investments by entrepreneurs who find that they need 
liquidity.
14 The presence of intermediaries may also alter the saving rate. The sign, however, is 
ambiguous. For instance, while greater risk sharing might reduce saving rates, a narrowing 
spread in interest rates in the presence of a competitive financial system is likely to
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It follows that financial intermediaries increase the productivity o f capital as they 
collect information on alternative investment projects, identifying the most 
promising ones. Furthermore, financial institutions do not only provide ex ante 
checks of projects they also carry out ex post monitoring.15
In addition to raising funds and identifying promising projects, financial 
institutions offer a third service in that they dilute liquidity risks for investors by 
augmenting the liquidity of long term investments.16 This service ensures that high 
return projects are not only identified but that they are also provided with funding. 
High return investments often require long term commitment of capital, but savers 
do not like to relinquish control of their savings for a long period. Therefore, less 
investment is likely to occur in high return projects if the liquidity of long term 
investments fails to be augmented.17 Financial institutions are able to divert the 
liquidity risk of investors as they enable investors to hold assets in the form of 
liquid financial instruments - such as shares, bonds or bank deposits - which they 
can quickly and easily sell if  they seek access to their savings. These liquid financial 
instruments are then transformed into long term capital investments in illiquid 
production processes. The liquidity transformation endows investors with liquid 
assets, while firms have permanent access to the capital invested. Furthermore, 
financial instruments allow investors to diversify risks, thus mitigating the 
idiosyncratic risks associated with individual investments. As high return projects 
tend to be riskier than low return projects and investors are generally risk averse, 
financial institutions that ease risk diversification induce a portfolio shift toward 
projects with higher expected returns. Therefore, financial intermediaries allocate 
savings more efficiently, as they induce individuals to invest in riskier but more
increase saving rates. A comprehensive analysis of various factors affecting saving rates 
can be found in Pagano, ‘Financial Markets’, pp. 616-619.
15 The role of financial markets in monitoring firms is discussed in greater detail below.
16 Liquidity risk arises due to the uncertainties associated with converting assets into a 
medium of exchange. With liquid financial markets, it is relatively inexpensive to trade 
financial instruments and there is little uncertainty about the timing and settlement of those 
trades.
17 High return projects often have a long gestation period which requires that ownership 
is transferred throughout the life of the production process in secondary securities markets. 
If exchanging ownership claims is costly, then longer run production technologies will be 
less attractive. Therefore liquidity affects production decisions.
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productive technologies by providing risk sharing through the creation of small 
denomination financial instruments which provide investors with the opportunity to 
hold diversified portfolios, invest in efficient scale projects, and to increase asset 
liquidity.
In summary, financial systems improve the efficiency of allocating resources, 
by providing the following services: they mobilise savings, identify promising 
projects, and allocate resources to high return but illiquid projects by transforming 
them into liquid, easily tradable financial instruments, which reduce liquidity risk 
and facilitate risk diversification. In addition, financial institutions monitor and 
exert corporate control. By identifying and providing funds to innovative and high 
return projects, financial institutions improve the efficiency of capital allocation and 
encourage innovative activity which enhances productivity and therefore economic 
growth.
2.4. Empirical findings on potential links between financial systems 
and economic development
Over recent years several studies have tried to measure empirically the links 
between financial systems and the pace of economic development. King and Levine 
have found that economies with better developed financial systems stimulate faster 
productivity growth and growth in per capita output and that the level of financial 
development predicts future growth and future productivity advances.18 They also 
argue that in an environment in which returns to innovation are lowered due to 
public interventions such as high corporate profit taxes or shifts in the enforcement 
of property rights companies demand fewer financial services. In other words, 
developments in innovative and productive sectors affect financial development.19 
However, the measurements they use in order to identify links between financial 
development and growth only allow inferences about the role of banks in promoting 
growth.
18 King and Levine, ‘Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth’, p. 528.
19 Ibid., p. 527.
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Demirgiic-Kunt and Maksimovic focus on stock markets function of 
aggregating information.20 They find that with an increased development of the 
stock market, companies tend to substitute equity for debt financing as the better 
information available induces lenders to extend credit to companies whose stock is 
traded. This finding reconciles the puzzling results of studies which suggest that 
companies in more capital market oriented countries tend to have higher leverage 
than companies in bank oriented countries.
Levine and Zervos measure the potential effects of stock market and bank 
development on growth. They find that both stock market liquidity and bank 
development are positively correlated with current and future growth rates, capital 
accumulation, and productivity growth. Furthermore, the major channel through 
which growth is linked to stock markets and banks is through productivity growth, 
not capital stock growth.21 They also point out that it is stock market liquidity and 
not the size of the stock market nor stock return volatility that significantly affects 
growth which reinforces the information effect argument suggested by Demirgiic- 
Kunt and Maksimovic.22 Moreover, they stress that bank lending to the private 
sector has a strong independent effect on growth. Their finding that both stock 
market liquidity as well as bank development positively affects growth rates 
indicates that banks provide different financial services from those provided by 
stock markets. This suggests that the impediment of one part of the financial sector 
may carry potentially large economic costs.23
Raj an and Zingales report that countries with better developed financial 
systems have a comparative advantage in industries which are more dependent on 
external finance, and since new entrants are likely to be in greater need for external 
funds, there are more new entrants in countries with well developed financial
20 A. Demirgiic-Kunt and V. Maksimovic, ‘Stock Market Development and Firm 
Financing Choices’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (1995), No. 1461, pp.
23-24.
21 Levine and Zervos, ‘Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth’, p. 547.
22 Ibid., p. 549.
23 Ibid., p. 547 and p. 554.
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systems. This finding suggests financial development could influence growth by 
disproportionately improving the prospects of young companies.24 This leads them 
to the conclusion that the level of financial development may be a factor in 
determining the size composition of an industry as well as its concentration. 
Furthermore, they find evidence for the theoretical argument that financial 
intermediaries reduce financial market imperfections as they reduce the costs of 
external finance, narrowing the gap between internal and external funds.25
Carlin and Mayer estimate whether country structures such as bank-company 
relations, the development of capital markets, the concentration o f ownership, and 
legal systems affect the characteristics of a country’s industry as measured by 
growth, fixed capital formation and R&D expenditure.26 They find a strong 
interaction between the structure of the financial sector in a country and the 
structure of its corporate sector. Similar to Levine and Zervos, they find that the 
structure of the financial sector has little effect on the growth o f capital stock, 
whereas they find significant relations between the structure of the financial sector 
and growth as well as R&D expenditure. Furthermore, they confirm results 
suggested by Levine and Zervos, as they find a difference between banking and 
stock market systems in their nature of interaction with industrial activity. In 
particular, they find that bank finance is unaffected by accounting standards, while 
R&D expenditures appear to depend more on the development of the capital market 
than on a country’s bank characteristics. Carlin and Mayer also suggest bank 
oriented systems and ownership concentration are particularly relevant to the 
financing of companies in the early stage of economic development. With regards to 
the question whether bank oriented systems or capital market oriented systems are 
more efficient in providing financial services, they conclude that it depends on the 
stage of the development of an economy.
24 Rajan and Zingales, ‘Financial Dependence and Growth’, p. 560 and pp. 578-580.
25 Ibid, p. 583.
26 W. Carlin and C. Mayer, ‘Finance, Investment and Growth’, mimeo, (University 
College, London and Said Business School, University of Oxford, 1998).
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Nickell et al. estimate the impact of high debt levels (which they call financial 
market pressure), product market competition, and shareholder control on 
productivity growth. Analysing a sample of UK manufacturing companies, they 
find that if the dominant shareholder is an external financial institution, this has a 
positive impact on productivity growth, while if the dominant shareholder is also 
managing the firm, it has no effect, and if the main shareholder is external, but a 
non financial company, it has a negative effect on productivity growth. Thus, their 
findings suggest that financial institutions are able to impose some managerial 
discipline and thereby generate higher productivity growth.27 They also find that 
financial market pressure and competition are positively related to productivity 
growth. Furthermore, their findings suggest that financial market pressure and 
dominant external shareholding may substitute for competition, as the impact of 
competition on productivity growth is lower when companies are under financial 
pressure or when they have a dominant external shareholder.28
2.5. Stock markets versus banks
It has long been argued that whether banks or stock markets are more efficient 
in providing financial services depends on the level of development of the economy. 
Gerschenkron was probably the first influential exponent who emphasised that 
different economic circumstances facilitate the development of different financial 
systems.29 Since then, a number of authors have tried to reconcile the finding that 
different financial institutional patterns persist across countries and to generalise 
their effects on economic development.30 For the period of industrialisation until 
World War I, it is commonly argued that the German institutional arrangement with
27 S. Nickell et al., ‘What Makes Firms Perform Well?’, European Economic Review, 
Vol. 41 (1997), pp. 790-791.
28 Ibid., pp. 793-794.
29 Gerschenkron, ‘Economic Backwardness’, pp. 5-31.
30 For a list of references on this subject see for instance R. H. Tilly, ‘Banking 
Institutions in Historical and Comparative Perspective: Germany, Great Britain and the 
United States in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century’, Journal o f Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics (Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft), Vol. 145 (1989), 
pp. 189-209; and Edwards and Ogilvie, ‘Universal Banks and German Industrialization’, 
pp. 427-446.
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its system of powerful universal banks was more effective in financing risky 
industrial investments than the rather unregulated British financial system. 
Gerschenkron claims that the emergence of the German financial system was due to 
the country’s relative backwardness. He argues that the relative backwardness 
required the raising of large up-front funding from a great number of dispersed 
investors. This need of raising large amounts of funds shaped the institutional 
structure of German banks creating a new type of bank - the ‘universal bank’- which 
combined investment and commercial banking activities.31 Gerschenkron provides 
the following explanation for the development of different financial systems.32
The industrialization of England had proceeded without any substantial utilization of 
banking for long-term investment purposes. The more gradual character of the 
industrialization process and the more considerable accumulation of capital, first from 
earnings in trade and modernized agriculture and later from industry itself, obviated the 
pressure for developing any special institutional devices for provision of long-term capital 
to industry. By contrast, in a relatively backward country capital is scarce and diffused, the 
distrust of industrial activities is considerable, and, finally, there is greater pressure for 
bigness because of the scope of the industrialization movement, the larger average size of 
plant, and the concentration of industrialization processes on branches of relatively high 
ratios of capital to output. ... It is the pressure of these circumstances which essentially 
gave rise to the divergent development in banking over large portions of the Continent as 
against England. The continental practices in the field of industrial investment banking 
must be conceived as specific instruments of industrialization in a backward country.
Other authors go further in their analysis when assessing the role of financial 
institutions in providing finance to growth promoting industries. For instance, 
Kennedy points out that the efficiency of the German universal banking system was 
not limited to its ability to provide large scale funding, but that is was better able to 
overcome informational asymmetries by providing objective external indication of 
worth.33 In contrast, ‘the British industry depended upon a direct appeal to investors 
through public financial markets, with minimal institutional intervention and 
regulation. If the public were in a perceptive mood, much money could be raised 
quickly in this manner. However, in the absence of reliable intermediation and with 
little regulation it was difficult to sustain and develop this enthusiasm when 
problems arose. ... Accordingly it was often difficult to raise external finance when
31 Gerschenkron, ‘Economic Backwardness’, p. 13.
32 Ibid., p. 14.
33 Kennedy, ‘Banks and Industry’, p. 441.
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it was most needed.’34 And Hannah writes, ‘Historians have also criticised the 
performance of the British capital market [during the period of industrialisation], 
especially in allocating resources to new industries. Despite the existence of a 
securities market in Britain that was more highly developed than similar markets in 
the United States and Germany, some maintain that market institutions performed 
their primary functions of bearing risks and encouraging innovations less efficiently 
than large corporations or industrial banks elsewhere.’35 Yet other authors claim that 
during industrialisation German banks distorted resource allocation by virtue of 
their concentration on heavy industry, resulting in a lower growth rate than would 
otherwise have been achieved.36 Capie and Collins question the claim that there 
existed a strong relationship between German banks and industry during the period 
of industrialisation, and whether economic performance was better than would have 
been the case in the absence of the .relationship.37
In contrast to the above mentioned claims on the weak performance of the 
British financial system in providing funds to industry during the industrial 
revolution, a report by the Bank of England on the role of the British capital market 
in providing funds after the Second World War puts the British financial system in a 
more positive light, at least during the early post war period. The report claims, ‘For 
much of the 1950s and early 1960s, the financing needs of private industry and 
trade were readily met within [the] financial system ... companies’ requirements for 
outside finance were met without the appearance of undue pressure, notably through 
the provision of equity finance and fixed-interest loans for the larger firms by the 
capital markets, and of overdraft finance for firms of all sizes by the banks. During 
the late 1960s and 1970s, however, the financial climate became increasingly harsh.
34 Ibid, pp. 440-441.
35 L. Hannah, ‘Visible and Invisible Hands in Great Britain’, in: A. D. Chandler Jr. and 
H. Daems, Managerial Hierarchies, (Cambridge, Mass, 1980), p. 65.
36 H. Neuburger and H. H. Stokes, ‘German Banks and German Growth, 1883-1913: an 
Empirical View’, Journal o f Economic History, Vol. 34 (1974), No. 3, pp. 730-731.
37 F. Capie and M. Collins, Have the Banks Failed British Industry ?, (London, 1992), pp.
24-27.
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... The long-term capital and equity markets to which companies had previously 
turned for funds fell into disuse. ...,38
The debate over whether there exists a superior financial system arose again in 
response to the take-over frenzy experienced in the Anglo-Saxon countries during 
the 1980s.39 In the 1980s, many observers of this development voiced the view that 
the absence of these activities in bank dominated countries might suggest that banks 
are better in monitoring companies and in exerting corporate control than stock 
markets, in that they intervene in the management of a company before the value of 
a firm is destroyed to the extent which makes take-overs profitable. However, lately 
the perception of the efficiency of take-overs has changed, with sentiments shifting 
in favour of take-overs. This shift in sentiments coincides with the growing 
recognition of the need for the most appropriate financial strategy, where take-overs 
are considered to change the financial strategy of the business in a way which 
enhances shareholder value. According to this view, Anglo-Saxon style take-overs 
may be more effective in generating efficiency enhancing corporate structures than 
German style banking systems (especially if banks themselves face only weak 
incentives to secure high returns from their own investment activities). Whereas the 
close relationship between German banks and companies are considered to facilitate 
corporate control, this kind of relationship is also likely to reduce the probability of 
aggressive actions in case a company is undervalued, in particular if  banks are 
stakeholders and the ownership of a company has to change in order for a required 
change in business or financial strategy to be implemented. In other words, although 
banks play a role in monitoring management, they appear to be less important in 
determining which management team should be in power. This form of disciplining
38 M. Lisle-Williams, ‘The State, Finance and Industry in Britain’, in A. Cox (ed.), State, 
Finance and Industry, (Brighton, 1986), p. 241.
39 At this point it seems appropriate to mention that studies which have deatl with the 
question of which financial system is more efficient in promoting growth almost 
exclusively concentrate on eras of rapid technological changes such as the industrial 
revolution and the more recent information technology revolution. There is a disconcerting 
absence of studies which have focused on the role of banks versus stock markets in the 
period between these two revolutions. See Kennedy, ‘Banks and Industry’, p. 451 on the 
absence of literature on the linkage between financial systems and the real economy for the 
German post war period.
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appears to be better performed via the market for corporate control in which 
management is contested through take-overs.40
According to Allen, the choice of what kind of financial institution is most 
appropriate to enhance economic growth depends on the stage of the economy. 
Allen argues that repetition of the decision making process is valuable if  no 
consensus consists on how firms should be run.41 Divergence of opinions is most 
likely to occur in oligopolistic or monopolistic industries when there is a long 
period between the adoption of policies and the time that their success or failure is 
realised and where technological changes are important and rapid.42 In these cases, 
Allen suggests that stock markets are better able to allocate resources efficiently as 
they carry out repetitive checks. In contrast, repetition of monitoring by stock 
market participants may be a waste of resources for competitive and mature 
industries, where a wide disagreement on optimal policies is less likely to occur and 
management is disciplined by a competitive environment.43 When duplication does 
not result in improved monitoring, that is when monitoring needs to be done by 
only one party, banks may be more efficient providers of financial funds.44 The 
advantage of choosing a bank as the single monitor lies in the fact that it mitigates 
the problem of who monitors the monitor, as a bank can guarantee that it is 
undertaking the cost of monitoring by promising a certain return to its depositors. If 
it did not monitor, it would be unable to make the promised payment to the 
depositor.45
Considering the role of banks and stock markets under this premise, the 
question arises whether the West German early post war period is better 
characterised as an era of rapid technological changes and by oligopolistic
40 Gorton and Schmid, ‘Universal Banking’, p. 1.
41 F. Allen, ‘Stock Markets and Resource Allocation’, in C. Mayer and X. Vives (eds.), 
Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation, (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 88-89.
42 Ibid., p. 92.
43 The number of companies and their maturity ensures a large pool of data which 
facilitates determining optimal action.
44 Allen, ‘Stock Markets’, pp. 86-89.
45 Ibid., p. 86 and p. 101 quoting D. Diamond, ‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated 
Monitoring’, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51 (1984), pp. 393-394.
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industries, or as a period when most important achievements were mainly in 
existing and competitive industries rather than in entirely new ones. It is probably 
safe to argue that the West German early post war period is better described by the 
latter characterisation. In as far as one subscribes to the argument that bank based 
systems are more efficient in providing finance to competitive industries with well 
understood technologies, one could argue - on the basis of Allen’s argument 
outlined above - that the West German economy was well served by its bank based 
financial system, both during the period of industrialisation as well as during the 
early post war period.
Indeed, the early post war period and the period of industrialisation have in 
common that companies were in need of large scale external funding for 
investments in relatively well understood technologies. Whereas during the German 
industrial revolution, large external funds were required in order to catch up with 
more advanced countries, the early post war period was in need of large scale 
external funding because the war, the loss of territory, and the delayed currency 
reform, diluted companies’ internal funds and generated a need for extraordinary 
investments.
However, as the ‘old’ economy matured and the relation between internal 
resources and future opportunities balanced for existing industries, it appears that 
the German financial system was slow in adapting to the changing circumstances. In 
particular, it is asserted that the powerful and economically entrenched German 
banking system prevented the development of a more potent capital market, and 
therefore contributed to the comparative lack of innovative activities, as capital 
markets are perceived to be more adequate in financing new technologies.46
In addition to the above cited studies on challenges banks face in an 
environment of rapid technological change, Dyson points out, ‘Faced by new, 
rapidly changing markets it may prove difficult for the most sophisticated economic
46 Kennedy, ‘Banks and Industry’, pp. 451-456 on the absence of an adequate financial 
system to foster innovative activities in post war Germany.
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and industrial analysis to reduce the element of risk sufficiently to overcome the 
native caution of the banker. Thus during the early 1980s criticism mounted of the 
failure of the big banks to give adequate backing to the information technology 
industry.’47 A similar interpretation can be found in Cox who writes, ‘In an era of 
rapid technological change and unstable and volatile markets however, the role of 
the banker becomes much more difficult, and the certainty that the financial system 
is always optimising the allocation of loans for maximum economic utility is more 
doubtful. The chance that bankers ... will play safe and fail to optimise their 
function of facilitating national economic growth is certainly higher in such an 
environment.’48
The argument that capital markets are superior to banks in fostering innovative 
behaviour has only emerged in more recent decades, particularly driven by the 
observation that the US with the most advanced and most efficient capital market in 
the world produces more patents and innovative technologies than any other 
economy. In the early twentieth century, Alfred Marshall praised the German bank 
based system, writing ‘the German banks have surpassed even those of America in 
the promptitude and energy with which they faced the risks of turning a large flow 
of capital into an enterprise ... to which the future belongs’.49 If nothing else, 
Marshall’s observation of the behaviour of German banks in the early twentieth 
century should remind us of the complex forces that influence the development of 
an economic system. Even if one concedes a link between a prevailing financial 
system and economic development, it is the interplay of a variety of variables 
including political, governmental, cultural and historical which determines 
economic development.
Nevertheless, if one is inclined to give credit to the financial system to having 
partly contributed to the strong economic performance experienced in Germany 
during the early post war period, it must also accept part of the responsibility for the
47 Dyson, ‘The State, Banks and Industry: The West German Case’, p. 133.
48 Cox, ‘State, Finance and Industry’, p. 3.
49 Shonefield, Modem Capitalism, p. 262 citing Alfred Marshall’s Industry and Trade, p.
518 published in 1919.
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comparatively modest growth rates experienced in more recent decades. To the 
extent that a financial system affects the economic performance of a country, it may 
be argued that, whilst the West German bank based system might have been 
beneficial to economic growth during the early post war period, it may have 
inhibited economic development over more recent decades due to its inability to 
adjust to changing funding needs. This suggests that it is important for economic 
development that the financial system develops with or even in anticipation of 
changing stages of economic development.
The claim that the West German financial system served the needs of the early 
post war period well, whereas it was less affective in providing an adequate 
financial environment for the more recent post war period, is indirectly supported 
by the finding that, in aggregate, German companies appear to have relied to a 
greater extent on external funding during the ‘recovery period’ than during the later 
period of increased technological changes. For a decreasing proportion of external 
funding suggests that the German financial system failed to move from existing 
sectors, which were increasingly able to finance their investments with internally 
generated funds, to identify and provide resources to new sectors which are in 
greater need of external funding. According to this argument, the presence of 
industries which rely to a high degree on external finance can be understood as 
indirect evidence for the suitability of a financial system.
2.6. Theories on the relevance of capital structure
Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, the value of a firm and its cost 
of capital are independent of its capital structure. According to this proposition by 
Modigliani and Miller, firm specific investment decisions are independent of the 
capital structure of a firm, since external funds are perfect substitutes for internal 
funds.50 The first to challenge Modigliani and Miller’s paper on the irrelevance of 
capital structure were the authors themselves with a correction of their previous
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paper in 1963.51 In this later version they established that the favourable tax 
treatment of debt provides an advantage to debt financing over equity financing. 
Since then an extensive literature on capital structure has developed which has tried 
to identify the relevance of various determinants that cause market imperfection and 
as such have a potential influence on the choice of capital structure. No attempt is 
made by the following subsection to cover all articles written on this subject, or 
indeed to cover all possible aspects of the subject. The purpose of this section is to 
introduce the basic theoretical considerations of why capital structure appears to 
matter. Therefore, the following restricts itself to presenting main ideas of seminal 
theoretical papers which have contributed most to our present understanding of the 
relevance of capital structure and which have been developed since the discussion 
was started by Modigliani and Miller’s groundbreaking work in the 1950s. In short, 
the overview of theoretical advances on capital structure determinants emphasises 
three approaches which have been identified to influence capital structure choices: 
the tax effect approach, the agency cost approach, and the asymmetric information 
approach.52 The tax effect approach is sketched out because it represents the first 
theoretical advance in modem capital structure theory. The agency cost approach 
and the asymmetric information approach have been chosen in order to contrast two 
theoretical approaches which fundamentally differ in their explanations on how 
capital structure is chosen. Moreover, these three theoretical approaches have a long 
standing tradition in financial literature, as they are persistently claimed to be 
important determinants of the choice of financial instruments. Furthermore,
50 F. Modigliani and M. H. Miller, ‘The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the 
Theory of Investment’, American Economic Review, Vol. XLVIII (1958), No. 3, pp. 261- 
297.
51 F. Modigliani and M. H. Miller, ‘Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A 
Correction’, American Economic Review, Vol. LIII (1963), No. 3, pp. 435-443.
52 Concentrating on those three approaches means sidestepping issues such as transaction 
costs and variations on the above mentioned approaches such as the role of non debt tax 
shields, the effects of differential personal tax rates between income from stocks and 
bonds, the interaction of capital structure with behaviour in the product or input market, 
and signalling theories. Literature covering these topics include H. DeAngelo and R. W. 
Masulis, ‘Optimal Capital Structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation’, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 8 (1980), pp. 3-29; M. H. Miller, ‘Debt and Taxes’, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 32 (May, 1977), pp. 261-297; S. Ross, ‘The Determination of Financial 
Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach’, Bell Journal o f Economics, Vol. 8 (Spring, 
1977), pp. 23-40.
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empirical work often refers to the presence of these factors when interpreting 
findings.
Despite best efforts, the question whether there exists an optimal capital 
structure or not is still unsolved. By contrasting two fundamentally differing 
concepts of explaining capital formation, Myers provides some indication of why 
the existence of optimal capital structure is so difficult to verify.53 He calls these two 
concepts the ‘static trade o ff framework and the ‘pecking order’ framework. In the 
static trade off framework firms have a well defined target debt to equity ratio and 
gradually move towards it, whilst in the pecking order framework firms simply 
prefer internal over external financing, and debt to equity without having a well 
defined target debt to equity ratio. The static trade off framework assumes that there 
is an optimal capital structure and deviations from it are only temporary, whereas 
the pecking order framework is based on the belief that firms always choose internal 
over external funds and if  they have to rely on external funds, companies always 
choose debt over equity, with equity as the last resort of financing. This concept of 
financing assumes that companies always try to rely on the least risky source for 
investment and only move to a higher risk source if  the lower risk source is 
exhausted. The reason for choosing debt before equity lies in the fact that from the 
point of view of the investor debt funding is considered to bear lower risks than 
equity funding. Thus, since its investor based risk profile is lower, debt should 
always be cheaper than equity for any particular company.54 In the pecking order 
framework, there is no well defined optimal debt/equity mix, because there are two 
kinds of equity, internal and external, one at the top of the pecking order and one at 
the bottom. By featuring these two fundamentally different concepts of thinking 
about capital structure, Myers demonstrates that the financial literature still lacks a 
comprehensive understanding of companies’ choice of capital structure. Whether 
the static trade off framework or the pecking order framework is better able to 
explain the financing choices of companies depends on which distorting factors are 
considered the most important driving forces.
53 S. C. Myers, ‘The Capital Structure Puzzle’, The Journal o f Finance, Vol. XXXIX 
(1984), No. 3, pp. 575-592.
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Until the paper by Myers and Majluf on the effects of asymmetric information 
on capital structure choice, models which had incorporated market imperfections 
and distortions generally supported the assertion that there is a well defined debt to 
equity ratio which maximises a company’s value.55 The first of the theories on 
capital structure which has suggested the existence of an optimal debt equity ratio 
was a model based on tax considerations developed by Modigliani and Miller.56 
According to this approach, optimal capital structure is determined by the trade off 
between the costs and the benefits of borrowing. The benefit of borrowing is due to 
the tax deductibility of interest payments on debt which can reduce a company’s tax 
obligations, thus transferring value from the government to shareholders. The cost 
of debt is understood to arise from the increased probability of financial distress as 
leverage increases. According to the tax approach, the tax shield is increasing the 
value of a company, but at a decreasing rate, while the potential costs of financial 
distress are reducing the value of a company but at an increasing rate. Therefore, the 
optimal capital structure involves balancing the tax advantage of debt against the 
present value of bankruptcy costs.
The agency cost approach presents another major line of research which 
indicates that there is an optimal debt to equity ratio. In models based on the agency 
theory, capital structure is determined by costs due to conflicts of interest.57 Jensen 
and Meckling have identified two types of conflicts: conflicts between shareholders 
and managers, and conflicts between shareholders and debtholders.58 Conflicts 
between managers and shareholders may arise because of managerial moral hazard 
in controlling costs and maximising value. If managers only hold part of the equity 
in their company, they have an incentive to overindulge in activities which benefit
54 Ward, Corporate Financial Strategy, p. 173.
55 S. C. Myers and N. S. Majluf, ‘Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When 
Firms Have Information Investors Do Not Have’, Journal o f Financial Economics, Vol. 13 
(1984), pp. 187-221.
56 Modigliani and Miller, ‘Corporate Income Taxes’, pp. 435-443.
57 For a comparison of different agency models and their prediction on the role of capital 
structure see M. Harris and A. Raviv, ‘The Theory of Capital Structure’, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. XLVI (1991), No. 1, pp. 300-306.
58 M. C. Jensen and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 (1976), pp. 305- 
360.
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themselves but which do not enhance the value of the company, since they only 
bear a fraction of the costs of the benefits they take out in maximising their own 
utility.59 The tendency of pursuing self benefiting activities may be exacerbated 
when the company has a large free cash flow, as managers are tempted to divert 
some to the free cash flow to pursue their self enhancing activities or to invest them 
in (by definition) unprofitable projects within the firm.60 Additional moral hazard 
arises because, if  managers only hold a part in their companies, they do not capture 
the entire gain from their profit enhancement activities, but they bear the entire 
costs, which reduces their incentives to devote significant effort to creative 
activities. The smaller the managers’ holdings in their companies’ stock, the smaller 
the fractional claim of the outcomes, and this will encourage them to appropriate 
larger amounts of corporate resources in the form of perks. According to the agency 
cost approach, debt can be used to mitigate these conflicts of interests between 
managers and shareholders in a variety of ways. First, holding the manager’s 
absolute investment in the firm constant, managerial ownership increases when the 
fraction of investments financed by debt is increased. In other words, debt financing 
reduces potential inefficiencies due to moral hazard, as it increases the fraction of 
equity owned by the manager.61 Second, assuming that bankruptcy is costly for 
managers (for instance because managers have to relinquish control over the 
company in the case of bankruptcy proceedings), debt provides an incentive to 
managers to pursue behaviour that reduces the probability of bankruptcy.62 Third,
59 In contrast, if managers decided to refrain from consuming part of the profit as perks, 
they would bear all the costs of this behaviour.
60 Free cash flow is the cash flow in excess of the amount that can profitably be 
reinvested in the company. For efficiency, these funds should be returned to shareholders 
who can put the money to whatever use they think best in consumption or other 
investments. Managers are interested in reinvesting in their companies as growing 
companies provide more opportunities for promotion and larger companies tend to earn 
higher salaries, see P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, 
(Englewood Cliffs, 1992), p. 494.
61 Jensen and Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm’, pp. 310-314.
62 S. J. Grossman and O. D. Hart, ‘Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial 
Incentives’, in J. McCall (ed.), The Economics o f Information and Uncertainty, (Chicago, 
1982), p. 108.
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debt financing commits the firm to pay out cash which reduces the amount of free 
cash flow available to managers for potential consumption of perks.63
However, these benefits of debt in the presence of conflicts between managers 
and shareholders are limited by the agency costs associated with the existence of 
debt in the form of conflicts between shareholders and debtholders. A potential 
conflict between shareholders and debtholders may arise when companies have a 
high fraction of debt compared to equity, because shareholders have an incentive of 
undertaking risky (and even value decreasing investments), as the owners of shares 
capture most of the gains if  returns on risky investments turn out to be high, while 
debtholders suffer most of the losses if the investment fails. Since debtholders 
perceive that shareholders will choose the riskier investment in order to maximise 
share value, they react to this perceived behaviour by taking it into account in 
deciding the price they will pay for any given debt claim. By correctly anticipating 
shareholders’ behaviour, shareholders receive less for the debt than they otherwise 
would, therefore bearing the cost of the incentive to invest in risky investments.64 
This effect, called the asset substitution effect, is an agency cost of debt. While the 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is generally seen to be 
mitigated by increasing the debt level, the conflict between shareholders and 
debtholders is seen to be exacerbated by high debt levels. Balancing the benefits and 
cost of debt arising from these differing conflicts of interest points to the existence 
of an optimal debt to equity ratio.
Models based on asymmetric information point to the costs of external finance 
due the fact that managers have better information on their investment opportunities 
than investors. According to Myers and Majluf equity may be mispriced by the 
market if  investors are less well informed about investment opportunities than 
managers, which might force managers to reject projects with positive net present
63 M. C. Jensen, ‘Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers’, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (1986), No. 2, pp. 323-329.
64 Jensen and Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm’, pp. 317-320.
45
values.65 Myers and Majluf argue that in the presence of asymmetric information, 
internal funds are to be favoured over external funds and if external funds are 
needed, it is better to issue debt than equity, because the future value of debt 
changes less than the future value of equity when the manager’s inside information 
is revealed to the market. The reason for preferring internal over external funds in 
the presence of asymmetric information is obvious as the cost of informational 
asymmetries can be avoided if  the company can retain enough internally generated 
funds to cover its positive investment opportunities. The reason for preferring debt 
over equity if managers have favourable information lies in the fact that the less 
risky debt security is likely to be less undervalued, because its value is less 
dependent on private information than the more risky equity security, which implies 
that fewer valuable investment opportunities are passed up if  they are financed by 
debt. Indeed, if  the company can issue default risk free debt it does not incur any 
undervaluation which sets default risk free debt equal to internal funds. 
Furthermore, if investors know that some profitable investment opportunities which 
seek finance through share issues might be passed up, while companies would 
always seek to raise shares if their information is unfavourable as it means that the 
security issue is overpriced, than investors would force the company to follow the 
pecking order, refusing to buy equity unless it has exhausted its debt capacity. 
Therefore, Myers and Majluf have demonstrated that in the presence of asymmetric 
information, pre-committing to equity is always inferior to pre-committing to debt.66
Highlighting different theoretical approaches to capital structure has made 
apparent that modem capital structure theory is still unsettled. Whereas models 
based on the importance of taxes and agency costs tend to support the view that 
there is an optimal capital structure, the pecking order framework is better able to 
incorporate the asymmetric information approach. The lack of one commonly 
agreed general model explains why different approaches to capital structure theory 
reach sometimes conflicting conclusions on how various factors which have been 
firmly established to determine capital structure affect its formation. Although the
65 See Myers and Majluf, ‘Corporate Financing’, pp. 187-221 for a detailed description 
of the model and its underlying assumptions.
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theoretical literature on capital structure provides some guidance for empirical 
studies as of how capital structure might be determined, their results can be 
contradicting as they are highly sensitive to the underlying assumptions.
2.7. Concluding remarks
The objective of this chapter has been to provide an overview of the financial 
literature on the relationship between financial market development and growth. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the economic circumstances of the early post 
war period were well served by the prevailing structure of financial institutions, and 
that as such the German financial system may have contributed to some extent to 
the relatively high growth rates experienced in West Germany during this period. 
The discussion has also addressed the fact that West Germany after 1965 has been 
somewhat lagging behind other industrialised countries in terms of innovative 
activities as it has been argued that capital markets are better in nurturing 
innovations than banks and that the powerful German banking system has inhibited 
changes in the financial system which would have strengthened the role of the 
capital market. However, to what extent the West German financial system 
contributed to an average growth rate in real GDP of 8.2% between 1950 and 1960, 
and to what extent it can be blamed for the rather modest growth in real GDP at an 
annual average of 2.2% between 1973 and 1990, is subject to future research.67 Non 
financial policy reforms and the lack of wider structural adjustments, reaching 
beyond structural changes in the financial sector, may have affected both the return 
of innovative activities and the development of the financial system. However, West 
Germany’s lesson of turning from an ‘economic miracle’ to a slowly adjusting 
economy with a lack of innovative and high growth sectors suggests that policy 
makers, which are advised to establish an efficient banking sector at the early stages 
of economic development, need to be aware of the importance of implementing 
mechanisms which prevent banks from inhibiting a timely development of the 
capital market.
66 Ibid., pp. 198-209.
67 For figures on growth rates in GDP see Giersch et al., The Fading Miracle, pp. 2-3.
47
3. The West German currency reform of 1948 and its effects 
on capital market development
3.1. Introduction
The West German currency reform implemented on 21 June 1948 had two 
main effects on the West German economy: it eliminated the over supply of money, 
thereby establishing an effective monetary system, and it caused an exogenous 
shock to the capital structure of West German companies by revaluing monetary 
and real assets differently. Most of the literature on the German currency reform of 
1948 was written shortly after the reform was carried out.1 The fact that by the time 
this literature was published only the monetary part of the conversion had been 
completed might explain why this set of literature restricted its analysis to the 
effects of the conversion of monetary assets. However, articles published in a 
special edition of the Zeitschrift fu r  die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1979 which 
focused on various aspects of the currency reform also failed to mention anything 
besides the conversion of monetary assets, although the sources employed in this 
study had already been available at the time these articles were written.2 Due to this 
inattention to the fact of the differential treatment of various assets by the currency 
reform, no study exists which has dealt with the impact of the currency reform on
1 See for instance, W. W. Heller, ‘Tax and Monetary Reform in Occupied Germany’, 
National Tax Journal, Vol. II (1949), No. 3; G. Colm et al., ‘A Plan for the Liquidation of 
War Finance and the Financial Rehabilitation of Germany’, Zeitschrift fur die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft, Vol. I l l  (1955), No. 2; F. H. Klopstock, ‘Monetary Reform in 
Western Germany’, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LVII (1949), No. 4; F. H. 
Klopstock, ‘Monetary Reform in Western Germany’, The Journal o f Political Economy, 
Vol. LVn (1949), No. 4; F. A. Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform and the Revival of the 
German Economy’, Economica, Vol. XVI (1949), No. 2; H. Mendershausen, ‘Prices, 
Money and Distribution of Goods in Postwar Germany’, American Economic Review, Vol. 
XXXIX (1949), No. 4; H. Sauermann, ‘Der amerikanische Plan fur die deutsche 
Wahrungsreform’ Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Vol. I l l  (1955), No. 2.
2 Those articles comprise L. A. Metzler, ‘The Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith Plan, Appendix 
O: Recent Experience with Monetary and Financial Reform’, Zeischrift fur die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft, Vol. 135 (1979), No. 3; H. Sauermann, ‘On the Economic and 
Financial Rehabilitation of Western Germany (1945-1949)’, Zeitschrift fur die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft Vol. 135 (1979), No. 3; E. Wandel, ‘Historical Developments Prior to 
the German Currency Reform of 1948’, Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Vol. 
135 (1979), No. 3.
48
the capital structure of companies. The following provides a detailed analysis of the 
implementation of the 1948 currency reform focusing on its redistributory effect 
within the West German society and on its impact on companies’ balance sheets. 
The analysis of the conversion of monetary assets expands the existing literature by 
including an evaluation of data which were published by the Deutsche Bundesbank 
in 1976.3 By providing a detailed account of the implementation of the 1948 
currency reform, a number of consequences and side effects become apparent which 
have been unnoticed by previous studies. With regards to the conversion of real 
assets, the analysis is based on reports and figures published by the Statistische 
Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office).4 As far as known, this data source has never 
been employed before which suggests that previous work may not have taken into 
account the full scope and consequences of the currency reform.
3.2. Monetary overhang and preparations for the currency reform
The German Reich-government financed war preparation and the war to a large 
extent through money creation in the form of short term treasury papers 
(iSchatzanweisungen) and treasury bills (Schatzwechsel) which were held within the 
German banking system.5 These securities were usually not marketable but in the 
case of treasury bills, they were eligible for discount, and in the case of treasury 
papers they were eligible as collateral for borrowings from the central bank. This 
form of financing came to be known as ‘gerauschlose Finanzierung’ (‘silent 
financing’), as about 90% of public debt remained in the portfolio of banks.6 
Between 1935 and 1945 the Reich-debt had expanded from Reichsmark (RM) 15 
billion to RM 400 billion, excluding war damage and other war connected claims
3 Deutsche Bundesbank (ed.), Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen 1876-1975, 
(Frankfurt a. M., 1976), pp. 24-25.
4 Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), ‘Die Kapital- und Bilanzumstellungen der 
Aktiengesellschafiten’, in Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. 60 (1952), pp. 1- 
27, and Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, (Stuttgart-Koln, 1952), pp. 334-337.
5 Banks were generally unable to oppose this practice as the government had gained 
influence over a large part of the banking sector by rescuing financially distressed banks 
from bankruptcy during the banking crisis in 1931.
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estimated at a further RM 300 to RM 400 billion. Over the same period, currency in 
circulation, including allied military marks issued to finance occupation 
expenditures, had increased from RM 5 billion to RM 50 billion, and bank deposits 
had increased from about RM 30 billion to over RM 150 billion.7 By contrast, 
national income in 1946 was estimated at RM 25 to 30 billion (at 1936 prices) 
compared to an estimated national income in excess of RM 60 billion in 1935.8 The 
discrepancy between the financial and the economic situation in post war Germany 
was addressed in the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith report of 1946 in the following 
statement:9
The discrepancy between Germany’s financial superstructure and her ability to 
produce has created a monetary illusion. In terms of the liquid assets which they hold, the 
German people appear to be as wealthy as if they had won the war and had passed into a 
period of booming prosperity; in terms of production and capacity to produce, however, 
they are suffering the inevitable consequences of war on their own soil and defeat. The 
absurdities of the present financial situation in Germany are due to this basic discrepancy 
between financial superstructure and economic realities.
Already by the time Germany had lost the war, it had become obvious that the 
Reichsmark had ceased to be an effective monetary instrument as more and more 
transactions were shifted to various money substitutes. Inflation could only be 
suppressed by a price and wage freeze, and a stringent rationing of commodities and 
foreign exchange.10 Although the price control policy prevented hyper inflation as 
experienced in Germany during the early 1920s, it led to a growing accumulation of 
monetary assets which could be less and less utilised for the purchase of goods.11 
With respect to the effectiveness of suppressed inflation, the Colm-Dodge- 
Goldsmith report observed:12
6 Only about 10% of Reich debt were in the hands of individuals, see Heller, ‘Tax and 
Monetary Reform in Occupied Germany’, p. 228.
7 Colm et al., ‘A Plan for the Liquidation’, p. 207.
8 Ibid., p. 214.
9 Ibid., p. 215.
10 These measures were implemented by the four occupation authorities (the U.S.A., 
Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union) which governed the occupation zones which 
later became West and East Germany.
11 Pfleiderer, ‘Two Types of Inflation’, p. 358.
12 Colm et al., ‘A Plan for the Liquidation’, p. 215.
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German inflation controls are safe as long as workers are willing to work for ‘mark’ 
wages and farmers and other producers to sell for ‘mark’ receipts. Inflation controls 
become illusory when services are no longer rendered and goods no longer sold for official 
mark wages and prices. The very imminent danger in Germany is not that inflation 
controls will break but that they will become meaningless.
The preparations for the invalidation of a large part of money supply did not 
remain secret to the German public. While no one knew exactly when the currency 
reform would occur, the German economy began to adjust itself to the prospect by 
increasingly rejecting the Reichsmark as a medium of exchange and store of value.13 
Although about 90% of transactions were legal and subject to price control, up to 
50% of these transactions took the form of inefficient barter tender. Black market 
transactions covered a relatively small volume of around 10% of transactions but 
absorbed a considerable part of excess money, as black market prices were on 
average between 50 and 75 times higher than legal prices.14 According to estimates 
the black market absorbed about five times more money volume than transactions at 
legal prices.15 Furthermore, an abundance of almost worthless money and the need 
for barter tender greatly reduced the incentive to work. The reluctance of workers to 
spend their time on the job and the reluctance of businesses to provide goods in 
exchange for Reichmark negatively affected economic activity. Companies hoarded 
goods in order to either use them for transaction purposes or as a store of value until 
after the currency reform.16 Alternatively, if  the character of production precluded 
its use for such purposes, companies preferred to keep their plants idle in order to 
prevent the premature use of raw materials and the depreciation of capital 
equipment.17 As early as 1946, studies on the economic situation of Germany 
reported that the rationing was close to collapse due to extensive localised barter 
economies.18 This suggests that already by 1946 the currency reform had become a 
pressing matter, but political disagreements between the occupation authorities 
postponed its execution until 1948 when the Western occupation authorities, the
13 Klopstock, ‘Monetary Reform’, pp. 278-279.
14 Roskamp, Capital Formation, p. 40.
15 Mendershausen, ‘Prices, Money and Distribution of Goods in Postwar Germany’, p. 
654.
16 W. Carlin, ‘West German Growth and Institutions, 1945-1990’, in N. Crafts and G. 
Toniolo (eds.), Economic growth in Europe since 1945, (Cambridge, 1996), p. 464.
17 Klopstock, ‘Monetary Reform’, p. 280.
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U.S.A., Britain and France, decided to carry out a currency reform only in their 
zones, excluding the Soviet occupation zone.
The belated implementation of the currency reform was mainly due to 
disagreements between the Western occupation authorities and the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union had little interest in abolishing a centralised administrative 
economic order based on a system of rationing and price controls as it facilitated its 
plans of establishing further socialisation measures and of destroying the privately 
owned business sector by enforcing prices which made it impossible to cover 
costs.19 Therefore, the Soviet Union prolonged discussions on the currency reform 
by making its approval of the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith Plan, which had been 
prepared by U.S. officials in 1946 and contained all necessary details on the 
implementation of the currency reform, dependent on the agreement over reparation 
payments and on control over industries.20 The reluctance of the Soviet Union to 
accept the proposed plan culminated in a dispute over printing rights of the new 
currency. The Soviet Union demanded to print part of the new banknotes in its own 
territory under its sole control. This would have meant that a set of engraving plates 
would have been in possession of the Soviet Union. The United States considered 
this demand as unacceptable out of fears that the plates would be misused for 
excessive money creation. The dispute over printing rights led to the official break- 
off of the ‘four power’21 negotiations in the first half of 1947.22 Although the 
Western authorities were aware that a currency reform limited to the Western 
occupation zones would have political consequences, they decided in September 
1947 to go ahead with the currency reform regardless of whether the Soviet zone 
would participate. Based on this decision the new currency went into print in the
18 Sauermaiin, ‘On the Economic and Financial Rehabilitation’, p. 309.
19 Wandel, ‘Historical Developments’, p. 327.
20 Sauermann, ‘Der amerikanische Plan’, p. 196.
21 The ‘four powers’ refer to the four occupation authorities administrating Germany at
that time, which were the United States, Great Britain, France, which occupied the Western 
zones, and the Soviet Union, which occupied the Eastern zone.
22 Wandel, ‘Historical Developments’, p. 326.
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United States in September 1947, anticipating that the printing and distribution of 
the currency would take about nine months.23
Already before the end of the war, several German experts had composed a 
number of proposals to resolve monetary and financial problems post war Germany 
was expected to encounter. When representatives of the four occupation authorities 
met in Berlin to discuss the currency reform for the first time in mid-1945, they 
were able to consult about 30 plans and proposals developed by the Germans. In 
early 1946, the American government put together a group of experts who tried to 
establish Germany’s financial and economic situation and who - on the basis of this 
analysis - worked out a detailed plan for a currency reform.24 In drawing up the 
details of the currency reform laws, they made use of the assistance of a group of 
German experts which worked for some weeks in strict seclusion in the so-called 
„Conclave of Rothwesten“. But the basic decisions were made by the military 
authorities, most notably by the American military authorities.25 By May 1946, a 
concise plan for the implementation of a currency reform in Germany had been 
worked out, which contained all essential parts of the currency reform. This plan 
was called ‘A Plan for the Liquidation of War Finance and the Financial 
Rehabilitation of Germany’ better known as the ‘Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith Plan’, 
after the most prominent members of the team of American experts preparing the 
plan.26 The name of the plan shows that the American authorities were the main 
players behind the currency reform, while Great Britain and France were rather 
passive actors allowing the U.S. authorities to implement their plan also in the 
French and the British occupation zones. Originally, the plan was in accordance 
with the Potsdamer Agreement of June 1945 which required of the occupation 
authorities ‘common policies ... for Germany ... as a single economic unit ... in 
regard to currency and banking, central taxation, and customs’.27 However, as
23 Ibid., pp. 327-328.
24 The experience of other European countries which had already carried out a currency 
reform provided useful guidance to certain aspects of the German program, see Metzler, 
‘The Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith Plan’, p. 366.
25 Pfleiderer, ‘Two Types of Inflation’, p. 361.
26 Wandel, ‘Historical Developments’, pp. 321-323.
27 Colm et al., ‘A Plan for the Liquidation’, p. 205.
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mentioned, the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith Plan was eventually implemented in the 
three Western occupation zones only. As such the currency reform was 
implemented on 21 June 1948 in the three Western occupation zones, excluding the 
Western sectors of Berlin. Four days later, when the Soviet Union announced a 
currency reform in its territory, the (Western) Deutsch Mark was also declared 
official currency in the three Western sectors of Berlin.28 The creation of two 
separate currency areas not only violated the Postdamer Agreement but it also 
manifested and sealed the partition of Germany. The swift implementation of a 
currency reform in the Soviet zone, only four days after a currency reform had been 
carried out in the Western zones, supports the view that the Soviet Union had long 
planned to realise a separate currency reform in the Eastern zone as we know from 
the experience in the Western zones that it took months to prepare for the reform. 
Although political differences became apparent in the course of the currency 
reform, the reform was an important prerequisite for the following economic 
reforms carried out in the Western occupation zones, as it reinstated an effective 
monetary system.
3.3. Technical aspects on the conversion of monetary assets
Adequate statistical material on economic output was scarce for the immediate 
post war period. The amount of money in circulation as well as national output 
could only be roughly estimated.29 Therefore, it was difficult to estimate the amount 
of money required to keep prices at approximately the level at which they were 
fixed at that time. The conversion rate from Reichsmark to Deutsch Mark was 
calculated by taking the ratio of money supply over GDP. According to estimates 
for the three Western occupation zones, money supply amounted to RM 240 billion 
and GDP to RM 35 billion in 1946, which represented a ratio of 686%. In 
comparison, money supply amounted on average to 68% of GDP for the years 
between 1913 and 1933. The objective of the occupation authorities was to re­
establish a similar ratio of money supply over GDP which could be achieved by
28 Wandel, ‘Historical Developments’, p. 330.
29 Roskamp, Capital Formation, p. 42.
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reducing money supply to a tenth of its original volume. Despite a considerable 
increase in GDP by 1948 compared to its level in 1946 on which the money supply 
to GDP ratio was based, the objective of cancelling 90% of money supply was 
maintained.30
Three possible ways of eliminating the oversupply of money were considered.31 
First, adjusting price levels to the supply of money by abolishing price controls 
which would have cleared the way to open inflation. However, given the experience 
of the ‘Great Inflation’ in Germany during the early 1920s, this plan was never 
seriously pursued, as a stable monetary system was an important political goal. 
Secondly, it was considered to block part of the money supply by converting it into 
loans either of a non negotiable kind or negotiable under severe restrictions. 
Theoretically, the advantage of this approach would have been that the blocked 
funds could have been utilised for payments of a capital levy in order to equalise 
financial burdens caused by the war. Practically, it was likely that the disposition of 
these blocked accounts would have been subject to uncertainty as continuous 
pressure to release further instalments of the blocked funds would have been 
exerted.32 The third way was the reduction of the money supply to a small fraction 
of its previous level. Essentially, the third approach was adopted by the Western 
occupation authorities. A reduction in money supply promised to provide the most 
rapid and most effective results. However, the cancellation of part of the money 
supply was complemented with a partial and temporary block of some accounts. 
This measure provided the occupation authorities with some kind of flexibility in 
terms of the implementation of the actual conversion rates.
The American occupation authorities insisted that all forms of debts and 
deposits were to be treated equally.33 German experts tried to achieve an exemption 
for the conversion of long term capital market debt such as bank and corporate
30 Sauermann, ‘Der amerikanische Plan’, p. 200.
31 Pfleiderer, ‘Two Types of Inflation’, pp. 360-361.
32 Metzler, ‘The Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith Plan’, p. 368 on the experience of various 
European countries with blocked funds and capital levies.
33 Sauermann, ‘The Economic and Financial Rehabilitation’, pp. 301-319 and Pfleiderer, 
‘Two Types of Inflation’, pp. 352-364.
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bonds and mortgages and demanded a conversion rate of one to one for these 
securities. They based their demand on three arguments. First, it was seen as wrong 
to take physical assets from their owners. Secondly, it was not good for the 
development of the capital market to treat less liquid investments in capital market 
securities in the same way as highly liquid savings and demand deposits. Third, the 
writing down of these assets would not contribute anything to the necessary 
elimination of excess money supply.34 But the occupation authorities insisted on a 
conversion rate of ten to one for long term capital market debt. They argued that all 
monetary claims should be treated equally. However, it will be shown that during 
the actual conversion monetary claims were treated anything but equally. Only 
wages, pensions, social security benefits and rents, which had been subject to price 
controls for many years, were converted at a rate of one to one.35
On the first day of the reform all natural and legal persons had to register their 
Reichsmark notes and bank assets in order to take advantage of their conversion 
rights. For these registered Reichsmark assets, they were promised Deutsch Mark 
amounting to 10% of the Reichsmark balance. Of the newly created Deutsch Mark 
balance 50% was of free disposal as soon as it had been approved by the tax 
authorities, the other 50% were temporarily blocked. Bank deposits which contained 
more than DM 5,000 were subject to particular scrutiny by the tax authorities. The 
clearing procedure carried out by the tax authorities was directed at balances that 
were acquired illegitimately through the black market which had evolved in 
response to the severe rationing of goods and the lack of value of the Reichsmark. It 
is estimated that approximately RM 2.5 billion were not registered out of fear for 
tax investigations.36 The clearing procedure also served to prevent the rapid
34 Pfleiderer, ‘Two Types of Inflation’, p. 361 and H. Irmler, ‘Wahrungsreform und 
reglementierter Kapitalmarkt’, in G. Bruns and K. Hauser (eds.), 30 Jahre Kapitalmarkt in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (Frankfurt a. M., 1981), p. 10.
35 Wage controls had existed since 1938 and were lifted in November 1948, see 
Adamsen, Investitionshilfe, p. 44. Price controls had been implemented as early as 1936, 
see Irmler ‘Wahrungsreform’, p. 9.
36 E. Wandel, ‘Die Entstehung der Bank deutscher Lander’, Schriftenreihe des Instituts 
fur bankhistorische Forschung, Vol. 3, (Frankfurt a. M., 1980), p. 123.
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spending of freely available funds as a great number of accounts were subject to 
approval by the tax authorities.37
In addition to the general conversion of the currency, every German citizen was 
entitled to receive a per capita quota ( ‘Kopfgeld 0 of DM 60, of which DM 40 were 
paid out immediately and DM 20 over the following two months. At first it was 
envisioned that the per capita quota was paid out in exchange for the same amount 
of Reichsmark notes, or in other words at a ratio of 1:1. However, one week later it 
was announced that the initial per capita quota would be counted against the bank 
balance at a rate of 10:1, provided the bank statement showed the necessary credit. 
This meant that if  an individual had a Reichsmark balance of at least RM 600 then 
the conversion rate for the per capita quota was 10:1, whereas those individuals who 
held no more than RM 60 obtained the per capita quota at a ratio of 1:1. The 
conversion rate for the per capita quota of anyone with a Reichsmark balance 
between RM 60 and RM 600 lay in between those two rates. The same was true for 
the initial endowment of firms, with firms being entitled to DM 60 per employee, 
which was often not sufficient to meet the initial week’s wage payments.38 The total 
initial endowment to households and companies amounted to DM 3,300 million, as 
shown in Table 3.1. Deposits of the Lander (the West German Federal Government 
only came into existence in 1949), local authorities, the federal rail, the federal mail, 
and military authorities were not converted but declared void. As a replacement of 
the cancelled deposits, public authorities received a standardised initial endowment 
calculated on the basis of their average monthly income between 1 October 1947 
and 31 March 1948.39 These endowments were given in the form of deposits with 
either one of the Landeszentralbanken (central banks of the states) or with the Bank
37 Klopstock, ‘Monetary Reform’, p. 282, Wandel, ‘Die Entstehung der Bank deutscher 
Lander’, p. 123, and Deutsche Bundesbank , Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen, p. 22 and 
Table 1.05, p. 25.
38 Klopstock, ‘Monetary Reform’, p. 282, Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, p. 123, 
Heller, ‘Tax and Monetary Reform’, pp. 216-217, and Roskamp, Capital Formation, p. 43.
39 Pfleiderer, ‘Two Types of Inflation’, p. 362.
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deutscher Lander.40 The initial endowment of public authorities amounted to DM 
3,550 million, see Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 shows that the allocation of initial endowments to public authorities 
as well as to individuals and companies was completed by September 1948. By 
contrast, the conversion of deposits lasted one and a half years and was finally 
completed by the end of 1949. The different speed in allocating initial endowments 
and in converting deposits meant that whereas public authorities were in control of 
all their funds by September 1948, households and companies had to wait for part of 
their funds until the end of 1949. In addition, only household and company deposits 
were targeted when the occupation authorities decided to contract money supply 
further in order to fight inflationary pressures in October 1948.
Table 3.1 Timing of Money Creation for West Germany without West Berlin (in DM million)
End of Month Initial Endowments Conversion of RM Deposits Sum of Legal
to Public 
Authorities 
incl. Military 
Authorities
Per Capita 
Quota to 
Individuals and 
Companies
Free Accounts Blocked
Accounts
Money Creation
According to Respective Book Entries of Banks
1948 June
Sept.
Dec.
2,500
3.450
3.450
1,900
3.250
3.250
3,500
5,350
2,850
'750
4,400
13,050
12,800
1949 March 3,450 3,250 5,700 550 12,950
June 3,450 3,250 5,950 450 13,100
Sept.
Dec.
3.450
3.450
3.250
3.250
6,100
6,200
400
350
13,200
13,250
According to Results of the Final Conversion as Stated by the Banking System
3,550 3,300 6,400 13,250
Note:1 Effect of Cancellation of 70% of Blocked Accounts in October 1948 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- undBankwesen, Table 1.05, p. 25.
Despite a drastic cut in money supply and a sudden increase in goods offered 
for sale, the German economy experienced inflationary tendencies during the first 
six months of the currency reform. Out of fear of inflationary pressures, the 
occupation authorities announced at the beginning of October 1948, that 70% of the 
blocked accounts were to be cancelled, 20% were to be released, and 10% were to
40 The Bank deutscher Lander was established a few months before the currency reform. 
As first German independent central bank, it replaced the former central bank, the 
Reichsbank. In 1956, the Bank deutscher Lander was succeeded by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. Landeszentralbanken were established by the occupation authorities as initial 
replacement of the Reichsbank, and are central banks operating at state level.
58
be transferred to an open account. The open accounts were eventually released by 
the central bank in 1949.41 All public and governmental agencies including federal 
rail, federal mail and military governments which, after cancellation of all their 
deposits, were provided with a generous initial endowment of the new currency, 
were exempt from the October revision. The change in the ratio did also not apply 
to private claims, so that the holders of money were penalised as compared to 
holders of private claims.42
The cancellation of 70% of blocked accounts had an averse psychological effect 
on the trust of the German public in the new currency as it openly revealed the 
authorities’ concern over inflationary pressures. The liquidation of blocked 
accounts, whose release the public had every reason to believe on the basis of the 
reform legislation of June 1948, seriously undermined the public’s confidence in the 
new currency. Therefore, what transpired was opposite to what was intended by a 
further cut in money supply and inflationary pressures picked up as the German 
public reacted with an even stronger preference for consumption which was already 
at high levels after years of privation. As a consequence, the unexpected cut of part 
of the blocked accounts led to a higher than expected increase in money velocity, 
which partly offset the additional reduction of money supply.
Tables 3.2(a) and 3.2(b) compare the closing Reichsmark balance sheet of 
banks with their opening Deutsch Mark balance sheet. The balance sheets in Tables 
3.2(a) and 3.2(b) are aggregates of balance sheets of all West German commercial 
banks, except West Berlin, and all West German central banks, the central banks of 
the states (Landeszentralbanken) and the federal central bank {Bank deutscher 
Lander). With the actual conversion of the currency carried out through the West 
German banking system, West German banks were required to keep exact books on 
the last Reichsmark balance and the first Deutsch Mark balance. Therefore the 
figures provided by the aggregate of bank balance sheets can be considered to
41 W. W. Heller, ‘The Role of Fiscal-Monetary Policy in German Economic Recovery’, 
The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. XL (1950), No. 2, p. 540.
42 Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, p. 123.
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reflect closely the actual amount of Reichsmark and Deutsch Mark in circulation at 
the time of the currency reform in June 1948.
Table 3.2(a) Aggregation of West German Bank Balance Sheets (Assets), (in RM/DM million)*
assets
Balance at 
20/21.06.1948
RM assets 
in % of 
sum of 
assets
DM assets 
in % of 
sum of 
assets
DM/RM
conversion
rate
(2)/ ( l )
weighted
conversion
rate
(3) x (5)
RM DM % % 10:x 10:x
columns 1 2 3 4 5 6
assets
1. cash on hand 35,820 1 13.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
2. credit balance with West 
German central banks 36,726 1,870 13.8 9.6 0.5 6.9
RM credit balance 36,726 - - -
DM credit balance for initial 
endowment 641 (3.3) (0.2)
DM credit balance for per 
capita quota of households 
and companies 1,229 (6.3) (0.3)
3. National Giro check credit
2,662 1.0
not
converted
4. Treasury bills, Treasury 
papers, government bonds 83,997 24 31.5 0.1 0.0 0.0
5. other securities and holdings1 2,916 283 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.1
6. balances with other banks 68,072 50 25.6 0.3 0.0 0.0
7. claims against public 
authorities 9,089 3 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
8. claims against companies and 
households 17,481 1,380 6.6 7.1 0.8 5.3
9. claims on foreign currency 
and other foreign assets2 1,507 473 0.6 2.4 3.1 1.9
10. other assets3 8,063 489 3.0 2.5 0.6 1.8
11. compensation claims
of 3% (§11 UG)4 14,191 73.2
of 4,5% (§22 para 2 UG) 448 2.3
of 3% other compensation 
claims 105 0.5
non-interest -bearing 76 0.4
12. Sum of assets 266,333 19,393 0.7
Percentage sum 100.1 99.9
average of weighted DM/RM 
conversion rate for assets 1.9
Note: *including Bank deutscher Lander, Landeszenralbanken and all commercial banks of West 
Germany but West Berlin, with the closing Reichsmark balance as of 20 June 1948 and the opening 
Deutsch Mark balance as of 21 June 1948; Column 1 and 2 as stated in ‘Deutsches Geld- und 
Bankwesen in Zahlen’. Column 3 to 6 comprise own calculations.1 Including participations in 
syndicates.2 Including claims on foreign currencies held by nationals.3 Including real estate, 
building, and equipment.4 UG: Umstellungsgesetz (conversion law).
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen, Table 1.02, p. 24
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Table 3.2(b) Aggregation of West German Bank Balance Sheets (Liabilities), (in RM/DM million)
liabilities
Balance at 20.06.1948
RM
liabilities 
in % of 
sum of 
liabilities
DM
liabilities 
in % of 
sum of 
liabilities
DM/RM
conversion
rate
(8)/(7)
weighted
conversion
rate
(9 )x (11)
RM DM % % 10:x 10:x
columns 7 8 9 10 11 12
liabilities
1. money put in circulation1 - 2,118 - 10.9 - -
2. deposits
20. banks 94,490 1,845 35.5 9.5 0.2 7.1
conversion of RM deposits 94,490 25 - (0.1) (0.0) -
initial DM liquidity 
endowment 648 (3.3) (0.1)
credit entry for per capita 
quota of households and 
companies (with part of 
second instalment for 
households) 1,172 (6.0) (0.1)
21. public authorities (including 
occupation authorities)
24,865 3,559 9.3 18.4 1.4 13.0
conversion of RM deposits 24,865 - - - - -
initial DM endowment - 3,559 - - - -
22. companies and households
119,643 7,615 44.9 39.3 0.6 26.9
conversion of RM deposits 119,643 6,387 - (32.9) (0.5) -
initial DM endowment (per 
capita and company quota) 1,228 (6.3) (0.1)
3. securities and loans 3,645 176 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.7
4. bonds outstanding 11,299 1,122 4.2 5.8 1.0 4.2
5. debts and securities of 
customers abroad 349 297 0.1 1.5 8.5 0.9
6. other liabilities abroad 565 270 0.2 1.4 4.8 1.0
7. equity capital or nominal 
capital of limited liability 
companies
8. reserves
3,099
3,528
} 1,205 1.2
1.3
6.2 1.8 4.5
9. provisions and value 
adjustments 2,039 1,028 0.8 5.3 5.0 4.0
10. other liabilities 2,811 158 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.6
11. sum of liabilities 266,333 19,393 0.7
percentage sum 100.00 99.99
average of weighted DM/RM 
conversion rate for liabilities 6.4
Note: Column 7 and 8 as stated in ‘Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen’. Column 9 to 12 
comprise own calculations.1 First instalment and part of second instalment of per capita quota. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen, Table 1.02, p. 24
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As mentioned, deposits held by public agencies were declared void. As 
compensation for the complete cancellation of their deposits, public authorities 
received a generous initial endowment which created an effective conversion rate 
for public deposits of 10:1.4 (see row 2.1, column 11 of Table 3.2(b)). Comparing 
the effective conversion rate of public deposits with the conversion rate of 10:0.6 
granted to household and company deposits shows that deposits of public 
authorities were treated more than twice as favourably by the reform as deposits of 
the private sector. The decision to provide public authorities with a relatively 
generous initial endowment was taken because it was expected that tax receipts 
were low during the first few months of the reform.43 Public debt was also declared 
void, as with the collapse of the Nazi regime there was no longer any authority to 
pay interest or to redeem outstanding securities. Intra-bank claims and intra-bank 
deposits were practically entirely written off as was cash on hand. Assets held by 
foreigners were granted the most favourable conversion rate with rates ranging 
between 10:4.8 and 10:8.5 (see rows 5 and 6, column 11 of Table 3.2(b)). Claims on 
foreign assets with a rate of 10:3.1 were also relatively less devalued than domestic 
claims. The items of ‘bonds outstanding’ and other securities were the only items 
which were converted at the originally envisioned rate of 10:1 (see row 5, column 5 
of Table 3.2(a) and row 4, column 11 of Table 3.2(b)).
As shown in row 22, column 11 of Table 3.2(b), the conversion rate of 
household and company deposits was 10:0.5. Taking into account the initial 
endowment of households and companies in addition to the general conversion of 
their bank deposits, gives an actual conversion rate of 10:0.6 for household and 
company deposits for June 1948. However, the allocation of the per capita quota for 
households and companies was not yet completed in June 1948 and increased from 
DM 1,228 million in June 1948 (see row 22, column 8 of Table 3.2(b)), to DM 
3,250 million by September 1948, see Table 3.1. Considering the total initial 
allocation households and companies had received by September 1948 in addition 
to the conversion of their deposits, gives a final conversion rate for household and 
company deposits of 10:0.8. This equals the conversion rate for household and
43 See Monatsberichte der Bank deutscher Lander (March, 1949), p. 33.
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company debts, also showing a conversion rate of 10:0.8 (see row 8, column 5 of 
Table 3.2(a)). Table 3.2 also shows that pre-currency reform debt of households and 
companies amounted to only about a tenth of their pre-currency reform deposits. 
The small absolute amount of household and company debt reflects the fact that 
they were Reichsmark rich and rarely needed to borrow.44 It is noteworthy to point 
out that the literature unanimously quotes a conversion rate of 10:0.65 for 
household and company deposits however, this figure is only correct if one 
considers only the first instalment of initial endowments received in June 1948. 
However, it understates the actual conversion rate one obtains when considering the 
first as well as the second instalment of initial endowments received in scheduled 
tranches between June and September 1948.
Taking the sum of the opening Deutsch Mark balance over the sum of the 
closing Reichsmark balance as presented in Table 3.2 suggests a general conversion 
rate of 10:0.7. However, considering the weighted average of the DM/RM 
conversion rates reveals a considerable difference between the conversion of bank 
assets and the conversion of bank liabilities. Whereas the weighted average of the 
DM/RM conversion rate for bank assets was 10:1.9, bank liabilities had a weighted 
average conversion rate of 10:6.4 (see last rows, column 6 and 12 of Table 3.2). 
According to this measure, bank assets were more than three times more devalued 
than bank liabilities. Table 3.2(a) also shows that compensation claims became by 
far the single most important asset of banks, accounting for 73.2% of their total 
assets. Because these compensation claims were eligible as collateral against credits 
from the state central banks, banks were in the position to expand credits right from 
the start of the post currency reform period. On the liability side, banks’ total equity 
in proportion of the sum of liabilities improved considerably in the course of the 
currency reform, with total equity accounting for 2.5% of the sum of liabilities 
before the reform, and for 6.2% after the reform (see rows 7 and 8, column 8 and 9 
of Table 3.2(b)).
44 Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, p. 125.
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Furthermore, Table 3.2 reveals that cash on hand, treasury bills, treasury papers, 
public bonds and other claims on public authorities as well as claims on banks were 
practically cancelled. This reflects the fact that the biggest debtor - the government - 
emerged from the currency reform with its debts taken off the books. Table 3.2 also 
shows that no monetary assets but one was converted at the rate of 10:1. Not only 
was every asset converted at a different rate but the conversion rate also depended 
on who the holder of the asset was. This conversion policy led to a significant 
change in the distribution of financial assets. Public authorities gained most from 
the currency reform, being granted a generous initial allocation of funds while their 
enormous bulk of debt, which had contributed most to the over-supply of money, 
was declared void. Households and companies suffered from the unanticipated 
cancellation of a large part of their deposits. However, acknowledging a rate of 
10:0.8 as the final conversion rate for household and company deposits meant that 
the ratio of households’ and companies’ bank debt to bank deposits remained 
unchanged in the course of the currency reform, as household and company debt 
was also converted at a rate of 10:0.8.
Table 3.3 Conversion of Non Bank Assets and Legal Money Creation
Treatment of non bank RM assets Sources of legal money creation
RM balance at 20.06.1948 Mill RM Million
1. Sight and time deposits 72,821 1. Initial endowment of non banks 6,849DM
10. Not to be converted 29,056 10. Per capita quota (1. & 2. Instalment) 2,818DM
11. To be converted 43,765 11. Company quota 472DM
12. Endowment to public authorities 3,559DM
2. Saving deposits 71,687 120. Lander and municipalities 2,438DM
20. Not to be converted 15,438 121. Rail and mail administration 318DM
21. To be converted 56,249 122. Military government 772DM
123. Foreign governments 31 DM
3. Total deposits 144,508 2. Conversion of RM assets of non-banks
20. RM assets of non-banks after
30. Not to be converted 44,494 depositing their liquid assets 144.508RM
RM assets of public authorities 200. Public authorities (including
21,738 occupation authorities) 24,865RM
RM assets of occupation 3,127 201. Companies and households J19.643RM
authorities Sight and time deposits 50.680RM
Statement of lapse by revenue- Saving deposits 68,963RM
office 89
Lapsed because of non­
registration 961
Lapsed petty cash 84 21. Converted RM assets according to
Spent on per capita quota 14,084 position 20. 6,387DM
Spent on company quota 4,362 210. Sight and time deposits 2,780DM
Other amounts not to be 211. Saving deposits 3,607DM
converted 49
Included in 21: deposits on open account (490DM)
31. To be converted 100,014 3. Total DM money creation (1.+21.) 13,236DM
Note: Reichsmark in italics
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen’, table 1.04, p. 25
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Table 3.3 shows that non-bank Reichsmark deposits amounted to RM 145 
billion before the currency reform, of which RM 45 were cancelled and RM 100 
were converted into DM 13 billion by the end of 1948. With an estimated GDP of 
DM 50 billion in 1948 and money supply of DM 13 billion, the ratio of money 
supply over GDP amounted to about 22% in the summer of 1948 and to 26% by the 
end of 1948. Therefore, the currency reform transformed the ratio of money supply 
over GDP to about 42% below the ratio originally envisioned by the occupation 
authorities, as they had set out to establish a ratio of approximately 68%. Even if  a 
general conversion rate of 10:1 had been applied, the ratio of money supply over 
GDP had only amounted to 53.3%, given that the actual GDP of 1948 was 
considerably higher than the estimated GPD for 1946, which was the basis of the 
original conversion rate.
3.4. Bank liquidity and company borrowing
As mentioned, banks had been the main holders of debt which the government 
had issued to finance war expenses. Public debt had represented the single most 
important asset of banks, accounting for 35% of their assets before the currency 
reform whereas after the currency reform public debt accounted for only 0.2% of 
banks’ assets, see Table 3.2. The cancellation of public debt, cash on hand and intra­
bank claims created a gap between bank assets and bank liabilities. This gap was 
widened by allowing banks to put a provisional figure for their proprietors’ capital 
equal to 5% of their new obligations from demand and time deposits.45 As 
compensation for their loss of claims, banks were credited with the 
Landeszentralbanken with DM 15 in reserve money for every DM 100 of their 
liabilities with respect to demand deposits, and with DM 7.5 for every DM 100 of 
their liabilities with respect to time and saving deposits.46 This initial allocation of 
liquid funds in the form of balances with the state central banks constituted the
45 The provisional assessment o f proprietors’ capital became necessary because the 
principles according to which real assets were to be converted were not yet determined, see 
ibid., p. 126.
46 L. Markert, ‘German Banking in 1948’, Journal o f the Institute o f Bankers, Part III, 
Vol. LXX (1949), pp. 70-71.
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transition to a system of minimum reserves.47. The allocation of compensation 
claims caused the banks to emerge from the currency reform with their equity to 
liability ratios enhanced by a factor of nearly 2.5, even though their pre-existing 
assets were devalued about three times more sharply than their liabilities. The 
remaining gap was closed by granting banks claims against the Lander. These 
equalisation claims (Ausgleichsforderungen), which bore a general interest of 3%, 
were not marketable but represented a cash reserve as they were eligible as 
collateral against credits from the state central banks (Landeszentralbanken). In 
special cases the central banks were able to purchase these claims, but no specified 
arrangements were made for redemption.48 The allocation of sizeable reserves and 
collaterals in the form of compensation and equalisation claims enabled commercial 
banks to expand their credits without having to rediscount with the central banks 
during the first crucial post reform months. The liquidity of commercial banks 
further improved as public authorities spent their initial endowments, as this process 
converted secondary liquidity into primary liquidity, which could be used to meet 
minimum reserve requirements.49
Companies demand for credit was high right from the start of the post currency 
reform period. Since accounts were only gradually released, many firms had to 
borrow money even though their bank balances might have been sufficient to 
finance their operations had those balances been immediately available. Thus, with 
the gradual release of accounts, an expansion of bank credits occurred.50 By the end 
of June 1949, commercial banks had granted long and medium term loans to the 
non banking sector amounting to DM 280 million, while short term credits had 
reached a volume of DM 6.5 billion.51 Already by July 1948, short term credits to 
non banks amounted to DM 1.3 billion, or 10% of money created by the currency 
reform, see Table 3.4. The sharpest increase of short term credits occurred in
47 Pfleiderer, ‘Two Types o f Inflation’, p. 362. Legal reserve requirements were 
introduced by the occupation authorities and provided the central bank with an additional 
mechanism o f monetary control, see Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, p. 127.
48 Markert, ‘German Banking’, p. 70, and Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, p. 126.
49 Monatsberichte der Bank deutscher Lander (February, 1949), p. 18.
50 Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, p. 129.
51 Monatsberichte der Bank deutscher Lander, (August, 1949), pp. 38-39.
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August 1948 when the volume of credits increased by almost 80% on the month, 
from DM 1.3 billion in July to DM 2.4 billion in August. After August 1948, the 
volume of short term credits continued to grow however at a decreasing rate until 
June 1949 when the absolute increase in short term credits rose over two 
consecutive months, see Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Short Term Credits of Commercial Banks to Non Banks (in DM million)
month total of short term credits monthly increase
1948
July 1,339.2 -
August 2,378.3 1,039.1
September 3,196.4 818.1
October 3,818.6 622.2
November 4,333.1 514.5
December 4,684.3 351.2
1949
January 4,900.6 216.3
February 5,264.7 364.1
March 5,551.2 286.5
April 5,886.9 335.7
May 6,123.6 236.7
June 6,535.7 412.1
July 6,997.4 461.7
Source: Monatsberichte der Bank deutscher Lander (August, 1949), p. 39.
This rapid increase in bank loans occurred despite an attempt of credit rationing 
during the first six weeks of the reform and further credit restrictions implemented 
by the central bank council between November 1948 and March 1949, when all 
banks were urged to reduce their volume of credit to the amount prevailing on 31 
October 1948.52
3.5. Initial disturbances associated with the currency reform
The greater than planned contraction of money supply reflects the fact that the 
currency reform was only one of several measures to rehabilitate the West German 
economy. The American authorities understood the currency reform as a means to 
establish an economic environment in which controls on prices, allocation and 
rationing could be relaxed. By initially blocking part of the accounts, the occupation 
authorities retained some control over money supply as the blocked accounts could 
be used as a safety valve to counteract inflationary tendencies. However, the
52 Klopstock, ‘Monetary Reform’, p. 289.
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decision to replace all accounts held by public authorities with initial endowments 
greatly reduced the amount of controllable funds. Therefore, the scope for a flexible 
response to inflationary pressures by reducing money supply was limited to blocked 
household and company accounts. Not only were initial endowments out of reach of 
inflation control policies implemented by the occupation authorities, they also 
limited the scope of central bank policies to control inflation. The Bank deutscher 
Lander had no means of controlling the gradually expanding money supply as it did 
not possess marketable securities which it could have used for open market 
operations in order to absorb money supply which increased as accounts were 
released and as initial endowments were spent.53 In addition, the high liquidity of 
commercial banks reduced the monetary policy tool of increasing the discount rate 
to a level where it was an effective device in controlling credit volumes, as banks 
hardly ever needed to rediscount with the central bank in order to expand credits. At 
the end of September 1948, only 11% of commercial bank credits were refinanced 
through the central bank.54 The system of minimum reserves was new to the 
German banking system and therefore the central bank did not immediately use this 
policy tool. When the central bank finally chose to use this mechanism of monetary 
control in December 1948, it raised the minimum reserve requirements for banks 
from 10% to 15%. The reduced possibilities of controlling money supply during the 
transition period contributed to initial inflationary pressures during the second half 
of 1948 followed by deflationary tendencies during the first half of 1949.
The inflationary pressures experienced during the second half of 1948 were 
partly due to the limited ability of the occupation and monetary authorities to exert 
control over money supply and partly due to the stronger than anticipated domestic 
demand. With the currency reform and the lifting of price controls, supply finally 
met demand again as confidence in the new currency induced producers to offer 
their (hoarded) goods. Since the relative structure of controlled prices did not reflect 
the relative scarcity of goods, a market price structure expressing these relative 
scarcities had to be found without any guidance from pre-currency reform prices.
53 Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, pp. 127 and 129-130. Claims which the central 
banks held against the Lander (states) and the Bizone were not marketable.
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The sellers at first simply charged whatever prices they thought the market could 
bear, and with the money stream increasing continuously until the end of 1948 
prices also rose continuously.55 In order to prevent excessive prices without 
returning to price controls, the occupation authorities passed a law which made 
charging ‘obviously excessive prices’ a penal offence and published a list of 
‘normal prices’ which was to be displayed in stores.56
In its eagerness to satisfy its backlog in demand, the German public spent most 
of its initial endowments and the gradually released accounts within the first few 
months of the currency reform, or in other words, as soon as it acquired its 
allocation of the new currency. Diary entries of a contemporary, Ludwig Vaubel - 
head of the legal department of the chemical company Vereinigte Ganzstoff- 
Fabriken and from 1953 member of the executive board - reflect the mood of the 
German public at the time of the currency reform.57
21 June 1948: The first instalment o f DM 40 has been distributed at the municipalities 
on Sunday. ... During the last few days, everybody tried to pay as many liabilities as 
possible in old money, most o f these transactions were carried out successfully. Now, over 
night a new time has begun. Shops are full o f commodities o f every kind, which were not 
seen for years or only available through barter tender ... Transactions which involve the 
new currency are only carried out with hesitation, as it is uncertain when regular income 
will be received again. [As mentioned above, the initial endowment o f companies was 
often not sufficient to pay the full salary to employees in the first month o f the currency 
reform.] 28 June 1948: On Saturday in Frankfurt, the first shopping: scissors, saucepan, 
bowl, bucket, cherries are available at any number. Nobody understands where all the 
fruits and vegetables have been until now. ..., prices are reasonable. But the overall 
uncertainty remains high. Will the supply o f goods last? Will prices rise or fall? ... The 
rationing has been lifted in most areas, even eggs have been freed. Incredibly low prices 
are reported from the black market; butter DM 4.- to DM 6.- per pound, 20 cigarettes for 
DM 2.50, so that the official rationing o f American cigarettes for DM 0.30 a cigarette 
cannot be sold. 12 August 1948: Life in the Bizone [consisting o f the American and the 
British occupation zone] has changed since the day o f the currency reform. The hopes for a 
better future were not only illusions. ... But this does not hold for everyone. Too many 
people are deprived o f all their means o f disposal after they have spent their ‘per capita 
quota’, and their savings have been dissolved. There are too many, who are not able to 
work any more, or who cannot find a job which would sufficiently provide them with the 
main fundamentals. - 19 October 1948: - The tendency to exaggerate which can be noticed
54 Monatsberichte der Bank deutscher Lander, (February, 1949), p. 14.
55 Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, p. 135.
56 Mendershausen, ‘Prices, Money and Distribution’, p. 669.
57 L. Vaubel, Zusammenbruch und Wiederaufbau: Ein Tagebuch aus der Wirtschaft
1945-1949, (Miinchen, 2nd ed., 1985), pp 171-178. Quotes are translated by me.
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everywhere in the Western zones after the currency reform, is also confirmed [by our 
behaviour]. Everyone would like to recover his former living standard as soon as possible, 
and catch up in material pleasures which had been missed so much over the last few years.
These diary entries portray the uncertainties still prevailing immediately after 
the currency reform. They also point out how hoarded inventories were rapidly 
reappearing on shelves right after the start of the currency reform and how severely 
the German population was deprived of the most essential goods as it had become 
more and more difficult to buy anything with Reichsmark in anticipation of the 
currency reform. As the German consumers had spent most of their initial balances 
within the first few months, they soon depended entirely on their current income, 
slowing down domestic demand. The changing behaviour in consumer demand was 
reflected in a reduction of the ratio of currency in circulation over money supply, 
decreasing from 37% in December 1948 to 33% in July 1949.58 With slackening 
demand, the beginning of 1949 was characterised by a fear of deflation. Ludwig 
Vaubel’s diary entries note.59
7 January 1949: At the moment, there are again two bankruptcies a week in Cologne, 
as in 1929. Post war business openings fold up. Price reductions also for shoes and textiles. 
Due to imports o f Italian oranges - DM 0.35 per pound - we also expect pressure on the 
prices o f  apples. Wage increases o f up to DM 0.75 per hour will become necessary in Nord 
Rhine W estfalia....
According to Carlin, the deflationary tendencies had a disciplinary effect on 
businesses, with deflation acting to increase the attention of companies to their 
costs. And the slack in domestic demand not only served to curb price increases and 
wage demands but also exerted pressure on businessmen to seek foreign markets for 
their goods.60 However, these initial disturbances which accompanied the currency 
reform were soon overcome and by the spring of 1949 the West German economy 
operated in a relatively stable monetary environment.
58 Monatsberichte der Bank deutscher Lander (August, 1949), p. 45.
59 Vaubel, Zusammenbruch und Wiederaufbau, pp. 182-183.
60 W. Carlin, ‘Economic Reconstruction in Western Germany, 1945-55: The
Displacement o f ‘Vegetative Control” , in I. Turner (ed.), Reconstruction in Post-War 
Germany, (Oxford, 1989), p. 59.
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3.6. The conversion of balance sheets of West German public limited 
companies
A law containing details on the conversion of company balance sheets was 
passed more than one year after the monetary reform in August 1949. It comprised 
all fundamental rules for converting the final Reichsmark balance sheet into the first 
Deutsch Mark balance sheet, in particular, it included the rules for the valuation of 
fixed assets and the Grundkapital (capital stock). All initial DM balance sheets were 
to be dated as of 21 June 1948, however the conversion procedure was not 
completed before 1952, with 88% of the 2,724 German public limited companies 
and Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien (commercial partnership limited by 
shares) having converted their balance sheets by December 1951.61 The lengthy 
procedure of the conversion of balance sheets handicapped the development of the 
capital market, since companies had to complete their conversion of balance sheets 
before they could be registered at one of the West German stock exchanges. 
Companies were also not allowed to pay out dividends before their nominal capital 
stock had been established.62 As the conversion of balance sheets progressed, more 
and more shares were quoted in Deutsch Mark.
The law of the conversion of balance sheets introduced a clearer and more 
detailed balance sheet structure. One of the major changes implemented was to 
capture the yearly changes of fixed assets by classifying them into initial capital 
stock, change in fixed assets, depreciation, and final capital stock.63 Fixed assets 
were revalued within the boundaries set by the conversion law and the valuation 
rule on fixed assets. The upper limit for the valuation of fixed assets was specified 
in the conversion law which stated that fixed assets could be revalued up to their 
replacement costs, which increased considerably. The lower limit was specified by
61 Among the companies which had not yet converted their balance sheets by the end of 
1951 were companies o f the coal, iron, steel, and chemical industries whose imminent 
disentanglement by the occupation authorities hindered conversion; commercial banks and 
insurance companies, whose conversion was delayed by lengthy examination o f their 
assets; and companies which had relocated from the east, see Statistisches Bundesamt, 
‘Die Kapital- und Bilanzumstellung der Aktiengesellschaften’, p. 13.
62 Ibid., p. 17.
63 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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the valuation rule on fixed assets which stated that fixed assets could not be valued 
below their original costs. The valuation rule on fixed assets led to a major 
conversion of hidden reserves into open reserves in the initial DM balance sheets.64 
The fact that a large proportion of hidden reserves was disclosed in course of the 
reform will be taken up again in chapter five when it will be investigated to what 
extent companies relied on internally generated funds which, among other items, 
also contain (open) reserves.
Next to the treatment of fixed assets, the conversion rules for capital stock 
(Grundkapital) and total equity (Eigenkapital) should be mentioned. Capital stock 
represented the residual item in the conversion procedure. The conversion of capital 
stock depended on the rate at which total equity was converted, and on the way total 
equity was divided between capital stock and reserves. Since paragraph 35 of the 
conversion law allowed for a discretionary split between capital stock and reserves, 
nominal capital stock could have been either above or below the value which was to 
be expected from the ratio of liabilities to assets. The valuation of total equity in 
turn depended on the conversion of the remaining balance sheet items and was 
calculated by taking the sum of capital stock and reserves minus the sum of capital 
adjustment and loss accounts.65 This revaluation procedure left total equity almost 
unchanged with an average conversion rate of 10:9.6, whereas capital stock 
experienced a devaluation of over 10% with an average conversion rate of 10:8.7, 
see Table 3.5. The reduction in nominal capital stock was offset by an increase in 
reserves which rose by an average of 34%, or 10:13.4, in the course of conversion. 
The increase in reported reserves was largely due to the disclosure of hidden 
reserves rather than the creation of new reserves.66
64 Ibid., p. 9. Hidden reserves had been accumulated by undervaluing assets. The 
valuation rule encouraged companies to dissolve hidden reserves as it reduced the scope o f  
revaluing assets at a later stage.
65 Ibid, p. 14.
66 Ibid, p. 15.
Table 3.5 Conversion of Balance Sheets of Public Limited Companies (in RM million as of 20 June 1948 [in italics], in DM million as of 21 June 1948)
assets sum of 
balance
industry sectors fixed assets current assets positions with 
uncertain 
valuation basis'
capital
depreciation
account
capital loss 
account
other
assets
tangible
assets
industrial
holdings2
invent­
ories
claims liquid
assets
fishery, agriculture, forestry, hunting 20 2 10 13 21 62 - - 14 142
32 0 10 2 2 0 0 - 0 46
mining, stone and soil, energy industry 5,855 641 277 546 792 1,292 - - 153 9,557
6,720 470 304 185 65 2 12 - 35 7,792
iron and metal production and 1,185 433 1,595 1,014 1,325 2,957 - - 860 9,369
manufacturing 1,942 459 2,026 340 141 0 22 - 8 4938
manufacturing industries (excluding 1,427 363 936 522 1,081 1,698 - - 337 6,364
iron and metal manufacturing) 2,303 268 1,182 122 104 5 22 0 8 4,013
construction and building material 33 7 23 133 148 254 - - 17 615
industry 71 4 19 16 11 0 0 - 0 122
commerce, finance and insurance 211 149 153 1,272 1,078 530 - - 136 3,529
industry 285 121 213 96 40 0 37 81 105 978
service industry 953 765 40 174 312 881 - - 92 3,217
659 624 37 32 29 0 113 0 2 1,496
transportation industry 802 34 42 264 527 589 - - 60 2,319
925 18 41 28 39 1 85 - 2 1,139
services in public interests 16 49 0 28 25 41 - - 22 180
13 37 0 4 2 0 1 - 0 56
total
% of sum of balance IRM1
10,502
29.8
2,443
6.9
3,076
8.7
3,968
11.2
5,310
15.0
8,303
23.5
- - 1,690
4.8
35,293
99.9
total
% of sum of balance [DM]
12,950
62.9
2,001
9.7
3,832
18.6
824
4.0
433
2.1
8
0.0
291
1.4
81
0.4
161
0.8
20,580
99.9
conversion rates 10:x 12.3 8.2 12.5 2.1 0.8 0.0 - - 1.0 5.8
Notes: Reichsmark in italics;1 Containing claims against the Reich for war damages, securities etc. the valuation basis for which was undetermined 
in June 1948.2 Investments in subsidiaries and affiliated companies.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, pp. 334-337.
Table 3.5 Conversion of Balance Sheets of Public Limited Companies (in RM million as of 20 June 1948 [in italics], in DM million as of 21 June 1948)
liabilities and net worth conversion ratio registered
balances
sum of 
balance
industry sectors capital reserves value adjustments3 provisions liabilities value adjust­ other capital total
stock ment of liabilitie stock equity
positions with s 10:X 10:X
uncertain
valuation basis
fixed floating long­ short­ number
assets4 assets term term
fishery, agriculture, forestry, hunting 36 16 - 3 19 3 7 56 2 142
34 9 - - 1 1 0 0 1 9.4 8.3 15 46
mining, stone and soil, energy industry 2,715 699 2,933 30 604 1,410 701 402 63 9,557
2,662 1,699 2,336 3 327 495 218 0 52 9.8 12.7 203 7,792
iron and metal production and 3,014 1,092 117 114 602 743 2,140 1,423 124 9,369
manufacturing 2,450 1,274 0 2 265 117 551 0 279 8.1 9.0 418 4,938
manufacturing industries (excl. iron and 2,893 839 150 81 404 284 802 813 98 6,364
metal manufacturing) 2,627 996 0 2 118 38 200 0 33 9.1 9.7 796 4,013
construction and building material 130 57 0 38 67 12 118 181 12 615
industry 64 21 0 0 17 2 15 0 2 4.9 4.5 40 122
commerce, finance and insurance 542 222 11 15 247 1,104 1,189 171 29 3,529
industry 447 134 - 0 80 125 187 0 5 8.2 6.1 140 978
service industry 1,167 125 32 28 144 1,179 218 305 18 3,217
920 230 10 0 149 142 41 0 4 7.9 8.0 156 1,496
transportation industry 667 323 341 53 372 77 170 283 33 2,319
549 200 251 0 74 26 30 1 9 8.2 6.7 147 1,139
services in public interest 84 23 0 0 9 24 28 10 2 160
43 4 - 0 1 3 5 - 0 5.1 4.3 37 56
total 11,248 3,396 3,583 362 2,469 4,837 5,373 3,644 381 35,293
% of sum of balance 31.9 9.6 10.2 1.0 7.0 13.7 15.2 10.3 1.1 100.0
total 9,796 4,567 2,597 8 1,031 949 1,245 1 386 1,952 20,580
% of sum of balance 47.6 22.2 12.6 0.0 5.0 4.6 6.0 0.0 1.9 99.9
conversion rate 10:x 8.7 13.4 7.2 0.2 4.2 2.0 2.3 0.0 10.1 8.7 9.6 5.8
Notes: Reichsmark in italics;3 Value adjustments is an entry on the liabilities side of a balance 
depreciation’ 4 Including indirect method of depreciation and other value adjustments: Source:
sheet, made to offset overvaluation of assets, also referred to as 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, pp. 334-337.
passive
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Table 3.5 provides the conversion rates of various balance sheet items at 
industry level. Table 3.5 shows that tangible assets were on average appreciated at a 
rate of 10:12.3. The construction and building material sector experienced the 
strongest appreciation of tangible assets, whilst the two service sectors faced a 
depreciation of tangible assets. Based on Table 3.5, claims held by companies were 
on average converted at a rate of 10:2.1, with the financial industry facing the least 
favourable and the mining, energy, and iron and steel sectors experiencing the most 
favourable conversion rates. Excluding claims held by banks, the average 
conversion rate for claims held by companies improved from 10:2.1 to 10:2.6, see 
Table 3.6. The average conversion rate of long and short term company liabilities 
also amounted to 10:2.1, see Table 3.5, whereas, the average conversion rate for 
long and short term liabilities excluding banks amounted to 10:2.4, according to 
Table 3.6. This suggests that on average, claims held by non financial companies 
were slightly less devalued than their liabilities. Moreover, it shows that private 
claims were considerably less devalued than bank deposits. Furthermore, Table 3.6 
shows that long term liabilities, including liabilities to banks, with a conversion 
ratio o f 10:2.3 were more devalued than short term liabilities with an average ratio 
of 10:2.6. The lower conversion rate for long term liabilities plus bank loans 
indicates that company cross borrowings were less devalued than capital market 
liabilities. A comparison of Tables 3.2 and 3.6 suggests that corporate bonds by 
non-banks were considerably less devalued than bonds issued by banks as Table 3.2 
shows a conversion rate of 10:1.0, whereas Table 3.6 reports a conversion rate of 
10:3.0. On the asset side, all items but tangible assets and inventories were 
devalued, whilst on the liability side all items but reserves were devalued, which led 
to an average conversion rate of 10:5.8 for the sum of balance, see Table 3.5.
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Table 3.6 Revaluation of Claims and Liabilities of Public Limited Companies (excluding banks), (in 
million)__________________________________________________________________________
nature of claims and liabilities final RM balance 
sheet
initial DM balance 
sheet
conversion 
ratio 10:x
claims
shares 39.9 37.0 9.2
mortgages 72.5 8.8 1.2
advance payments 169.9 76.5 4.5
claims on deliveries and services 1,045.4 157.1 1.5
intra group claims 817.2 343.0 4.2
other claims 836.4 154.9 1.9
sum of claims 2,981.4 777.3 2.6
cash resources
cash 745.5 51.1 0.7
bank deposits 3,257.2 259.7 0.8
bills of exchange 12.2 0.0 0.0
securities 626.1 106.4 1.7
sum of cash resources 4,641.0 417.3 0.9
sum of claims and cash resources 7,622.4 1,194.6 1.6
liabilities
bonds 1,663.3 498.1 3.0
mortgages 1,157.0 137.3 1.2
other long term loans 987.1 209.7 2.1
liabilities on advance payments 621.8 182.7 2.9
liabilities on deliveries and services 955.4 192.6 2.0
intra group liabilities 916.6 312.2 3.4
bills of exchange 22.7 2.3 1.0
bank liabilities 706.3 173.6 2.5
other liabilities 1,424.1 340.9 2.4
sum of liabilities 8,454.1 2,049.4 2.4
reserves 2,453.1 1,026.7 4.2
sum of liabilities and reserves 10,907.2 3,076.1 2.8
participating interests 2,411.7 1,992.3 8.3
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt ‘Die Kapital- und Bilanzumstellungen der Aktiengesellschaften’, in 
Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band 60 (Stuttgart), 1952, Table 9, p. 18.
Considering the effects the conversion of balance sheets had on capital 
structure, one finds that whereas capital stock comprised 31.9% of total assets 
before the conversion, its share increased to 47.6% after the conversion, see Table 
3.5. (Open) reserves over the sum of assets increased from 9.6% before the 
conversion to 22.2% after the conversion. The share of provisions over the sum of 
assets decreased by 2.0%. The share of long term liabilities decreased from 13.7% 
to 4.6% over the sum of assets, and the share of short term liabilities decreased from 
15.2% to 6.0% over the sum of assets. On the asset side, tangible assets and 
inventories increased proportionally the most, with an increase from 29.8% to 
62.9% and 8.7% to 18.6%, respectively. The appreciation of tangible assets and 
inventories was due to revaluation procedures which allowed companies to revalue 
their assets according to replacement costs, which had risen considerably, and by
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disclosing hidden reserves. A large appreciation of assets provided companies with 
a tax advantage as it enabled them to employ higher depreciation rates over the 
following years. However, the pending equalisation of burden law (see details 
below) limited the incentives of over-appreciating assets, as the rate of contribution 
to the equalisation of burden tax was based on the value of assets at the time of the 
conversion. The sectors experiencing the greatest absolute appreciation of assets 
included the energy sector, mining, textile, mechanical engineering and rail cars. 
Housing and the financial industry were excluded from the possibility of 
appreciating assets.67
The share of claims and liquid assets was reduced in the course of the balance 
sheet conversion, decreasing from 11.2% to 4.0% and from 15.0% to 2.1%, 
respectively. The ratio of total equity to total liabilities shifted in the course of the 
balance sheet conversion from 54:46 to 81:19. The ratio of fixed assets to current 
assets shifted from 51:49 before the reform to 75:25 after the reform, based on 
Table 3.5. The shift towards fixed assets and towards equity reflects the effects the 
devaluation of monetary assets had on the balance sheet structure of companies as 
monetary assets had been devalued by more than 90%. Since equity is calculated as 
the difference between total assets and liabilities, the cancellation of a large part of 
the debt led to a Schuldnergewinn (‘profit for debtors’). At the same time, the 
cancellation of parts of company claims led to a Glaubigerverlust (‘loss for 
creditors’). Among the net winners were sectors which had a great share of fixed 
assets and correspondingly a great share of long term debt. The sectors gaining most 
from the devaluation of liabilities included housing, electrical engineering, energy, 
mining, iron and steel, and shipbuilding. The sectors whose devaluation of claims 
and liquid assets exceeded those of their liabilities included breweries, rail cars and 
shipping.68 Moreover, the ratio of fixed assets to long term capital improved in the 
course of the conversion. Before the conversion, fixed assets amounted to 53.9% of 
long term capital (equity plus long term credits). This ratio increased to 86.7% after 
the conversion, based on Table 3.5.
67 Ibid., pp. 20-25.
68 Ibid., p. 19.
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Table 3.7 shows that conversion rates for capital stock varied widely around the 
mean. For about half of the companies the nominal value of capital stock remained 
unchanged. For 15.8% of companies the nominal value of capital stock increased at 
a weighted average rate of 10 to 14.6. With the appreciation of their capital stock, 
those companies almost doubled their share in total capital stock from 7.3% in RM 
denomination to 13% in DM denomination. For 34.5% of companies the nominal 
value of capital stock was reduced at a weighted average conversion rate of 10 to 
5.3. Among those with the greatest devaluation in capital stock were companies 
which had large parts of their fixed investments in the Eastern zone occupied by the 
Soviet Union. The construction industry was another sector which had to write 
down a large portion of its capital stock as it had to write down most of its claims 
against the former Reich. The sectors with the greatest appreciation in capital stock 
included the textile industry, mining, and the rubber and asbestos industry.69 
Unfortunately, the findings in Table 3.7 cannot be reproduced for the sample of 
companies introduced in chapter five as balance sheet data on these companies was 
compiled from 1952 onwards, or after the conversion had taken place.
Table 3.7 Conversion of Companies’ Capital Stock broken down by the Rate of Conversion (at the 
end of December 1951)_________________ _________________ ______________ __________
conversion rate companies capital stock before 
conversion
capital stock 
after conversion
average of 
conversion
number % number % Mill DM 10:X
10:10 1,187 49.7 6,077.6 47.8 6077.6 10
greater than 10:10 but 
lower than 10:20 316 13.2 907.8 7.1 1,275.7 14.1
greater than 10:20 63 2.6 28.2 0.2 90.7 32.2
greater than 10:5 but 
lower than 10:10 494 20.8 3,909.9 30.7 2,636.7 6.7
lower than 10:5 327 13.7 1,801.5 14.2 399.9 2.2
sum 2,387 100 12,724.9 100 10.480.6 8.2
Note: This table also contains companies which have changed from public limited to another form 
of legal entity, therefore it is not, strictly speaking, comparable with Table 3.5.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, ‘Die Kapital- und Bilanzumstellungen der Aktiengesellschaften’, 
in Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band 60 (Stuttgart), 1952, p. 13 covering almost 94% 
of all converted balance sheets.
At this point the reader may be reminded that the evaluation of capital stock 
derives as residual as it is dependant on (a) the conversion of equity capital
69 Ibid., p. 15.
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(Eigenkapital) and its distribution between capital stock and (open) reserves, and 
(b) on the evaluation of the remaining balance sheet items.
3.7. The L astenausg leichsgesetz  (the law of equalisation of burden)
The aim of the equalisation of burden law was to compensate for war damages, 
damages occurred during the immediate aftermath of the war, and the currency 
reform. Based on an assessment of all real assets (including houses, real estate, 
plants, and inventories) on the one hand and of losses due to bombing, expulsion 
from the east, reparation payments and the currency reform on the other hand, it was 
intended to impose a capital levy on owners of real assets with which to compensate 
those who had suffered losses.70 At first, it was considered to link the equalisation of 
burden law with the currency reform. However, in the end the occupation 
authorities decided to enact only the currency reform and to leave the equalisation 
of burden issue to be solved at a later stage by the German authorities.71
Establishing the value of real assets proved to be a lengthy process partly 
resorting to figures provided by the conversion of balance sheets. Estimating the 
value of losses was practically impossible. With no data available concerning losses 
suffered by refugees from the east or concerning losses of personal belongings due 
to bombing in the west, the valuation of losses was rudimentary at best.72 The 
difficulties in evaluating real assets and losses postponed the equalisation of burden 
law considerably, being finally passed in August 1952. The delayed settlement of 
the issue of equalisation of burden meant that it was uncertain on what basis the 
value of contribution to the Lastenausgleich would be assessed. This uncertainty 
contributed to the inflationary pressures experienced in the second half of 1948, as 
companies tried to blur their assets by shifting out of real assets into banknotes, 
since the latter could be hidden more easily.73
70 Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, p. 127.
71 Pfleiderer, ‘Two Types o f Inflation’, p. 361.
72 Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, p. 128
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In order to settle the important issue of property evaluation, a provisional 
Lastenausgleich, the so-called Immediate Aid Levy, was passed in August 1949. 
Under the Immediate Aid Levy (Soforthilfe) it was announced that the assessment 
was to be based on the assets held at the day of the currency reform, at which date 
firms had already been obliged to submit a complete inventory of their assets. It was 
further announced that 50% of the assets assessed in that way were subject to a 
capital levy to be paid over the following 30 years, with the last instalment due in 
February 1979. The immediate aid law also specified that the capital levy should 
amount to 3% of the underlying assets plus a one off levy over 4% on ‘necessary’ 
business inventories, and over 15% on all other inventories.74 The total amount to be 
generated by the capital levy was estimated at DM 80 billion.75 By the end of 1959, 
a capital levy amounting to DM 27 billion had been raised and redistributed.76 
Receivers of these funds were 9 million refugees, 3.4 million bombing victims, a 
further 0.37 million received compensation for losses incurred during the currency 
reform.77
The settlement of the issues raised by the equalisation of burden helped 
normalise the German economy to the extent that it dissolved the distortions created 
by the pending law of equalisation of burden. According to the West German 
Ministry of Finance, industry contributed about 70%, agriculture contributed 10%, 
and owners of residential real estate provided 20% of assets to the capital levy.78 In 
real terms, the capital levy decreased with proceeding inflation as the assets which 
served as the basis for valuing the contribution were not indexed. With an inflation 
rate of about 25% between 1952 and 1965, the capital levy was reduced by about
73 Ibid, p. 137.
74 Lutz, ‘The German Currency Reform’, p. 138 and Sauermann, ‘Der amerikanische 
Plan’, pp. 201-202.
75 Roskamp, Capital Formation, p. 219.
76 E. Kirch, Die Neuordnung des Geldwesens, des Kreditmarktes und des 
Verkehrsmarktes der westdeutschen Wirtschaft nach der Wdhrungsreform’ (Dissertation, 
University of Marburg, 1964), p. 41.
77 F.-W. Henning, Das industrialisierte Deutschand 1914 bis 1972, (Paderbom, 1974), p. 
238.
78 Roskamp, Capital Formation, p. 219.
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20% in real terms over this period.79 During the first four years of implementation, 
the equalisation of burden fund constituted about 7% of total tax revenues of the 
federal government and the Lander. From 1952, revenues generated by the 
equalisation of burden fund decreased relative to total tax revenues from around 
6.7% in 1952 to 2.4% in 1963.80
The equalisation of burden levy constituted a special form of recurring property 
taxation paid mainly out of current profits over a long period of time. As such it 
intended a redistribution of wealth from those who had suffered less to those who 
had suffered major war damages and currency reform losses. Since residential 
dwellings were much more affected by bombing raids during the war than were 
industrial plants, which were protected by air defence and harder to hit in any event, 
this law meant effectively a redistribution of wealth from companies to individuals. 
By separating the equalisation of burden issue from the currency reform, the capital 
levy became a political issue and was generally perceived as a separate measure 
unconnected with the earlier implemented currency reform.81 The German 
authorities were concerned that the capital levy might deprive the economy of 
investment capital as the funds allocated to individuals supported consumer 
spending at the expense of capital formation.82 Therefore, it was politically accepted 
that the system of equalisation of losses should be no more than a meagre 
compromise falling far short of a complete equalisation of damages. As it turned out 
that the capital levy would not present a heavy burden on companies, which were 
generally able to pay their instalments out of profits, companies voiced little 
opposition against the imposed capital levy.83 In particular as the 
Lastenausgleichsgesetz allowed contributors to avoid income tax whose rates were 
far higher than that of the capital levy. In order to generate greater income to the
79 F.-W. Henning, ‘Die Untemehmensfinanzierung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
von 1952 bis 1965, unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung einiger Industrie- 
Aktiengesellschaften’ in D. Petzina (ed.), Zur Geschichte der Untemehmensfinanzierung, 
Schriften des Vereins fur Socialpolitik, Vol. 196, (Berlin, 1990), pp. 103-104. Between 
1950 and 1973 the cost o f living rose by 92%, see Henning, Das industrialisierte 
Deutschland, p. 233.
80 Monthly Report o f the Deutsche Bundesbank (June, 1963), pp. 112-113.
81 Metzler, ‘The Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith Plan’, p. 368.
82 Heller, ‘Tax and Monetary Reform’, pp. 228-229.
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fund during the early years of its existence, when it faced the majority of claims, a 
law was passed in 1953, expiring in January 1955, which encouraged early payment 
to the fund by allowing contributors to deduct these payments from taxable 
income.84
3.8. The Wertbereinigungsgesetz (the secu rities validation law)
The objective of the securities validation law, which was passed in August 
1949, was to establish the lawful ownership of financial securities. This became 
necessary because a bulk of securities was either lost or looted during the war. The 
remaining securities were predominantly deposited with the former central bank, the 
Reichsbank, or in the headquarters of the former big three commercial banks, all 
located in that part of Berlin which was occupied by the Soviet occupation 
authorities. The Soviet authorities had confiscated these securities and it was 
considered unlikely that they would release them. In order to newly identify the 
lawful owners of securities, every security holder had to submit a formal claim. The 
banks then tried to verify the claim on the basis of duplicates and issued an 
equivalent credit note in the form of a ‘global* (allumfassend) security. Trading in 
securities with this form of affidavit started in 1947, and gradually these ‘global’ 
securities were replaced by singe documents.85 The nominal value of shares could 
only be determined after the value of capital stock had been established in the 
course of the conversion of balance sheets taking place between 1948 and 1952. In 
order to facilitate a smooth listing of the newly validated securities, a law was 
passed in December 1951, which exempted companies from issuing a prospectus 
containing details on the conversion of monetary and real assets due to the currency 
reform. Without this exemption, official trading of securities would have been 
suspended until the company had issued a prospectus announcing the conversion
83 Heller, ‘The Role o f Fiscal-Monetary Policy’, pp. 544-545.
84 Reuss, Fiscal Policy for Growth, p. 122.
85 B. Rudolph, ‘Effekten- und Wertpapierborsen, Finanztermin- und Devisenborsen seit 
1945’ in H. Pohl (ed.), Deutsche Borsengeschichte, (Frankfurt a. M., 1992), p. 296. 
Securities without affidavit were declared void and replaced by new securities.
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rate of their assets.86 In the course of the securities validation law, shares worth DM 
17 billion, and bonds worth DM 10 billion were registered.87
The establishment of the rightful owners of securities was an important step 
towards the revival of the West German capital market, since securities trading 
could only take place after and to the extent that the owners of securities had been 
identified.88 However, the validation of securities was interconnected with the 
conversion of balance sheets which meant that the actual value of all individual 
securities was not established until 1952. In other words, securities trading was 
restricted by the slow process of balance sheet conversion and security validation 
hampering an early revival of the West German capital market. Table 3.8 shows that 
self financing and short term credits constituted the most important component of 
financial sources between 1948 and 1950. However, self financing and short term 
credits showed a negative growth rate of minus 4.6%, with its relative importance 
decreasing from 77.1% in the first year after the currency reform to 53.4% in 1950. 
Unfortunately, records of the Bank deutscher Lander do not mention whether the 
decrease of this financing component was due to a decrease in self-financing or a 
decrease in short-term debt, private credits or reinvested depreciation. At the same 
time, medium and long term bank credits showed the second biggest increase, both 
in relative and in absolute terms, achieving a growth rate of 588.6% between 
1948/49 and 1950 (see Table 3.8). This kind of growth was only surpassed by the 
growth of European Recovery funds which grew by 819.7% over the period. The 
relative share of listed securities remained comparatively stable, growing at a rate of 
41.2%.
86 Ibid., p. 297.
87 Kirch, Die Neuordnung des Geldwesens, p. 48.
88 By 1946 all West German stock exchanges traded in the over the counter market. 
Trading in official quotations commenced one year after the currency reform in July 1949. 
See Rudolph, ‘Effekten- und Wertpapierborsen’, pp. 294-295.
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Table 3.8 Contribution of Financial Sources for Investments between June 1948 and 1950 (in DM
million)
sources of finance 21.06.1948-
30.06.1949
01.07.1949-
31.12.1949
1950 growth rate 
from 48/49 
to 1950
total % total % total % %
1. public sector appropriation 1,950 14.1% 1,620 18.2% 3,630 19.0% 86.2%
2. capital market 1,030 7.4% 1,237 13.9% 2,927 15.3% 184.2%
a medium and long term credits by
commercial banks1 220 1.6% 429 4.8% 1,515 7.9% 588.6%
b lendings and allotments of
housing money by building
societies 80 0.6% 88 1.0% 424 2.2% 430.0%
c marketing of securities2 260 1.9% 190 2.1% 367 1.9% 41.2%
d investment by life insurance and
commodity insurance 310 2.2% 280 3.1% 421 2.2% 35.8%
e investment of social insurance
companies 160 1.2% 250 2.8% 200 1.0% 25.0%
3. transmitted counterpart funds 1933 1.4% 2153 2.4% 1,775 9.3% 819.7%
sum of 1 to 3: medium and long
term external finance 3,173 22.9% 3,072 34.5% 8,332 43.6% 162.6%
4. pre financing by central banks - - 71 0.8% 586 3.1% .
5. short term bank loans, private
credits, reinvested depreciation
and self financing 10.7004 77.1% 5,7702 64.8% 10,2104 53.4% -4.6%
sum of 1 to 5: sum of financial
sources for investment 13,870 100% 8,910 100% 19,130 100%
Note: 1 Excluding credits from counterpart funds, marketing of securities or credits pre-financed by 
the central banks.2 To avoid double counting: excluding placements with large scale public 
subscribers and with insurance companies.3 Excluding counterpart funds to finance certain imports 
by the federal railway.4 Approximately.
Source: Geschafitsbericht der Bank deutscher Lander (December, 1950), p. 35
3.9. Price liberalisation
During the pre-currency reform period the four-power allied control authority 
continued the German laws and regulations on price controls and rationing which 
had gradually been introduced under the German national socialist regime since 
1936. This meant that prices for most goods were subject to approval by German 
price formation offices whilst the allied control authority reserved itself the right to 
control prices of the most important basic commodities produced by industry and 
agriculture exercising this function in a most cumbersome and rigid manner. In the 
absence of price control, prices for agricultural and basic products were likely to 
have risen more than prices for other goods, as the disruption of the German 
economy due to territorial losses in the east most severely affected these sectors. 
The split of control over price controls, however, led to an inverse tendency. While 
consumer goods roughly doubled in price, prices of agricultural products and 
industrial raw material increased by 50% or less during the pre-currency reform
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period. This unequal increase in prices during the pre-currency years reflected a 
preference by the occupation authorities (with the exception of Great Britain) to 
prevent price increases of most basic goods, partly out of fear for inflation and 
partly driven by reparation considerations.89
Both the occupation authorities and the leading German authorities devoted 
themselves to a sudden decontrol of most parts of the economy as a complementary 
measure to the currency reform. Three days after the currency reform a law was 
enacted which permitted a liberalisation of prices for the great majority of consumer 
and investment goods. The law contained directives for rationing and price policy.90 
The process of price liberalisation in connection with the currency reform provided 
a strong impulse to economic activity, as it induced producers to offer their goods in 
the market. Despite an extensive increase in the supply of goods, demand outpaced 
supply and consumer prices rose at an annualised rate of 33.1% during the first four 
months after the currency reform. During the same period, producer prices increased 
at an annualised rate of 45.0%. The difference between the consumer and the 
producer price index was largely due to the fact that the former included housing 
rents, transport and other services whose controlled prices remained constant, whilst 
most controlled prices of the latter were raised.91 During the height of the post 
reform inflation, a majority of Germans favoured of a return to an administered 
economy. However, the authorities kept their nerves and, instead of reintroducing 
price controls, passed a law which prohibited the charging of exorbitant prices, and 
published a list which served as guidance to ‘normal prices’. By the fourth quarter 
of 1948, price levels were approaching the limits set by the monetary frame and the
89 See Mendershausen, ‘Prices, Money and Distribution o f Goods’, p. 647-651 and p. 
664 for a list o f commodities which remained under price control after the currency 
reform. The issue o f public investment programmes favouring price controlled sectors is 
dealt with in detail in chapter 3.
90 Sauermann, ‘Economic and Financial Rehabilitation’, p. 317. Rationing was not 
completely eliminated, with essential commodities such as textiles and shoes remaining 
subject to rationing. Agricultural products and raw materials continued to be subject to 
rationing and price control, as were rents and wages.
91 H. Giersch et al., The Fading Miracle: Four Decades o f Market Economy in Germany, 
(Cambridge, 1992), p. 42. Real purchasing power was not heavily affected by this kind of  
price increases, as wages had been raised by up to 15% just before the currency reform. 
Controls on wages were lifted in November 1948, see ibid., p. 43.
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fiscal surplus, with the annualised increase in consumer prices reaching 8.8% and 
that of producer prices reaching 2.9%.92
Despite principally embracing market economic principles, it was decided to 
keep sectors which were considered most crucial to the development of the West 
German economy under price control. In light of low prevailing savings rates, 
which mirrored the high propensity to consume during the early post currency 
reform period, it was feared that too high an interest rate would develop, and that 
price controlled sectors in particular would not be able to bear market rates. The 
insufficient adjustment of prices in controlled sectors entailed a policy of subsidies 
and subsidised credits to agriculture, housing, infrastructure, mining, the energy 
sector and the steel industry. These public investment programmes conducted for 
price controlled industries in turn contributed to the delay in capital market 
development, as did various other interventions specifically introduced to curb 
capital market mechanisms in order to channel investments in price controlled 
sectors.93
3.10. Foreign trade and the establishment of a uniform exchange rate
During the early period of occupation, the allied authorities forbade individual 
Germans to engage in international trade and all trade went through allied 
channels.94 Before the currency reform imported goods were bought by the Joint 
Export Import Agency (JEIA) at higher world market prices and sold to the 
Germans at lower controlled prices. To cover the difference generated by this 
practice, German exports were bought by the JEIA at lower controlled prices and 
sold at higher world market prices. In May 1948, a general exchange rate of US 30 
cents for one Deutsch Mark was established, which was relevant for all exported 
and imported goods, with the exception of food imports. Food imports were sold at
92 Ibid., p. 43.
93 See a discussion on the development o f price controlled sectors in chapter 4.
94 Only in 1950 did control over foreign trade revert completely to Germany, see W. F. 
Stolper and K. W. Roskamp, ‘Planning a Free Economy: Germany 1945-1960, Zeitschrift 
Jiir die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Vol. 135 (1979), No. 3, pp. 382 and 391.
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legal domestic prices until May 1949, implying a conversion rate of more than 30 
cents to the Deutsch Mark. From May 1949 food imports were sold at world market 
prices and faced an exchange rate of 30 cents for one Deutsch Mark like all other 
imports, which led to a sharp increase in prices for food imports.95
At the end of September 1949 along with other European currencies, the 
occupation authorities agreed to devalue the Deutsch Mark by 20.6% against the US 
dollar. This established an exchange rate of US 23.8 cents for one Deutsch Mark.96 
At that time all German exports had still to be paid for in US dollars and no bilateral 
exchanges were permitted. However, soon after the establishment of a new 
exchange rate parity, the occupation authorities gave up the dollar pricing practice 
and permitted bilateral exchange in Europe.97 The new exchange rate parity and the 
following liberalisation of trade marked the beginning of a resurgence of the 
German export industry. And the West German economy, which had suffered from 
trade deficit and a balance of payment crisis during the first few post currency 
reform years, soon started to enjoy considerable trade surpluses. The growth in 
German exports was later boosted by increased world aggregate demand provided 
by the Korean War rearmament. And Germany’s structure of industrial base, with 
its strength in the manufacture of capital goods and chemicals, matched the 
structure of export demand well.98
3.11. Concluding remarks
At least three major effects can be attributed to the currency reform. First, it 
created a stable monetary environment. With the introduction of the Deutsch Mark,
95 Mendershausen, ‘Prices, Money and the Distribution o f Goods’, p. 669.
96 Wandel, Die Entstehung der Bank deutscher Lander, pp. 154-155. The occupation 
authorities had exclusive jurisdiction on the matter o f exchange rates. The French 
government only approved a devaluation o f the German mark against the US dollar by 10- 
15%, the newly established German government demanded a devaluation o f 23.8%. The 
Western allies finally agreed on a devaluation o f 20.6%. This established a US$/DM  
exchange rate which was also effective after the great inflation in 1923. Choosing the same 
parity was thought to have a positive psychological effect enhancing trust in the exchange 
rate.
97 Stolper and Roskamp, ‘Planning a Free Economy’, p. 392.
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rationing and barter tender were replaced by monetary transactions, which 
considerably enhanced economic activity. Second, the currency reform 
discriminated against different forms of monetary assets partly depending on the 
owner of the assets. This discriminating conversion procedure led to a significant 
redistribution of wealth within the West German economy, affecting the economy’s 
saving structure. Third, the currency reform altered the capital structure of 
companies since real assets were significantly less devalued than monetary assets.
a. monetary stability
The currency reform was successful in eliminating the excess supply of money 
which had impeded economic activities, and its technical design contributed to its 
immediate success in forcing producers to release their accumulated stocks of goods 
so as to remain liquid." Although economic recovery had already started to pick up 
before the reform, it paved the way for the introduction of market mechanisms 
which aided the economic environment to achieve a more rapid recovery, as it 
enabled more complicated decision making with a longer time horizon, notably that 
of investment, to occur.100 According to Domes and Wolffsohn whether economic 
recovery was already ‘in full swing’ by the time the currency reform was 
implemented, or whether the recovery was triggered by the currency reform is 
secondary. They state that investigations into decision making processes undertaken 
by political scientists have found that ‘decision-makers act in accordance with their 
perception of reality, not in response of reality itself. In the view of the West 
German public, the economic recovery was primarily due to the currency reform.101 
The favourable association of the currency reform with economic recovery shows 
that the German public valued the improvements in living standards experienced 
since the reform higher than the losses suffered in the course of the reform.
98 Carlin, ‘Economic Reconstruction in Western Germany’, p. 61.
99 Carlin, ‘West German growth and institutions’, p. 464.
100 Carlin, ‘Economic Reconstruction in Western Germany’, pp. 53-54.
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b. redistribution of wealth
The currency reform induced a significant redistribution of wealth as different 
devaluation methods were applied depending on the type of asset and on the status 
of the owner or borrower of the respective assets. As it has been shown, public 
authorities gained most from the currency conversion, turning them from the 
biggest debtors to the biggest creditors. With no debt to service and a generous 
initial endowment which accounted for roughly one quarter of legal money creation 
(see Table 3.3) public authorities were the single most important provider of 
external funds during the first post reform years (see Table 3.8).
The second biggest winner in the currency reform was the banking sector, 
which enjoyed generous liquidity as it was compensated for losses due to the 
cancellation of public debt. This put banks in a situation which allowed them to 
provide the private sector with credits without having to rediscount with the central 
banks. Furthermore, as long as the capital market was handicapped by the 
incomplete implementation of the currency reform, in particular the conversion of 
real assets and the establishment of the rightful owners of securities, commercial 
banks held an extremely powerful position in deciding whom to provide with 
external funds. In a situation where external capital was scarce while profitable 
investment opportunities were ample, numerous companies sought external capital 
in addition to their internally generated funds, and it was largely in the hands of 
banks and public authorities to decide which sectors and which companies to 
provide with credit.
Relative to the public sector, the monetary situation of the non-banking private 
sector deteriorated in the course of the currency reform as private bank deposits 
were converted at roughly the same rate as were private bank credits. However, as 
has been established in the chapter, the actual conversion of 10:0.8 for company and 
household deposits was considerably above the rate of 10:0.65 which the literature
101 J. Domes and M. Wolffsohn, ‘Setting the Course of the Federal Republic of Germany: 
Major Policy Decisions in the Bi-Zonal Economic Council and Party Images, 1947-1949’ 
Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Vol. 135 (1979), No. 3, p. 342.
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uniformly quotes. Nevertheless, private saving rates were rather low during the 
immediate post reform period. The German public used most of its initial 
endowment to satisfy its backlog in demand, and after the unexpected cancellation 
of a large part of blocked accounts was left with less savings than anticipated.102 
Due to the rather low savings rate and high demands for credits, the authorities 
feared that market interest rates would be too high for an economy in recovery still 
suffering from distortions, and decided to circumvent market mechanisms in order 
to ensure investments in certain sectors.
c. changes in companies’ capital structure
Introducing the findings on balance sheet conversions to earlier findings on the 
wealth redistributing effects of monetary conversions, adds further insights into the 
complexities of the 1948 currency reform. As the analysis of the conversion of 
company balance sheets has shown, the currency reform had greatly improved the 
position of those who possessed non-monetary assets and punished those with 
assets such as money, demand and saving deposits. With an average conversion rate 
of 10:8.7 for capital stock compared to a conversion for bonds with a rate of 
between 10:1.0 and 10:3.0, and for bank deposits with a rate of 10:0.8, equity 
owners were highly favoured by the currency reform, while small private savers 
bore most of the burden.
The unequal treatment of monetary assets relative to real assets significantly 
affected companies’ gearing ratios. Whilst companies’ claims and liabilities were 
written off at an average rate of 10:2.1, capital stock was converted at an average 
rate of 10:8.7 and total equity at a rate of 10:9.6 (see Table 3.5). This shifted the 
ratio of total equity to total liabilities from 54:46 before the reform to 81:19 after 
the reform. Furthermore, a strong appreciation of fixed assets in the course of the 
currency reform, improved the ratio of fixed assets to long term liabilities from 
53.9% before to 86.7% after the reform. Chapter five will address the question
102 The low voluntary saving rate was partly offset by so called forced savings through 
high prices and taxation.
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whether companies tried to reverse the effects the currency reform caused to their 
balance sheet structures.
In summary, the chapter has shown that the currency reform induced a 
significant redistribution of wealth, endowing banks and public authorities with 
ample financial means to provide external funds to the non financial private sector. 
Whereas the monetary part of the currency reform was carried out within months, 
the conversion of balance sheets and the establishment of the rightful owners of 
securities proved to be a lengthy procedure. The lengthy process of completing the 
related securities and balance sheet reforms severely restricted trading of capital 
market securities, since securities trading could only take place after and to the 
extent that the owners of securities had been identified. In addition to its limited 
scope of providing a platform for securities trading, the West German capital 
market was also restricted in its role of providing funds as public authorities 
introduced measures which aimed at circumventing the capital market. The nature 
of these measures, and how they affected the development of the West German 
capital market is addressed in the following chapter.
Based on the absence of literature capturing the full extent of the implications 
of the currency reform and based on the absence of a discussion on the complexity 
of the currency reform in newspapers of the time, it can be argued that neither the 
U.S. nor the German authorities nor the German public were fully aware of all the 
implications the currency reform had on the distribution of wealth in the German 
society. In other words, literature does not suggest that the authorities deliberately 
induced these redistributional effects as it does not suggest that they were fully 
aware of all the aspects and the extent of redistribution. The thesis has identified at 
least three reasons why the distributional consequences of the currency reform 
could not be known in June 1948: (1) the conversion o f balance sheets was not 
finalised until 1952 (and in some cases even later), so the full effects of different 
treatment of assets and liabilities could not possibly be known accurately in June 
1948, especially relating to assets in the Soviet zone; (2) perhaps even more 
importantly, the full consequences of generous treatment of assets depended upon 
subsequent growth and inflation; as it turned out growth was explosive and inflation
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non-trivial, both factors which enhanced the value of real corporate assets, but ex 
ante neither could be known in June 1948, in other words had growth been slower 
and inflation less, the balance sheet windfall would have been correspondingly 
reduced; (3) the value of balance sheet windfalls was contingent on the exact nature 
of subsequent tax legislation, which in turn was highly contingent on the political 
balance at the time of passage - in the event, deteriorating relations with the Soviets 
and the Korean War introduced political factors that could not have been foreseen in 
mid-1948. Also, in drafting policy, the authorities may have wished to err on the 
side of safety: had liabilities been treated less drastically, bankruptcies might have 
been substantially higher, something the authorities surely wished to avoid. But 
what seemed like a small margin of safety in mid-1948 had become much more 
generous later - for the reasons given above.
In as far as the authorities were aware of redistributional effects, they made a 
timid attempt to partly undo these effects by implementing the equalisation of 
burden law. The U.S. occupation authorities, who played a major role in 
implementing the currency reform, saw it as a responsibility of the German 
authorities to carry out the equalisation of burden law. As an equalisation of burden 
could only be established after assets had been converted, the process of 
equalisation was delayed, and in the end amounted to hardly more than a ‘token 
adjustment of burden’.
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4. The influence of public policy on capital market 
development in West Germany during the early post World 
War II period
4.1. Introduction
Although the majority of the German as well as the occupation authorities was 
keen on establishing a free market economy together with the implementation of the 
currency reform, public interventions were manifold during the immediate post 
currency reform period. In particular, a number of fiscal measures were designed to 
solve the problem of capital formation as capital formation was considered as one of 
the most important issues to be tackled.1 However, the economic state of post 
reform Germany was considered too fragile to cope with an ‘orthodox’ method of 
overcoming its capital shortage, i.e. lifting interest ceilings. In particular, it was 
feared that the ‘basic goods’ industries, which included coal mining, iron and steel 
production, housing and the utility sector, would be unable to make sufficient 
investments in an interest rate environment of between 10% and 15%. Therefore, 
the occupation authorities together with the German authorities introduced a number 
of policies including investment aid programmes, tax concessions and depreciation 
allowances which were aimed at channelling low cost capital into certain sectors 
considered crucial to the overall recovery of the economy.
The following chapter provides an analysis of the influence of public policies 
on the financing behaviour of West German companies. The chapter focuses on 
foreign as well as on domestic investment aid programmes and establishes an 
overview of the regulatory and tax situation facing the capital market. It argues that 
the German authorities agreed to compromise on a partial lifting of price controls in 
anticipation of the arrival of foreign investment funds which were thought to be 
sufficient to finance the investment needs of price controlled sectors. Furthermore, 
it will be argued that the policy of partial price control negatively affected the 
development of the capital market as taxation of capital market products was
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structured to favour investments in price controlled industries. However, by the 
early 1950s the need for capital market interventions became less compelling as 
economic distortions became less apparent and most remaining price controls were 
lifted between 1952 and 1954. Therefore, the early post war period can be divided 
into two eras. The first period covers the years from 1948 to 1954, which was 
characterised by public policies aimed at circumventing the capital market. During 
this period the capital market was paralysed by distorting taxation, which most 
heavily affected the equity market, and interest rate ceilings, which made 
investments in bonds unattractive. The second period covers the years after 1954. 
The year 1954 was an important turning point for the development of the German 
capital market as it was the year in which most public investment programmes came 
to an end and distorting taxation was abolished. The fast resurgence of the capital 
market after 1954 was particularly impressive considering the severe restrictions the 
German capital market had suffered since the early 1930s.
The chapter also analyses the development of prices and output in different 
sectors. It will be shown that prices in a number of controlled sectors were raised 
while free market sectors experienced a deflationary price environment. This 
finding qualifies the common assertion that companies operating in free market 
sectors were able to generate excessive profits by demanding high prices while 
enjoying low costs due to low input prices during the early post war period. 
Nevertheless, it can be assumed that prices in controlled sectors might have risen 
even more if they had been allowed to adjust freely. Furthermore, findings on 
temporary capacity constraints experienced by price controlled sectors in the late 
1940s / early 1950s suggests that increased investment efforts in price controlled 
sectors were required in order to avert bottlenecks.
In summary, the chapter portrays the transition period from a govemmentally 
directed allocation of scarce investment funds to allocations mainly guided by 
market forces. It will be shown that Germany did not rely on the capital market to 
overcome initial structural disequilibria, and thus the distinguishing feature of the
1 Stolper and Roskamp, ‘Planning a Free Economy’, p. 388.
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first phase after the currency reform was a sustained high level of public capital 
formation, benefiting various key sectors of the economy whose common feature 
was that they remained under price controls. Public authorities feared that 
investment funds were too scarce to allow their allocation by the market. In 
particular, it was considered to be first priority to ensure that key sectors which 
created positive externalities to the overall economy were supplied with investment 
funds. In order to offset the fact that these sectors remained under price controls 
they were provided with capital at favourable terms. In other words, the demand by 
the occupation authorities to keep strategic sectors of the economy under price 
control led to constraints in self financing for the price controlled sectors which in 
turn led to the need for investment aid, regulations, tax distortions etc. In turn, these 
impeded the development of the capital market and affected the financing 
opportunities of firms in non controlled sectors. During the first post reform years, 
government savings were substantial and more than offset low savings rates by 
households. However, it was always hoped that rising household income would be 
accompanied by higher volumes of private savings which would make public 
interventions in the capital market unnecessary. This hope was largely fulfilled by 
1956 by which time public policy measures distorting the capital market had been 
largely withdrawn.2
4.2. Distortions created by partial price control
Along with the 1948 currency reform, price controls for most consumer and 
investment goods were lifted. Ludwig Erhard, head of the German economic 
administration, was one of the main promoters of an immediate liberalisation of 
prices, which he understood as a necessary complementary measure to the currency 
reform in order to induce producers to supply goods. Given the deprivation of goods 
the German public had suffered during the war and the post war period until the 
currency reform, a high propensity to consume and low saving rates were 
anticipated. While Erhard was aware of the importance of the availability of goods 
for the social stability of the country, he was also wary of the effects increased
2 Ibid., pp. 398-399.
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consumption might have on inflation and on the availability of household savings 
for corporate investment. Therefore, Erhard agreed to a partial liberalisation of 
prices, which was demanded by the occupation authorities who feared a rise in 
inflation and by parts of the German parliament who opposed a complete 
abolishment of public dirigisme. Given the observation that the demand by the 
Western occupation authorities to leave products like coal, steel, electricity and 
lumber under price control constituted a form of hidden reparation, it is arguable 
whether German authorities would have been able to bring about a complete 
abolishment of price controls.3 However despite price controls, prices in the 
controlled sectors were raised a number of times, mostly reflecting the changing 
attitude by the occupation authorities towards Germany as a whole and individual 
sectors in particular. The last remaining price controls were gradually lifted between 
1952 and 1954.
The economic argument in favour of partial price controls was that by keeping 
core sectors of the industry such as coal, steel, utilities, agriculture and housing 
below market prices, inflationary pressures could be reduced and companies which 
operated in the free market economy could acquire large enough profits as not to 
have to rely to a large extent on external funds. The financial requirements of those 
sectors kept under price control were expected to be provided by the soon-to-arrive 
foreign aid funds and through public spending in these sectors. Ludwig Erhard has 
been quoted to have said, ‘After the currency reform we will not have in Germany 
any capital for investment purposes. If we tried to accumulate that capital from 
small savings at the expense of the already low standard of living that would be a
3 The policy of partial price control was initially enforced by the occupation authorities. 
W. Abelshauser, ‘American Aid and West German Economic Recovery: A 
Macroeconomic Perspective’, in C. S. Maier and G. Bischof (eds.), The Marshall Plan and 
Germany, (New York/ London, 1991), p. 380 sees in the decision of the Western allies to 
leave products like coal, steel, electricity and lumber under price control a form of hidden 
reparations. According to Abelshauser ‘American Aid’ p. 380, ‘The French occupation 
element dictated the export of coal, lumber, electric current and scrap, even though far 
larger export earnings could have been made by finishing these products rather than 
shipping them out as raw materials. ... The suspicion that these ‘exports’ were little more 
than a form of hidden reparations is confirmed when the prices are considered. The Allies 
set $ 10.50 as the benchmark for a ton of coal, most of which they in fact bought for
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difficult way. We hope to get foreign aid [Marshall Plan] for these purposes. Then 
the solution will be that investment will be financed by foreign aid, while German 
incomes at low, medium and high levels can be used essentially for consumption.’4 
On the same subject Abelshauser states, ‘As late as February 1948, Ludwig Erhard 
still operated under the assumption that he could practically finance his entire 
investment programme for the Bizone out of the Marshall Plan, which would have 
allowed the German national income to go towards consumer products.’5 High 
consumer demand was undoubtedly an important factor in promoting investments in 
the newly established market economy. In a prospering economy with the outcome 
of the currency reform still in mind, German households seemed to have trust in 
receiving steady income but had doubts about the stability of the newly introduced 
Deutsch Mark. Until the early 1950s, this was reflected in a high propensity to 
consume, and a low rate of saving, with assets held in liquid form to allow 
immediate withdrawal as soon as the Deutsch Mark showed any signs of 
inflationary pressure.
4.3. Price controlled industries
Price controlled sectors consisted of the basic goods industries such as the coal 
and steel industries, utilities, housing, infrastructure, agriculture, and the capital 
market.6 Table 4.1 presents the producer price index between 1949 and 1954 
comparing figures for price controlled sectors such as mining, and iron and steel 
production with price developments in the free market economy.
themselves - at a time when coal price on the world market was $ 25 to $ 30.’ Abelshauser 
reports similar procedures for lumber, scrap and electrical current.
4 G. Hardach, ‘The Marshall Plan in Germany, 1948-1952’, The Journal o f European 
History, Vol. 16 (1987), No. 3, pp. 447 quoting Ludwig Erhard.
5 Abelshauser, ‘American Aid’, p. 390
6 The housing industry was affected by price control through regulated rents. With 
regards to the infrastructure industry, railways most heavily suffered from the maintained 
price control. In the capital market, price controls were applied in a number of ways: bonds 
were kept at or close to par value while coupons where fixed below market rates. Due to 
these measures bond yields were unattractive to investors.
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Table 4.1 Producer Price Index (1950=100, yearly average)
industries 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
total industry1 103 100 119 121 117 115
mining2 98 100 112 130 151 151
- coal mining * 99 100 112 131 154 154
- other mining * 
electricity supply3 *
91 100 112 123 129 129
- 100 106 126 140 140
basic & producer goods industry4 101 100 127 138 131 128
- iron & steel production * 96 100 122 170 175 168
- non-ferrous metals 83 100 154 136 113 113
- chemical industry 110 100 115 111 106 104
investment goods industry 105 100 117 127 125 122
- steel construction 103 100 120 148 156 150
- mechanical engineering 104 100 117 127 127 126
- vehicle manufacture 106 100 108 116 112 109
- electrical engineering 111 100 122 121 115 111
consumer goods industry5 101 100 122 105 97 96
- printing 100 100 118 121 114 113
- textiles 96 100 129 100 91 89
food industry 106 100 108 108 104 103
- foods stuff6* 101 100 114 113 109 110
- breweries 105 100 91 97 98 98
Excluding crude oil production.3 Source: H.R. Adamsen, Investitionshilfe f i r  die Ruhr; 
Wiederaufbau, Verbande und Soziale Marktwirtschaft 1948-1952 (Wuppertal, 1981), table 18. 4 
Including crude oil production.5 Without food sector. 6 Excluding fresh fruits and vegetables, 
coffee, tea, spices, wine, cider.
Source: F. Grtinig and R. Krengel ‘Die Expansion der westdeutschen Industrie 1948 bis 1954’ 
Deutsches Institut f i r  Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderhefte, Neue Folge, No. 34 (1955), pp. 64-96.
Table 4.1 reports a mixed picture on the effects of price controls on the 
development of the overall producer price index. From 1949 to 1950, prices in 
controlled sectors appear to have been raised more than market prices rose. For 
instance, price levels in mining and iron and steel production were increasing 
between 1949 and 1950, whereas prices in the free market economy were generally 
decreasing over the same period, with the exception of non-ferrous metals where the 
price index rose by 20.5% from 1949 to 1950. In 1951, when the economic boom 
triggered by the Korean war led to a sharp increase in prices, price controlled 
sectors saw a smaller price increase than prices in free market sectors. Again the 
non-ferrous metal industry experienced the sharpest price increase with a 54% rise 
between 1950 and 1951. From 1951 to 1952, the producer price index of the 
consumer goods industry grew faster than the overall index which was due to a 
significant price increase in the textile industry. For all other years, the price index 
of the consumer goods industry grew slower than the overall index. In 1952, coal 
and steel and iron products experienced a sharp mark up in prices. In fact, from 
1952 onwards the upwards pressure on the overall index was solely due to increases
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in prices in price controlled sectors and increases in prices in steel construction and 
mechanical engineering.
It is also worth mentioning that the sector ‘food industry’ displayed a 
consistently lower growth rate in its prices which might provide some indication of 
the extent of price controls imposed on agricultural products. Interventions in the 
agricultural sector took place in a variety of forms ranging from price controls for 
final products, direct subsidies to farmers and other competitive measures including 
customs barriers, quota limitations and so called state trading (Staatshandel).
Furthermore, the development of the index for the overall industry shows that 
the fear of excessive inflation did not materialise. To the contrary, the overall 
producer price index shows a downward trend with the exception of one sharp 
increase during the Korean war. Table 4.1 also shows that by 1954 the price indices 
for price controlled sectors such as mining and iron and steel production had 
increased by about twice as much as price indices in free market price sectors. The 
deflationary development in free market sectors together with increasing price 
levels for input factors such as coal, steel and electricity questions the common 
assertion that companies operating in free market sectors were able to generate 
excessive profits by demanding high prices while enjoying low costs due to low 
input prices during the early post war period.7 The general downward trend of prices 
in free market sectors coincided with a weakening in consumer demand and with an 
increase in export levels which reflects the increasing competitive environment 
those sectors were operating in, with nominal export sales increasing threefold 
between 1950 and 1954.8 However, the findings suggested by Table 4.1 need to be 
qualified as they do not provide information on price developments in sectors which 
were shielded most from market forces such as housing, utilities or infrastructure.
7 The consumer price index behaved similarly to the producer price index showing 
deflationary signs during the first few years after the currency reform.
8 F. Griinig and R. Krengel ‘Die Expansion der westdeutschen Industrie 1948 bis 1954’ 
Deutsches Institut jiir Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderhefte, Neue Folge, No. 34 (1955), pp. 
24-26. Nominal export sales of investment goods increased 3.7 times, of consumer goods 
3.5 times, of basic and producer goods 2.3 times and of mining products 1.4 times. Export
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Unfortunately, there is little quantifiable information available on the extent of price 
controls in these sectors. However, to the extent that there is information available, 
it suggests that prices in these sectors were significantly below market prices and 
the government placed great efforts in providing them with subsidised funding. The 
following looks at public policies in housing, utilities and infrastructure. 
Investments in these sectors were crucial to the performance of the overall 
economy. An account of public investment efforts in these sectors also sheds some 
light on the underlying idea of a social market economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft) 
which will be discussed in connection with the selection of industries financed by 
public investment programmes.
a. the housing sector
The extent of price controls on rents is probably best illustrated by comparing 
the price development of rents with the development of construction costs. While 
construction costs were 43% higher in 1950 than they were in 1928, rents only 
increased by 1% over the same period.9 All rents in dwellings built before the 
currency reform remained under price control.10 The treatment of new dwellings 
were categorised the following.11 The first category comprised houses built with 
public funds known as ‘social housing construction’. These dwellings were subject 
to rent control and special social criteria had to be fulfilled in order to be accepted 
as a tenant. The second category comprised tax-favoured housing. No tenancy 
control existed for those dwellings but to some degree rent controls prevailed. The
sales in real term increased 2.3 times between 1950 and 1954. Export prices reached a peak 
by mid 1952 and decreased thereafter.
9 E. R. Baumgart ‘Investitionen und ERP-Finanzierung’, Deutsches Institut fur 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft, Neue Folge, No. 56 (1961), p. 93.
10 Despite some mark ups in rents undertaken in 1955 for dwellings built before the 
currency reform, rents in houses built before 1914 were only 20% above pre war rents and 
rents in houses built between 1918 and 1939 were 28% above pre war rents, whereas 
construction costs had increased by 168% since 1938, G. Schulz, ‘Wohnungspolitik und 
Wirtschaftsordnung: Die Auseinandersetzung um die Integration der Wohnungspolitik in 
die Marktwirtschaft (1945-1960)’, in D. Petzina (ed.), Ordnungspolitische 
Weichenstellungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Schriften des Vereins fur Socialpolitik, 
Neue Folge, Vol. 203 (1991), p. 136.
11 Roskamp, Capital Formation, pp. 176-182.
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third category consisted of houses built without any public assistance. This category 
was free of any rent or tenancy control. Between 1950 and 1956, the public sector 
provided 39.0% (DM 18.7 billion) of funds for investment in the housing sector, see 
Table 4.2. Financial institutions provided 35.4% (DM 17.0 billion) of funds among 
which savings banks (Sparkasseri) and special mortgage banks (Pfandbriefinstitute) 
contributed most with 26.9% (DM 12.9 billion), followed by building societies with 
5.4% (DM 2.6 billion) and life insurance companies with 3.1% (DM 1.5 billion). 
Around 4.6% (DM 2.2 billion) were provided in the form of company loans (mostly 
from employers to employees). A further 21.0% (DM 10.1 billion) were financed 
via self generated funds and shares.12 The DM 18.7 billion of public funds contained 
DM 587 million of EC A (Economic Commission Act) funds which accounted for 
10% of the total EC A fund portfolio, see Table 4.11.
Table 4.2 Distribution of Financial Sources for Gross Fixed Investment in Residential Housing
between 1949 and 1956 (in DM billion)
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 total1
gross fixed investment 2.5 3.6 4.7 5.5 7.0 8.2 9.1 9.9 48.0
financial sources:
financial institutions - 1.2 1.0 0.9 2.1 3.6 4.1 4.1 17.0
of which
savings & special mortgage banks - 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.7 2.9 3.3 3.1 12.9
building societies - 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 2.6
life insurance companies - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.5
company loans - 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.2
public funds - 1.8 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.1 2.8 3.2 18.7
of which ECA credits (DM mill) 18 164 138 125 65 22 26 29 569
self-generated funds and shares2 - 0.4 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.8 2.2 10.1
Note: 1 1950-1956.2 Residual amount.
Source: Baumgart, ‘Investitionen und ERP-Finanzierung’, Deutsches Institutfiir Wirtschafts- 
forschung, Sonderhefit, Neue Folge, No. 56 (1961), p. 94.
According to Roskamp total public aid to residential construction including 
loans, premiums, direct investments, interest subsidies and budget losses through 
tax exemptions amounted to DM 51.8 billion or 55.1% of gross investment in 
residential construction between 1949 and 1959.13 In the second half of 1949, the 
Kreditanstalt fu r  Wiederaufbau (Bank for Reconstruction) tried to raise money for 
the social housing programme by issuing a ‘housing bond* (Wohnbauanleihe).
12 See F. Liitge ‘Finanzierungsprobleme des Wohnungsbaues in Westdeutschland seit 
der Wahrungsreform’, Jahrbiicher fur Nationaldkonomie und Statistik, Vol. 164 (1952), p. 
124 for a comparison of the composition of financial sources before and after the Second 
World War.
13 See Roskamp, Capital Formation, Table 39.
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Returns on capital gain and on coupon payments for this bond were tax exempt. 
However, with a coupon of 3.5% and an issue price at par, only DM 8 million could 
be raised.14
In order to understand the massive public intervention in the housing market, a 
few figures are reported which illustrate the extent of housing shortage during the 
early post war period. With a shortage of about 1.5 million dwellings even before 
the war and the destruction of another 2.3 million dwellings during the war, the 
shortage of housing had become a severe problem during the early post war period. 
With the influx of about 10 million refugees it was estimated that 5.5 million new 
dwellings were needed in order to ease the housing shortage. Between 1949 and 
1959, 5.1 million dwelling units were built - more than half a million a year.15 The 
intense social housing programme helped reduce unemployment, which peaked in 
the beginning of 1950 at a rate of 12.0% (or 1.9 million unemployed), both directly 
and indirectly. The direct effect was due to the absorption of large numbers of the 
potential workforce in the construction and construction related industries. The 
indirect effect of the social housing programme contributed to the enhancement of 
overall productivity as it enabled workers with their families to move from less 
damaged rural areas to industrial centres where the marginal return of human capital 
was highest.
b. infrastructure
Next to residential housing, infrastructure had been most severely damaged 
during the war. At the end of the war, of the 13,000 km of railway tracks in the 
British zone, only 1,000 km were still intact and of the total of 15,700 locomotives, 
only 38.6% were in working order. By the time of German capitulation, every 
bridge over the Rhine had been destroyed, except one at Remagen. The river itself
14 In comparison, corporate bonds issued in 1949 had an issue price of 98 and paid 6.5/ 
5.5% coupon, where the 6.5% coupon faced a 30% tax rate and the 5.5% coupon was tax 
free.
15 Giersch et al., The Fading Miracle, p. 84.
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was impassable because of the destroyed bridges and sunken ships and barges.16 
With DM 23,968 million of public funds provided to the infrastructure sector 
between 1949 and 1956, infrastructure became the second largest receiver of public 
funds.17 With most of these sectors either government controlled or government 
owned, it is not surprising to find that the public sector funded on average 87.2% of 
investments in these sectors between 1949 and 1956, with the proportion of public 
funding decreasing from 96.3% in 1949 to 89.8% in 1956.18 The DM 23,968 million 
of public funds contained DM 1,314 million EC A (Economic Commission Act) 
funds which amounted to 5.5% of overall public funding efforts. Receiving 22.5% 
of the total ECA portfolio, infrastructure became the second largest receiver of EC A 
funds, only surpassed by the energy sector which received 23.1% of ECA funds (see 
Table 4.11). These large public funding efforts allowed gross investment in the 
transport and communication sector to more than double, growing roughly at the 
same rate as total gross investments in the economy, while gross investments in 
roads, harbours and waterways even quadrupled during the same period.19 
Unfortunately, there are no figures available which would allow to distinguish 
precisely to what extent the government relied in its investment efforts in 
infrastructure on tax income and to what extent it raised funds by issuing bonds. 
However, according to the Deutsche Bundesbank, the gross issue of public bonds 
amounted to DM 3.0 billion between 1949 and 1956, of which DM 879 million 
were issued by the federal rail and DM 185 million by the federal mail system.20 
According to these figures at least 4.4% of public funding provided to infrastructure 
was raised via bond issues. In remembrance of the severe transportation problems 
which largely contributed to the economic crisis experienced in winter 1947, the 
importance of improvements in infrastructure development for overall productivity 
enhancement cannot be over-rated, see Table 4.3 for figures displaying increases in 
transport capacity.
16 A. Kramer, The West German Economy, 1945-1955 (New York/ Oxford, 1991), p. 14.
17 Infrastructure includes transportation including federal railroad and other public 
transportation, communications including the postal system (which contains telephone and 
telegraph systems), roads, bridges, harbours, and waterways.
18 Roskamp, Capital Formation, Table 44.
19 Ibid., pp. 190-195.
20 Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- undBankwesen, Table 1.05, p. 302.
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Table 4.3 Transport Capacity in Freight Traffic between 1950 and 1956 (in bill tonnage kilometres)
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
railroad traffic 47.8 54.9 55.0 50.9 52.1 58.1 61.6
inland navigation 16.8 21.0 22.5 23.0 25.1 28.6 32.0
freight traffic on roads 7.8 10.0 11.8 13.0 14.6 16.7 17.7
total 72.4 85.9 89.3 86.9 91.8 103.4 111.3
Source: Baumgart, ‘Investitionen und ERP-Finanzierung’, Deutsches Institutfur Wirtschafts- 
forschung, Sonderhefit, Neue Folge, No. 56 (1961), p. 81.
c. the energy sector
Until 1952, electricity suppliers were the most important direct beneficiaries of 
price controls on coal products as they consumed nine tenths of soft coal production 
and two third of hard coal production. Naturally, they also suffered most from the 
severe increase in prices for coal when price controls for these products were 
relaxed in mid 1952, while electricity supply remained under strict price control, 
based on rate settings according to social criteria. Table 4.1 provides figures of the 
producer price index for electricity supply. The development of prices for electrical 
supply shows similar movements to the ones observed in other price controlled 
sectors such as mining and iron and steel production. The price index for electricity 
supply was 10.9% below the overall index in 1951. However, by 1952 the producer 
price index for electricity supply was already above the overall level and 
contributed to the upward pressure in prices from 1952 onward. Despite this 
considerable increase in its own prices, electrical supply lagged behind price 
developments in coal mining. As coal was still the most important input for 
electricity generation, the gap in price developments of these two indices negatively 
affected the self-financing ability of electricity suppliers. This negative effect was 
partly offset by the introduction of the Investment Aid Law (Investitionshilfegesetz) 
in 1952.21 With 23.1% of all ECA funds provided to the energy sector between 1949 
and 1956, the energy sector was the largest receiver of ECA funds. Similar to the 
infrastructure sector, most of the energy sector was either government owned or 
government controlled. Unfortunately, there are no figures available which would 
allow an estimate of the significance or the source of public funding for investments
104
in the energy sector to the extent that they went beyond the ECA programmes and 
the Investment Aid Programme. Whereas a contribution of 7.6% by the utility 
sector to total gross capital expenditure between 1949 and 1956 suggests a high 
level of investment for a sector whose net output amounted to only 1.9% of GDP, 
electricity suppliers continued to operate at capacity limits as demand for electricity 
increased on average by 12% annually.22
4.4. The development of price controlled sectors compared to free 
market price sectors
Before turning to the various public investment aid programmes which were 
directed to support investments in price controlled industries, the analysis continues 
by investigating whether output in priced controlled industries grew slower than in 
free market price sectors. Table 4.4 compares the development of price controlled 
sectors and free market sectors by addressing the question whether output grew 
slower in price controlled industries than in free market industries. The first 
observation Table 4.4 allows is that all industry sectors had reached or surpassed pre 
war production levels by 1950. In particular, Table 4.4 shows that industrial 
production in the basic and producer goods industry and the consumer goods 
industry grew at about the same rate, with an average growth rate of 20.4% and 
18.6%, respectively between 1949 and 1954. Considering a narrower time span 
covering 1950 to 1954, the average growth rate achieved by these two sectors drops 
by almost one half to 11.7% for the basic and producer goods industry, and to 
10.5% for the consumer goods industry, which translates into a compounded growth 
rate of 9.2% and 8.2%, respectively. Industrial production in the investment goods 
industry outperformed the overall index starting from the lowest level in 1948 and 
displaying the highest level from 1950 onwards, achieving a compounded growth 
rate of 12.7% between 1950 and 1954. Table 4.4 suggests that the mining industry 
and the food industry started trailing behind the overall development of industrial
21 Other beneficiaries of this law included coal mining, the iron and steel industry, gas 
production, water supply and the federal rail. See details on the implementation of the 
Investment Aid Law below.
22 Baumgart, ‘Investitionen’, p. 74.
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production from about 1950 onwards, while they were still about 20 points above 
the overall index in 1948. With the mining sector displaying consistently the lowest 
growth rate over the whole period. Between 1950 and 1955, the electricity 
generating sector achieved an average yearly growth in industrial production of 
11.8%, and a compounded growth rate of 9.1% in the period of 1950 to 1954. This 
means that output in electricity generation grew at approximately the same rate as 
growth in demand for electricity which grew at a rate of approximately 12.0% 
annually. However, there seems to have been a period of two years covering 1952- 
53 when the growth in electricity supply fell short of demand.23
The year 1953 generally suggests a rather unfavourable period for growth in 
industrial production. The iron and steel producing sector seems to have been hit 
most heavily during this period suffering a contraction in industrial output of 
10.1%. Between 1951 and 1954, industrial production in most price control sectors 
appear to have grown in line with free market price industries (with the exception of 
the mining sector which lagged behind considerably), only the investment goods 
industry, with an average growth rate of 16.6% over this period, accomplished a 
considerably greater increase in industrial output.
In summary, a comparison of growth rates in industrial production between 
price controlled sectors and free market sectors suggests that industrial production 
in price controlled sectors grew on average slower than industrial production in free 
market sectors, when looking at the period between 1948 and 1954. However, the 
discrepancy in growth rates diminishes considerably when considering the narrower 
time frame of 1950 to 1954, which coincides with the period when prices in price 
controlled sectors were at first raised and from 1952 onwards when price controls 
were gradually abolished all together. The increase in output in price controlled 
sectors might also be a reflection of the heightened public investment efforts aimed 
at raising the output in these sectors.
23 As noted the figures on industrial production for the electricity generating sector and 
for gas production are based on a different source than the figures for the other sectors 
quoted. However, both sources use 1936 as base year and the figures reported by
106
Table 4.4 Index of Industrial Production (1936=10(f
industries ** 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 48-546 50-546
total industry 1 59.6 87.0 110.6 132.3 141.5 153.8 172.9
growth rate in % 46.0 27.1 19.6 6.9 8.7 12.4 20.1 11.9
mining industry2 * 79.5 93.7 101.8 112.2 118.1 119.2 122.9
growth rate in % 17.9 8.6 10.2 5.3 0.9 3.1 7.7 4.9
electricity
generation3 * 207.0 243.0 264.0 281.0 320.0 360.0
growth rate in % 17.4 8.6 6.4 13.9 12.5 11.8 11.6
gas production3 * 123.0 142.0 156.0 156.0 169.0 191.0
growth rate in % - 15.4 9.9 0.0 8.3 13.0 9.3 8.4
basic & producer
goods industry4 57.3 84.8 108.1 \21.1 132.7 145.3 167.6
growth rate in % 48.0 27.5 18.1 3.9 9.5 15.3 20.4 11.7
iron &steel prod.3 * 88.0 113.0 119.0 107.0 123.0 149.0
growth rate in % 28.4 5.3 -10.1 15.0 21.1 11.9 9.7
investment goods
industry 51.4 82.8 113.6 151.0 170.0 175.6 206.6
growth rate in % 61.1 37.2 32.9 12.6 3.3 17.7 27.5 16.6
of mech.
which engineer.3 - 116.0 155.0 180.0 177.0 198.0 243.0
growth rate in % 33.6 16.1 -1.7 11.9 22.7 16.5 15.0
of vehicle 143.0 183.0 215.0 231.0 301.0 396
which manuf.3
growth rate in % 28.0 17.5 7.4 30.3 31.6 23.0 20.8
consumer goods
industry5 53.8 86.0 113.0 130.6 134.6 155.2 167.4
growth rate in % 38.4 31.3 15.6 3.1 15.3 7.9 18.6 10.5
food industry7 * 79.6 99.1 112.3 118.7 127.4 147.6 153.9
growth rate in % 24.5 13.3 5.7 7.3 15.9 4.3 11.8 8.3
Notes: * Industries with price controls in place. ** The compounded growth rate over the period of 
1950 to 1954 for the total industry amounted to 9.3%, for mining to 3.8%, for electricity generation 
to 9.1%, for gas production to 6.6%, for the basic and producer goods industry to 9.2%, for iron and 
steel production to 6.9%, for the investment goods industry to 12.7%, for mechanical engineering to 
11.3%, for vehicle manufacturing to 16.1%, for the consumer goods industry to 8.2% and for the 
food industry to 6.5%.1 Excluding construction and energy supply sectors.2 Excluding crude oil 
production.3 Source: Kramer, The West German Economy, quoting K. Pritzkoleit, Gott erhalt die 
Machtigen. Ruck- und Rundblick auf den deutschen Wohlstand (Diisseldorf, 1963), pp.260-261.4 
including crude oil production.5 Without food sector.6 Average growth rate.7 See Table 3.1 for a 
list of food stuff not facing price controls.
Source: Griinig and Krengel, ‘Die Expansion der westdeutschen Industrie 1948-1954’ Deutsches 
Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderhefit, Neue Folge, No. 34 (1995), pp. 64-96.
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 give a more detailed picture of the development of 
industrial production by providing figures for selected industry sectors. Table 4.5 
compares the ranking of selected sectors according to percentage increases in 
industrial production to the ranking according to the level o f industrial production 
between 1948 and 1950. Table 4.6 undertakes the same kind of comparison for the 
years covering 1950 to 1954.
Pritzkoleit on the other sectors correspond to a large degree with the figures reported by 
Griinig and Krengel. Therefore a comparison of the two sources seems appropriate.
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Table 4.5 Index o f Industrial Production between 1948-1950 for Selected Industry Sectors
(1936=100)
industry sectors ranked percentage increase industry sectors ranked index of ind. prod.
according to % increase from 1948 to 1950 according to ind. prod, level 1948 1950
car manufacturing 313 crude oil production 143 251
mechanical engineering 122 food industry* 119 144
iron & steel production* 117 other mining* 89 131
overall industry 86 coal mining* 79 99
chemical industry 82 chemical industry 73 133
crude oil production 76 overall industry 60 111
steel construction 47 mechanical engineering 56 124
other mining* 47 steel construction 39 58
coal mining* 26 iron & steel production* 38 82
food industry* 21 car manufacturing 30 126
Note: * industries with price controls in place.
Source: Griinig and Krengel, ‘Expansion der westdeutschen Industrie 1948-1954’ Deutsches Institut 
fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderhefit, Neue Folge, No. 34 (1995), pp. 14 and 15.
Table 4.5 illustrates that those sectors, which produced the lowest level of 
industrial output in 1948, experienced the strongest rates of growth between 1948 
and 1950. In fact, comparing the two rankings one observes an almost complete 
inversion in the positioning of the sectors. Table 4.6 suggest an altogether different 
trend where those sectors displaying the highest level of industrial production in 
1950 were also the ones with above average growth rates, with the exception of the 
food industry and other mining. This indicates that whereas price controlled sectors 
still held a relatively favourable position in terms of industrial production at the 
time of the currency reform, they were soon outpaced by industrial output 
improvements achieved in important free market sectors.
Table 4.6 Index o f Industrial Production between 1950-1954 for Selected Industry Sectors
(1936=100)
industry sectors ranked percentage increase industry sectors ranked index of ind. prod.
according to % increase from 1950 to 1954 according to ind. prod, level 1950 1954
crude oil production 138 crude oil production 251 599
car manufacturing 113 food industry* 144 183
steel construction 98 chemical industry 133 217
mechanical engineering 68 other mining* 131 196
chemical industry 63 car manufacturing 126 268
overall industry 56 mechanical engineering 124 208
other mining* 50 overall industry 111 173
iron & steel production* 40 coal mining* 99 115
food industry* 27 iron & steel production* 82 115
coal mining* 17 steel construction 58 115
Note: * industries with price controls in place.
Source: Griinig and Krengel, ‘Expansion der westdeutschen Industrie 1948-1954’ Deutsches Institut 
fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft, Neue Folge, No. 34 (1955), pp. 18-19.
Figures provided in Table 4.7(a) and Table 4.8 allow a comparison of the 
relative importance of the different sectors both in terms of the formation of gross
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fixed capital and in terms of their contribution to total turn-over.24 Table 4.7(a) 
shows the yearly gross capital formation of companies between 1948/49 and 1955. 
The relative contribution of different industries to gross capital formation varied 
over the years with the investment goods industry being the most stable contributor 
to gross capital formation. The basic and producer goods industry experienced the 
strongest relative as well as absolute increase, with its percentage share in gross 
fixed capital formation increasing from 32.7% in 1948/49 to 47.4% in 1955. Due to 
strong yearly growth in gross capital formation, mining was almost able to double 
its relative share, increasing from 7.1% in 1948/49 to 15.0% in 1955. In contrast, 
the relative importance of gross capital formation in the investment goods industry 
displayed a decreasing trend varying between 33.1% and 25.8%. The same holds 
true for the consumer goods industry and the food industry, whose relative share 
decreased from 16.7% to 3.3%, and from 10.5% to 4.2%, respectively, see Table 
4.7(a).
Table 4.7(a) Gross Fixed Capital Formation of Public Limited Companies in Different Industry
industries 48/491 1950 1951 1953 1954 1955
total industry 5,233 3,923 5,641 6,937 8,803 11,030
mining* 369 404 520 1,132 1,588 1,658
- in % of total industry 7.1 10.3 9.2 16.3 18.0 15.0
basic & producer goods industry 1,711 1,150 2,217 3,358 4,094 5,226
- in % of total industry 32.7 29.3 39.3 48.4 46.5 47.4
investment goods industry 1,731 1,279 2,064 1,830 2,272 3,338
- in % of total industry 33.1 32.6 36.6 26.4 25.8 30.3
consumer goods industry 876 628 463 270 315 362
- in % of total industry 16.7 16.0 8.2 3.9 3.6 3.3
food industry* 549 468 378 324 478 460
- in % of total industry 10.5 11.9 6.7 4.7 5.4 4.2
Note: the year 1952 is missing.1 prolonged fiscal year.* industries with price controls in place. 
Source: E. Baumgart et al., ‘Die Finanzierung der industriellen Expansion in der Bundesrepublik 
wahrend der Jahre des Wiederaufbaus’, Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft, 
Neue Folge, No. 49 (1960), pp. 84-89.
Table 4.7(b) provides figures which give some indication on how West German 
public limited companies financed their gross capital formation between 1948/49 
and 1955. According to Table 4.7(b) the mining industry relied most heavily on 
internally generated funds in order to finance gross capital formation, and it appears 
that external financial sources were almost exclusively provided by the various
24 Turn over comprises domestic sales and exports.
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public investment programmes, see Table 4.11.25 The basic and producer goods 
industry, and in particular the investment goods industry which required the greatest 
amount of funding in absolute terms consistently relied to a relatively large extent 
on external financial sources, whereas the proportion of external finance to total 
funds decreased sharply for the consumer goods industry and the food industry, 
dropping from 47.7% in 1948/49 to 3.0% in 1955, and from 72.9% to 22.0%, 
respectively. It is interesting to note that the relative importance of outside sources 
was greatest during the immediate post currency reform period which reflects the 
great demand for credits during this period as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Table 4.7(b) also shows that the relative importance of external funds picked up in 
1955, coinciding with the lifting of restriction on capital market financing which 
induced companies to utilise the capital market for fund raising, see chapter five.
25 External funds comprise bank loans, bonds and share capital. Internal funds contain all 
funds generated by the company and as such comprise all forms of legal and other 
reserves, profit (loss) for the year, profits (losses) carried forward, and to some extent 
provisions in as far as they were identified as such. See Baumgart et al. ‘Die Finanzierung 
der industriellen Expansion’ pp. 78-79 for details. For the years 1948 to 1951, many 
companies had to be excluded from the data set, among them a number of large companies, 
as their converted balance sheets had not yet been confirmed, see Ibid., p. 17. 
Unfortunately, Baumgart et al. do not provide a detailed account of the number and 
characteristics of the companies comprising their study of company balance sheets. They 
state, however, that their study comprises the majority of all non financial public limited 
companies, see Ibid., p. 16.
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Table 4.7(b) Financing of Gross Fixed Capital Formation of Public Limited Companies in Different 
Industry Sectors (in DM million, at current prices) ______ __________________________
industries 48/49' 1950 1951 1953 1954 1955
total industry
internal equity 2,052 2,066 3,081 4,229 5,874 6,839
funds from outside sources 3,180 1,857 2,560 2,708 2,929 4,191
relation of outside sources to total funds in % 60.8 47.3 45.4 39.0 33.3 38.0
mining*
internal equity 236 266 316 733 1,212 1,440
funds from outside sources 133 138 205 398 376 218
relation of outside sources to total funds in % 36.0 34.2 39.4 35.2 23.7 13.1
basic & producer goods industry
internal equity 540 627 1,329 2,059 2,558 3,235
funds from outside sources 1,171 523 888 1,299 1,536 1,991
relation of outside sources to total funds in % 68.4 45.5 40.1 38.7 37.5 38.1
investment goods industry
internal equity 633 634 884 1,044 1,533 1,470
funds from outside sources 1,098 645 1,181 786 739 1,869
relation of outside sources to total funds in % 63.4 50.4 57.2 43.0 32.5 56.0
consumer goods industry
internal equity 458 327 287 216 244 351
funds from outside sources 418 302 176 54 72 11
relation of outside sources to total funds in % 47.7 48.1 38.0 20.0 22.9 3.0
food industry*
internal equity 189 218 267 200 272 359
funds from outside sources 400 250 111 124 207 101
relation of outside sources to total funds in % 72.9 53.4 29.4 38.3 43.3 22.0
Notes: The year 1952 is missing.1 Prolonged fiscal year.* Industries with price controls in place. 
Source: Baumgart et al. ‘Die Finanzierung der industriellen Expansion in der Bundesrepublik 
wahrend der Jahre des Wiederaufbaus’, Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft, 
Neue Folge, No. 56 (1960), pp. 84-89.
According to Baumgart et al., between 1953 and 1956 most external funding by 
public limited companies was financed by issuing shares which accounted for DM 
3.4 billion, or 62% of all external funding. Furthermore, they estimate that about 
30% of all those share issues were bought by investors other than the public limited 
companies which made up their study (cross-shareholding). They also found that 
between 1953 and 1956 bond issuance was the second most important source of 
external funds amounting to DM 1.5 billion, 23% of all external funding with more 
than one third being bought by investors other than the public limited companies 
comprising their study.26 Considering their definition of external funds (bank loans, 
bonds and share capital), this left 15% of external funding to be provided by bank 
loans.
With respect to growth in total turn-over, the investment goods industry 
displayed the greatest increase with a growth rate of 420% followed by the basic
26 Ibid., p. 20.
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and producer goods industry with a growth rate in total turn-over of 385% from 
1949 to 1954, see Table 4.8. The mining and consumer goods industry displayed a 
similar growth in turn-over with an increase of 238% and 234%, respectively. And 
the foods industry showed the smallest increase with a growth rate of 203% over the 
same period. The relative contribution of the mining sector to total turn-over with 
around 5.5% remained significantly below its relative importance with respect to its 
contribution to gross fixed capital formation which reflects the great capital 
intensity of this sector. The relative contribution of the consumer goods and food 
industries to total turn-over was decreasing from 25.3% in 1949 to 20.8% in 1954 
for the consumer goods industry, and from 21.2% to 15.8% for the food industry. At 
the same time the relative contribution of the basic and producer goods and 
investment goods industry was increasing from 25.3% in 1949 to 30.2% in 1954 for 
the basic, and producer goods industry and from 22.0% to 28.1% for the investment 
goods industry, see Table 4.8.
Table 4.8 Contribution to Total Turn Over (in DM million, at current prices)
industries 1949s 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
total industry 1 34,653 80,395 109,909 119,392 126,162 140,943
mining2 2,117 4,478 5,616 6,705 6,749 7,149
- in % of total industry 6.1 5.6 5.1 5.6 5.3 5.1
basic & producer goods industry3 8,773 22,485 33,377 36,755 37,277 42,546
- in % of total industry 25.3 28.0 30.4 30.8 29.5 30.2
investment goods industry 7,617 18,253 26,371 31,803 34,147 39,589
- in % of total industry 22.0 22.7 24.0 26.6 27.1 28.1
consumer goods industry4 8,783 20,336 26,867 25,259 27,356 29,361
- in % of total industry 25.3 25.3 24.4 21.2 21.7 20.8
food industry 7,363 14,843 17,678 18,870 20,633 22,298
- in % of total industry 21.2 18.5 16.1 15.8 16.4 15.8
Notes:1 Excluding construction and energy supply sectors;2 Excluding crude oil production;3 
Including crude oil production;4 Without food sector;5 Figures for 1949 correspond to the second 
half of 1949 (six months only).* Industries with price controls in place.
Source: Griinig and Krengel, ‘Expansion der westdeutschen Industrie 1948-1954’, Deutsches Institut 
fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft, Neue Folge, No. 34 (1955),’, pp. 64-96.
In addition to analysing the importance of various sectors with respect to 
industrial production, gross capital formation and turn-over, Table 4.9 provides an 
overview of capacity utilisation of different sectors between 1949 and 1955. Table 
4.9 shows that capacity was idle to a large extent until 1951, when the Korean war 
boosted the West German economy. The fact that coal mining and iron and steel 
production reached their capacity limits in 1952 suggests that the fear of bottlenecks 
arising in sectors central to the performance of the overall economy were not 
entirely unfounded. However, after 1952 capital utilisation was decreasing in those
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sectors and by 1955 almost 15% of capacity in coal mining was unemployed, while 
most other sectors operated at or close to capacity limits. Therefore, Table 4.9 
suggests that at least with respect to coal mining and iron and steel the problem of 
(potential) bottlenecks had been overcome by 1953. It is hard to imagine the 
counterfactual that these sectors would have been able to raise timely sufficient 
funding without the help of the public sector, even in the case of full liberalisation, 
including full price liberalisation, full liberalisation of the capital market, and 
privatisation of these controlled industries. Moreover, privatisation was politically 
not on the agenda and a number of companies in these sectors were still under the 
rule of the occupation authorities, facing the threat of dismantling or restructuring. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether a full liberalisation would have been 
economically desirable given the strategic role of these sectors with their potential 
positive externalities on the overall economy.
Table 4.9 Indices of Capacity Utilisation 1949-1955 (in percentage of gross fixed assets)
industries 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
mining (excl. coal processing) 84.0 89.6 97.4 99.2 94.9 90.7 88.0
coal mining* 86.4 91.1 98.9 100.0 95.0 89.4 86.1
iron-ore mining 64.1 75.0 87.8 100.0 92.7 81.8 91.9
mineral oil 71.1 82.1 86.3 92.7 96.7 98.4 100.0
basic & production goods industry 63.3 76.0 89.3 90.3 88.7 93.0 98.5
iron & steel production* 59.6 77.5 89.2 100.0 85.9 88.2 98.8
iron & steel foundry 65.8 81.6 99.0 98.0 82.8 90.0 100.0
non-ferrous metals 60.0 79.1 93.3 82.1 85.7 98.1 100.0
chemical industry 58.1 64.6 84.4 80.1 89.7 94.8 97.5
mineral oil refining 46.1 81.2 98.1 96.8 94.2 99.6 100.0
investment goods industry 54.1 66.6 81.2 84.5 82.4 89.8 99.7
steel construction (incl. wagon manuf.) 69.5 76.7 81.5 85.0 92.9 91.3 97.0
mechanical engineering 65.1 77.6 93.5 98.0 88.5 90.7 100.0
vehicle manufacture 44.5 61.5 73.1 79.8 76.3 88.0 100.0
shipbuilding 25.3 36.7 46.6 63.3 77.4 90.9 100.0
consumer goods industry 69.5 84.6 89.3 83.9 92.2 95.2 98.0
printing 68.6 90.9 89.5 90.5 99.0 100.0 97.4
textiles* 68.7 85.9 90.3 82.9 94.0 96.3 99.0
food industry* 73.3 78.2 82.1 83.1 90.7 91.6 96.1
milling 86.0 80.3 80.7 80.8 77.8 83.7 92.0
sugar 78.3 93.3 84.0 70.1 100.0 81.4 84.8
all industries 66.8 77.8 88.3 88.6 89.0 92.1 96.8
Note: * industries with price controls in place.
Source: Kramer, West German Economy, Table 5.7 quoting Pritzkoleit, Gott erhdlt die Machtigen. 
Ruck- und Rundblick auf den deutschen Wohlstand, (1963), pp. 290-291.
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4.5. Public investment programmes
4.5.1. The role of foreign aid funds27
The U.S. occupation authorities started to distribute army supplies and stocks of 
the Combined Civil Affairs Office among the West German population as early as 
1945. From 1946 imports such as foodstuff, medicine, fertilisers and fuel were 
distributed more systematically under a programme called the Government Aid and 
Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) which was financed by the U.S. defence 
budget and which terminated in 1950.28 The revenues (counterparts) generated from 
the sales of GARIOA imports were employed to finance the immediate aid 
programme (Soforthilfeprogramm), which constituted the first investment 
programme financed by counterpart funds and which came into effect in 1949. The 
immediate aid programme was followed by three further foreign investment 
programmes, which became known as Economic Cooperation Act (ECA). The 
Economic Cooperation Act was financed in the same fashion as the immediate aid 
programme by allocating revenues, which were generated from import sales. Only 
this time import revenues were generated under the so-called European Recovery 
Programme (ERP, often also referred to as the Marshall Plan), whereas the 
immediate aid programme received its funds from revenues generated under the 
GARIOA programme. The composition of imports under the European Recovery 
Programme somewhat differed from earlier GARIOA imports with a greater share 
of raw materials and industrial products, see Table 4.10. The imports from these 
programmes were paid for in Deutsch Marks, the proceedings of which were held in 
an intermediate clearing account by the West German central bank (then the Bank 
deutscher Lander).29 The U.S. government charged this account on a monthly basis
27 There are numerous articles and books on the impact of foreign aid on the 
development of West Germany, a number of which are cited throughout this chapter. 
Despite covering a variety of sources, the cited literature is by no means exhaustive.
28 See Hardach, ‘The Marshall Plan in Germany’, p. 436.
29 Given the West German current account deficit and its poor U.S. dollar holdings, this 
form of foreign aid imports helped overcome the dollar shortage. According to an ECA 
estimate total imports of the Bizone in 1948 were US$ 1.4 billion of which 50% were 
GARIOA imports, 7% were ERP imports and 43% were financed by export earnings, see 
Hardach, ‘Marshall Plan’, p. 457. According to Kramer, The West German Economy, p. 
106 the requirement enforced by the British and American governments of paying for West
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for various costs it accrued in the course of providing aid. The remaining 
proceedings were then transferred to a so-called Sonderkonto (special account) of 
the central bank.30 The special account was under joint U.S. and German control 
until West Germany had partly repaid the funds after which she became the sole 
owner of funds held in the special account.31
Table 4.10 ERP Imports (in US$ thousand)
year foodstuff, fertiliser industrial raw 
material
machinery, vehicles transport
1948/49 213 135 8 32
1949/50 175 212 9 29
1950/51 196 240 13 31
1951/52 76 100 8 26
1952/53 24 38 2 4
sum 684 725 36 122
Source: J. Holscher, Entwicklungsmodell Westdeutschland, Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften, Heft 437 
(Berlin, 1994), p. 49.
All investment projects that were granted a counterpart credit received this 
credit on favourable terms and generally under the condition that part of the 
investment had to be financed by other means than counterpart funds. Only 
sometimes interest free loans or subsidies were granted, where the extent of 
subsidies was limited to the amount generated from interest earnings on the special 
account in compliance with the U.S. requirement of not reducing the stock of 
funds.32 Interest rates for counterpart fund credits ranged from 7.5% (the lower end 
of market rates) to 0.5% (for the housing programme). In 1954, around 10% of 
counterpart credits bore an interest rate of 7.5% and a further 14% of credits bore an 
interest rate of 7.0%. Taking the weighted average of interest rates on all ECA 
credits, one arrives at an average interest rate charge for ECA credits of 4.3%,
German exports in US$ impeded trading. As most of West Germany’s trading partners 
themselves were short of dollars, they would have preferred to buy German goods on the 
basis of bilateral exchange.
30 Baumgart, ‘Investitionen’, p. 25.
31 Under the London Debt Agreement of 1953, West Germany was to redeem its debt 
with regard to foreign aid payments by paying US$ 1.0 billion to the US (about one third 
of its combined GARIOA and ERP debt), US$ 420 million to Great Britain, and US$ 12 
million to France. The final instalment was paid in 1966. See Hardach, ‘Marshall Plan’, p. 
483 and Kramer, The West German Economy, p. 152. West Germany was the only country 
which repaid all foreign aid funds to the agreed amount. The repayment was financed by 
the federal budget which preserved the special account to its full extent, see Pohl, 
Wiederaufbau, p. 140.
32 Baumgart, ‘Investitionen’, p. 26.
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exclusive of banking commission.33 The allocation of counterpart funds was based 
on economic considerations following a social market principle and normally 
constituted a compromise between the U.S. administration authorities and the 
relevant German counter-parties.34 The distribution of counterpart funds was based 
on an evaluation by the Kreditanstalt fu r Wiederaufbau (KfW) (Bank for 
Reconstruction) in cooperation with the Bizonal administration. The KfW was 
established in late 1948, with the purpose of allocating counterpart funds generated 
from U.S. imports effectively.35 Many other countries receiving ERP funds used the 
generated counterpart funds for other than investment purposes most prominently 
for national debt retirement.36 For example, the Great Britain and Norway used 
almost all their counterpart funds as an anti-inflationary devise by retiring national 
debt. These countries experienced strong inflationary pressures from excessive 
purchasing power and the use of counterpart funds was conceived as a means of 
cancelling part of the money supply. By contrast, France and Italy used counterpart 
funds in a similar way to West Germany.37 France, for instance, used much of the 
Marshall Aid funds to outfit the enlarged steel industry with up-to-date equipment.
33 Ibid., pp. 32-33. Half of the banking commission of 2% went to the Kreditanstalt fiir 
Wiederaufbau, the other half was received by the intermediating commercial bank, see 
Pohl, Wiederaufbau, p.59.
34 On the U.S. side, the European Recovery Programmes were administered by the 
European Cooperation Administration (ECA) from 1948 to 1951 and its successors, the 
Mutual Security Administration (MSA) from 1951 to 1953, the Foreign Operations 
Administration (FOA) from 1953 to 1955, and the International Cooperation 
Administration (ICA), see Baumgart, ‘Investitionen’, p. 24. The change in U.S. 
administrations co-ordinating the European Recovery Programmes reflected the change in 
strategic objectives envisioned by the U.S. government. The West German administration 
consisted of six Executive Directors (Direktoren) as government, the Economic Council 
(Wirtschaftsrat) as parliament and an Executive Committee (Executiveausschufi) as a 
second chamber representing the federal element. The actual planning and administrative 
tasks were performed by the Economic Council and the Bank for Reconstruction 
(Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau). A special committee (the ERP Ausschufi) co-ordinated 
the activities of the Bizonal administration and the state governments, see Hardach, 
‘Marshall Plan’, p. 443 and pp. 451-452.
35 The Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau was founded at the end of 1948 to manage and 
allocate counterpart funds, to help other special purpose banks (i.e. Industriekreditbank) in 
raising funds, and to underwrite guarantees. The KfW was initially supposed to provide 
finance for industries in the U.S. and British occupation zones (the so-called Bizone) only 
but many foreign investment schemes included the French zone. For a detailed description 
of the work of the KfW, see Pohl, Wiederaufbau.
36 Pohl, Wiederaufbau, p. 18.
37 I. Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited, (London, 1983), pp. 107-112.
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The KfW was also used to provide interim finance which was often necessary 
due to delays in the sale of imports and because counterpart funds were allocated in 
half year intervals. The KfW ranked the industries it considered important to 
finance and submitted this list to the American occupation authorities, including the 
amount of finance each industry was supposed to receive. The final decision on the 
allocation of GARIOA counterpart funds was based on the approval by the Bipartite 
Control Office Joint Secretariat and Finance Group (BICO). The allocation of ECA 
counterpart funds were to be approved by the Economic Commission 
Administration.38 As most of the loans provided from counterpart funds were 
interest bearing, the size of the fund increased steadily over the years. These 
additional funds which were generated due to interest payments and redemption of 
earlier loans could be utilised at the sole discretion of the West German 
government.
As mentioned, the availability of counterpart funds for investments was tied to 
the sale of U.S. imports. Unfortunately, the goods delivered by the U.S. did not 
always match the requirements of the West German economy, which contributed to 
a sometimes unsatisfactory sale of imports.39 A further negative effect on the sale of 
ERP imports was attributed to a relatively high exchange rate of DM 4.20 for one 
US dollar which was established in September 1949 and which made American 
imports rather expensive.40 Slow distribution of imports due to lengthy bureaucratic 
procedures further aggravated the problem of mismatches between the approved 
amount of foreign aid and available counterpart funds. Due to these mismatches, 
investment projects approved under one foreign aid programme often had to be 
deferred to a following foreign aid programme. The mismatch between granted and 
available funds was particularly severe during the first ECA programme in 1949/50. 
The first ECA programme was further handicapped by differing expectations of the 
various authorities involved regarding the conduct of the programme as well as the
38 Pohl, Wiederaufbau, pp. 53-65 and pp. 73-94.
39 By the end of 1948, the gap between generated counterpart funds and approved 
investment projects amounted to 70%.
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order of priorities. This meant that West Germany had to re-submit investment 
proposals several times before they were approved by the U.S. authorities. 
Therefore, it was not before 1950 that first investments were financed through the 
ECA I programme. The late start of the ECA I programme meant that there was a 
considerable balance left which was to be employed by later ECA programmes.
The implementation of ECA programmes improved with the start of ECA II in 
1950/51, when bureaucratic procedures were simplified and individual screenings of 
national reconstruction plans were abandoned in favour of aid distribution according 
to quotas. Despite considerable improvements in the implementation of ECA 
programmes, some discrepancies between granted and available funds remained. 
The European Recovery Programme officially expired in 1952, but foreign aid 
continued to arrive under the Mutual Security Act, the Foreign Operations Act and 
the International Cooperation Act until 1956. When foreign aid imports terminated, 
investment programmes continued to be financed by accumulated interest and 
repayments on counterpart credits which transformed the special account into a 
revolving permanent investment fund.
The U.S. government always considered foreign investment aid as a temporary 
and complementary measure to domestic investment plans. Therefore, it made its 
release of counterpart funds for investment projects dependent on efforts undertaken 
by the West German administration to promote capital formation. In particular, the 
U.S. government requested that the West German government implemented 
investment policies which made use of the capital market. West Germany complied 
by implementing various bond programmes including the ‘Investment Aid 
Programme’ but the amount of funds raised via the capital market were small both 
in absolute terms as well as relative to investment programmes financed by foreign 
aid.41
40 Between May and September 1949, the DM/US$ exchange rate was DM 3.33 for one 
US$, see Wandel, Die Entstehung der Bank deutscher Lander, p. 171.
41 Issues concerning these programmes are treated in detail below.
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Table 4.11 shows the relative importance of various public investment 
programmes between 1948 and 1956. The circle of recipients for foreign aid funds 
was most restricted during the immediate aid programme, when the bulk of funds 
went into three sectors only. Infrastructure was the most prominent receiver with the 
gross of funds invested in federal rail, receiving a staggering DM 444 million under 
the immediate investment programme. The great amount allocated to the federal rail 
reveals the high priority the allied occupation authorities initially placed on the 
improvement of transport. Even before the start of the European Recovery 
Programme great efforts were undertaken to improve the transportation system.42 
Mining received DM 185 million and utilities including the electricity, gas and 
water industry received DM 125 million under the immediate aid programme. This 
extent of concentration in the list of receiving industry sectors was only experienced 
again during the Investment Aid Programme which benefited four sectors only, 
namely the utilities sector, coal mining, iron and steel production and residential 
housing. All other public investment programmes included a wider range of 
recipients. The utilities sector remained one of the main beneficiaries throughout all 
public investment programmes, with DM 1,835.7 million of investment aid funds 
invested in this sector, see Table 4.11. The mining sector benefited from foreign aid 
programmes at a decreasing rate, receiving DM 185 million during the immediate 
aid programme and DM 130 million during ECA III. The iron and steel industries 
received relatively little foreign aid funding during the first three years. However, 
towards the second half of public investment programmes, iron and steel production 
turned into one of the main beneficiaries of these programmes. This pattern of 
allotment of counterpart funds to the iron and steel industry reveals a reorientation 
of policy by the Western allies. As the iron and steel industry was subject to the 
‘Level of Industry Plan’ of 1946 (which restricted production levels), it was initially 
not one of the sectors the occupation authorities intended to support. However, the 
allies changed their policy on iron and steel production when they placed greater
42 See Kramer, West German Economy, pp. 97-101 on achievements in the improvement 
of infrastructure during the first years after the war. The development of transportation 
systems was particularly important for the distribution of coal, with supplies to industry 
improving significantly from autumn 1947.
119
efforts on the development of the investment goods industry.43 Foreign aid 
investments in the housing sector reached its peak during ECA III when it received 
DM 297.2 million or 25.8% of funds allocated during ECA HI. Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing benefited from all three ECA programmes to a similar extent receiving 
around DM 98 million each year. The shipping and harbour sector was the second 
most important receiver of funding between 1953 and 1956 when it received DM 
250.7 million out of the revolving investment fund generated through interest 
earnings and redemption of earlier credits. Considering all three ECA programmes, 
the shipping and harbour sector received on average DM 53.7 million each year. 
Other sectors reported individually in Table 4.11 received relatively small amounts 
of public investment funds, with the sector combining tourism and small companies 
owned by refugees receiving 2.2% under various investment aid programmes. The 
basic chemical sector received 2.0% of all funds allocated under these programmes 
and the federal mail received 1.0% of funds. Other industries not listed individually 
received a total of 12.2% of allocated funds.
43 Ibid, pp. 101-102.
Table 4.11 Relative Importance o f Public Investment Programmes between 1948 and 1956 (in DM million)
industries
immediate
aid
programme
1948/49
ECA I 
1949/50
ECA II 
1950/51
ECA III 
1951/52
other foreign 
aid
programmes1
1953-56
funds from 
interest earnings 
& redemption 
1953-1956
bonds2
investment
aid
programme
1952-1954
sum distribution of 
funds in %
electricity, gas & water* 125.0 247.3 169.7 371.3 10.2 489.0 423.2 1,835.7 26.4%
mining* 185.0 162.3 123.4 130.0 113.6 228.2 942.5 13.5%
other industries 15.0 169.3 186.5 85.2 84.9 234.9 73.3 849.1 12.2%
iron and steel* 39.6 55.4 108.2 13.0 176.7 8.9 296.5 698.3 10.0%
federal rail* 444.0 1.0 154.5 40.0 50.0 689.5 9.9%
housing* 105.0 131.9 297.2 43.0 42.7 8.0 627.8 9.0%
agriculture, forestry & fishing* 5.0 97.9 94.6 101.7 1.0 144.8 445.0 6.4%
shipping & harbours 2.0 49.8 59.7 51.7 250.7 6.3 420.2 6.0%
tourism & small companies owned 1.6 25.8 2.1 8.3 116.9 1.7 156.4 2.2%
by refugees
basic chemicals 39.8 36.8 5.3 57.0 138.9 2.0%
federal mail* 20.0 47.2 5.0 72.2 1.0%
transportation* 7.0 19.6 1.6 0.1 22.6 1.2 52.1 0.7%
non-ferrous metal 8.9 12.7 4.8 26.4 0.4%
science & social institutions 0.3 0.1 0.4 2.4 3.2 0.0%
sum3 776.04 928.5 936.4 1,150.1 170.6 1,851.0 146.8 997.9 6,957.3 99.7%
Note:1 Other foreign aid programmes contains counterparts generated under the MSA, FOA and ICA programmes implemented between 1953 and 1956.2 Contains the 
KfW bond programme and MSA bonds.3 Excludes financial aid in form of subsidies and participating interests. * Industries with price controls in place.
4 Excludes US$ 1.9 billion of funds generated from imports before the currency reform, as those funds perished with the implementation of the currency reform.
Source: Baumgart, ‘Investitionen und ERP-Finanzierung’, Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft, Neue Folge, No. 56 (1961), pp. 28-29
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Table 4.12 separates industries according to whether they faced price controls 
or not. As presented in Table 4.12, the main beneficiary of counterpart credits was 
the energy sector, which received 23.1% of foreign aid funds allocated between 
1949 and 1956. Infrastructure received 22.5% of funds. Within the infrastructure 
sector, the federal rail received with 12.9%, by far the largest component and more 
than the mining sector, which received 12.3% of foreign aid funds. The fourth 
largest sector that received benefits constituted the housing programme with 10.0%. 
The iron and steel industry and agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors received 
roughly similar amounts, with a share in foreign aid of 7.1% and 7.6%, respectively. 
Table 4.12 shows that between 1949 and 1956, 82.6% of foreign aid funds were 
allocated among six industry sectors which accounted for 55.15% of gross capital 
expenditure. These sectors had in common that they suffered price controls.
The figures in Table 4.12 reveal that the selection of industries financed by the 
above public investment programmes was embedded in the idea of a social market 
economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft). Under the social market economy concept, free 
market principles were embraced but the government was seen to play an important 
function in organising the economy.44 In other words, the principles of social market 
economy combine the concept of a free market economy with normative planning 
by the state, based on the belief that a certain amount of public intervention is 
required and welcome in order to stabilise the economy. Moreover, it does not 
matter whether the state intervenes much or little, but how it intervenes. According 
to the social market economic principle, the state has to set the conditions within 
which a viable (funktionsfaehig) and humane (menschenwuerdig) economic order 
develops. But it must not direct the economic process itself.45 This means that 
public intervention had to be marktkonform (‘in line with market conditions’).46 A 
further important aspect of the social market economy concept lies in the fact that it 
considers only temporary public interventions as appropriate. Any activity by the 
state should set out to achieve a particular, well formulated objective. Once the
44 Giersch et al., The Fading Miracle, p. 30.
45 Stolper and Roskamp, ‘Planning a Free Economy, p. 377.
46 Baumgart, Investitionen’, pp. 34-39 on the role of counterpart funds in the West 
German economic system.
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objective is achieved it is again to be abolished.47 Under these premises, public 
investment programmes financed by counterpart funds were considered 
marktkonform because they relied on temporary ERP imports, which made them 
unlikely to transform from transient subsidies (which were considered necessary for 
adjustments) into unwelcome permanent subsidies.48 And the sectors to benefit from 
these programmes were chosen on the grounds that they were considered crucial for 
the recovery of the economy as a whole and in order to counter-balance other public 
interventions, namely partial price controls.
47 Stolper and Roskamp, ‘Planning a Free Economy, p. 378.
48 Baumgart, ‘Investitionen’, pp. 34-39.
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Table 4.12 Investment Structure and Distribution of ECA-funds in West Germany between 1949 and 
1956 (in DM million)   ____________ ________  ________ _________ _______
industry branches gross 
capital ex­
penditure
ECA-
credits
ECA- 
credits 
over gross 
capital ex­
penditure 
in %
gross capital 
expenditure 
in % of total 
gross capital 
expenditure
cumulative 
structure of 
gross capital 
expenditure 
in %
ECA- 
credits in 
% of total 
ECA- 
credits
cumulative 
structure of 
ECA- 
credits in 
%
Drice controlled industries
energy supply 17,160 1,347 7.8% 7.59% 7.59% 23.05% 23.05%
electricity supply 12,360 1,021 8.3% 5.47% 5.47% 17.47% 17.47%
hydro-electric power plants 2,420 223 9.2% 1.07% 6.54% 3.82% 21.29%
gas supply 2,380 103 4.3% 1.05% 7.59% 1.76% 23.05%
infrastructure 23,835 1,314 5.5% 10.55% 18.14% 22.49% 45.54%
federal rail 9,460 756 8.0% 4.19% 4.19% 12.94% 12.94%
sea navigation 3,945 333 8.4% 1.75% 5.94% 5.70% 18.64%
federal mail 4,100 119 2.9% 1.81% 7.75% 2.03% 20.67%
inland navigation 370 41 11.0% 0.16% 7.91% 0.70% 21.37%
local public transport 1,490 23 1.5% 0.66% 8.57% 0.39% 21.76%
ports 705 22 3.1% 0.31% 8.88% 0.37% 22.13%
private rail 340 14 4.0% 0.15% 9.03% 0.23% 22.36%
other private transport 3,425 8 0.2% 1.52% 10.55% 0.13% 22.49%
mining 11,110 717 6.5% 4.92% 29.00% 12.27% 65.40%
coal mining 7,800 652 8.4% 3.45% 3.45% 11.16% 11.16%
petroleum, natural gas and 
mineral processing 2,305 64 2.8% 1.02% 4.47% 1.10% 12.26%
other mining 1,005 0.5 0.0% 0.44% 4.91% 0.01% 12.27%
housing programme 50,500 587 1.2% 22.34% 51.34% 10.04% 75.44%
agriculture, forestry &
fishing 13,420 443 3.2% 5.94% 24.08% 7.59% 53.13%
iron and steel industry 8,620 417 4.8% 3.81% 55.15% 7.14% 82.58%
sum of price controlled 
industries 124,645 4,825 3.9% 55.15% 55.15% 82.58%% 82.58%
free market Drice industries
fine mechanics and optics 525 23 4.3% 0.23% 55.38% 0.39% 82.97%
glass and ceramics 876 37 4.2% 0.39% 55.77% 0.63% 83.60%
non-ferreous metal industry 1,020 40 3.9% 0.45% 56.22% 0.68% 84.28%
chemical industry 6,895 171 2.5% 3.05% 59.27% 2.92% 87.20%
engineering industry 5,405 122 2.2% 2.39% 61.66% 2.08% 89.28%
electrotechnical industry 3,325 92 2.8% 1.47% 63.13% 1.58% 90.86%
textile and clothing 4,380 86 2.0% 1.94% 65.07% 1.46% 92.32%
food industry 5,855 106 1.8% 2.59% 67.66% 1.81% 94.13%
pulp and paper industry 3,015 54 1.8% 1.33% 68.99% 0.92% 95.05%
other industries 47,034 299 0.6% 20.81% 89.80% 5.10% 100.16%
sum of free market price 78,240 1,028 1.3% 89.80% 89.80% 100.2% 100.16%
industries
public administration 23,050 10.19% 99.99%
sum 226,025 5,854 - 99.99% 99.99%
Source: Baumgart, ‘Investitionen und ERP-Finanzierung’, Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschafts­
forschung, Sonderheft, Neue Folge, No. 56 (1961), pp. 45-46.
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4.5.2. The Investment Aid Programme
Contrary to expectations by the West German administration and in particular 
contrary to Ludwig Erhard’s expectation, famously expressed by his statement that 
‘investment will be financed by foreign aid’, the occupation authorities always 
regarded counterpart funds as supplementary and not as the main source of 
investment funds. Therefore, the American authorities demanded that the foreign 
aid investment programmes were to be complemented by investment programmes, 
which utilised the West German capital market.
In compliance with this request, a programme was introduced to invest in 
carefully chosen projects, which were considered particularly important for 
widening the productive capacity of the economy as a whole.49 The introduction of 
the investment aid programme was preceded by an intense discussion between 
industry and various economic and political factions within the parliament lasting 
for almost one year. In January 1952, the investment aid programme came finally 
into effect lasting until December 1954.50 The investment aid programme was solely 
subject to the West German authorities, administered by the Kreditanstalt f i r  
Wiederaufbau (KfW) and a special agency established under the law, ‘The 
Trusteeship for the Special Industrial Fund for Investment Aid’ (Kuratorium f i r  das 
Industriekreditbank-Sondervermogen Investitionshilfe). The KfW was prohibited by 
law from engaging in any competition for business with commercial banks. 
Furthermore, it was required to bring in other credit institutions as intermediaries 
when granting loans. Only in exceptional cases was the KfW allowed to grant loans 
directly to clients. The KfW was conceived as a banker’s bank in as much as it 
provided additional funds (mostly out of foreign aid) to supplement the resources of 
commercial banks. While the commercial banks sifted through their clients’ 
requests for loans deciding on which to present to the KfW, the KfW held the
49 Giersch et al., The Fading Miracle, p. 82.
50 The investment aid law underlying the investment aid programme is reprinted in Pohl, 
Wiederaufbau, pp. 206-223.
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ultimate power to decide which investment project was considered suitable for 
favourable funding.51
The investment aid programme was intended to provide price controlled and 
capital intensive sectors with financial funds at favourable terms, by channelling 
some of the profits generated in free market sectors to these price controlled and 
capital intensive sectors. The programme aimed at compensating price controlled 
sectors which were thought to suffer deficiencies in internally generated funds due 
to the imposed price controls which in turn were thought to negatively affect those 
sectors’ investment opportunities in two ways. First, low profitability makes it more 
expensive to raise external funds. Second, the lack of profits reduces the possibility 
of taking advantage of depreciation allowances. The investment aid programme 
tried to alleviate the issue of raising external funding, whilst a law which granted 
special depreciation allowances to price controlled sectors was passed to 
compensate for otherwise foregone depreciation advantages.
Under the investment aid law, business in general had to supply DM 1 billion 
for investments in basic goods sectors, utilities and transportation. The funds were 
collected between 1952 and 1954 on the basis of profits and sales generated in 1950 
and 1951, by a quasi-tax of 3.5% on profits and 4% on sales. DM 1.16 billion thus 
collected from 130,510 firms was distributed as follows:52
DM 296.5 million to 22 iron and steel companies
DM 241.8 million to 34 electric power companies
DM 228.2 million to 34 coal mining companies
DM 106.1 million to 48 gas companies
DM 77.4 million to 48 water supply companies
DM 50.0 million to 1 the federal rail
DM 160.0 million to x small & medium sized contributing companies
Between January and June 1952, investment aid credits worth DM 107 million
were disbursed. A further DM 677 million was paid out between July 1952 and June 
1953. By June 1954 credits worth DM 983 million were paid out of the DM 1
51 Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, pp. 277-278.
52 Adamsen, Investitionshilfe, p. 228 and Table 10, and Roskamp, Capital Formation, p.
168.
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billion investment aid fund. The importance of investment aid funds relative to total 
financing means differed considerably between the receiving sectors. Whereas 
investment aid funds accounted for 49% of investment funds employed by gas 
companies, and for 33% of investment funds employed by water supply companies, 
the investment aid programme contributed only 14% of financial funds to the 
investment expenses of coal mining companies, 17% to the investment expenses of 
electrical power companies, and 24% to investments by benefiting iron and steel 
companies.53
In exchange for money out of the fund, the receiving firms were obliged to 
issue bonds.54 From the time companies had paid their contribution to the time they 
were allotted the securities, the companies received an interest of 4% on the amount 
of their contribution which was approximately equivalent to the interest paid a on 
one-month money deposit.55 In mid 1953, the first bonds were issued amounting to 
a total of DM 178 million. Bonds worth a total of DM 750 million were issued in 
1954.56 Altogether 75 bonds were issued and distributed among the contributing 
companies. Of these 75 bonds, 20 bonds were tax exempt with a coupon of 5.5%, 
54 bonds enjoyed tax favoured treatment as laid out in the 
Kapitalmarktforderungsgesetz, bearing a coupon of between 6.5% and 8%, and one 
bond was issued with a coupon of 6.5% facing full taxation.57 The underwriting 
price of these bonds was between 96.5 and 98 and the final redemption prices were 
at or above par. By 1954, all the bonds traded above par and most of them traded at
53 Adamsen, Investitionshilfe, p. 229 and Table 16. The stated figures are as of March 
1955.
54 For companies which were unable to issue securities, the Industriekreditbank took on 
this obligation, see Kirch, Die Neuordnung des Geldwesens, pp. 58.
55 Adamsen, Investitionshilfe, p. 213.
56 Ibid., p. 212.
57 Ibid., p. 213 and W. Dannemann, Struktur und Funktionsweise des Kapital-marktes in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (Tubingen, 1959), p. 55. Reuss, Fiscal Policy for 
Growth, p. 204 is mistaken when he writes that bonds issued under the investment aid 
programme bore an interest rate of 4%. He may have confused the coupon rate with the 4% 
interest paid to contributing companies on an interim basis.
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a yield of at least 7%.58 This represented an attractive return when compared to 
returns on other securities.59
Companies operating in either the mining sector, the iron and steel industries or 
the energy supply sector, and receiving investment aid credits enjoyed considerable 
special depreciation privileges laid out under paragraph 36 of the investment aid 
law.60 Under paragraph 36 of the investment aid law the mentioned companies were 
permitted the following depreciation allowances in addition to normal depreciation 
rates granted under paragraph 7 of the income tax law. Real estate could be 
depreciated by up to 30% and other investment by up to 50% within the first two 
years if those assets were purchased or constructed between 1 January 1952 and 31 
December 1955. These privileges were in effect until the end of 1956.61 The 
allowance for accelerated depreciation coincided with price increases in these 
sectors, which further facilitated internal financing. According to estimates quoted 
in Adamsen, accelerated depreciation in these sectors amounted to DM 3.2 billion 
between 1952 and 1956.62
Because of the long delay between the concern over the development of 
bottlenecks during the height of the Korean boom in 1950/1951 and the passing of 
the investment aid law in the beginning of 1952, interim finance was granted which 
allowed a start o f the programme in the second half of 1951. This interim aid was 
pre-financed through DM 13.9 million out of the ERP programme and DM 106.1 
million provided by the Kreditanstalt fu r  Wiederaufbau. The benefiting industries 
of these interim credits were the electricity industry which was granted DM 44.2 
million, the mining industry with DM 39.3 million, the iron and steel industry with 
DM 29.5 million, the gas industry with DM 5.0 million, and the water industry with
58 Adamsen, Investitionshilfe, Table 12.
59 However, whether companies in general had gained under the investment aid 
programme can only be answered positively if they did not have investment opportunities 
of their own which had generated higher rates of return.
60 Pohl, Wiederaufbau, p. 222.
61 Reuss, Fiscal Policy for Growth, p. 204 and pp. 108-109.
62 Adamsen, Investitionshilfe, p. 232.
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DM 2.0 million. These credits were charged an interest rate of 7%.63 The demand 
for these credits was rather sluggish. By the end of 1951, only 66.4% of interim 
funds had been claimed. Only the water industry had claimed all its allocated funds 
of DM 2 million and the electricity industry had claimed 98% of its allocated DM 
44.2 million of funds by the end of 1951. The coal mining industry had claimed 
55.7% of its allocated DM 39.3 million of funds, the iron and steel industry had 
claimed 42.4% of its allocated DM 29.5 million of funds, and the gas industry had 
not claimed any of its allocated DM 5 million of funds by the end of 1951. 
Adamsen points out that if one uses the speed (or rather lack of it) of distribution of 
interim finance as the criterion to determine their necessity, then neither coal mining 
nor iron and steel nor the gas industry seemed to be in need of investment aid.64
Also Giersch et al. provide a rather cautious assessment of the effects the 
investment aid programme had on the development of the industries it intended to 
promote. They conclude, ‘The relatively short duration of the measures and their 
limited scope make it hard to imagine a counterfactual scenario, with market forces 
given a chance to do the required work. In any case, the bottlenecks emerging in the 
Korean boom were finally overcome, but the question whether this was to any 
significant extent due to the Investment Aid Law or simply the natural consequence 
of rapid growth throughout the economy remains unanswered.’65 A similar critical 
assessment of the investment aid programme can be found in Adamsen. Adamsen 
questions the claim by the Kuratorium fur das Industriekreditbank-Sondervermogen 
Investitionshilfe that ‘the overall success of the investment aid programme had to be 
found in the timely provision for future requirements in order to avoid bottlenecks 
in the time to come ... the whole economy including the contributing companies 
were well served by the programme’. To the contrary Adamsen points out that the 
Kuratorium, when assessing its success, neglected the fact that the factors which 
had triggered bottleneck situations in 1950/51 were no longer prevailing at the time 
when the investment aid programme was in effect. Adamsen argues that a steadier 
and more proportionate development of the overall economy prevented new
63 Ibid., pp. 202-205.
64 Ibid., p. 206 and Table 11.
129
bottlenecks from arising and that the investment aid programme contributed little to 
this general trend.66
4.5.3. The early bond programmes of the K reditanstalt fur 
W iederaufbau
The American authorities encouraged the Kreditanstalt fu r  Wiederaufbau to 
place bonds in the West German capital market, which were supposed to be issued 
by companies in exchange for counterpart funds. The first bond issuance was placed 
in connection with the immediate aid programme in 1949. Ten energy supply 
companies, which received DM 220 million GARIOA counterpart funds, were to 
issue bonds over the received amount with a coupon of 6.5%. This programme 
turned out to be of little success, as only DM 29.6 million could be placed in the 
market by the end of 1949. The remaining amount had to be held by the 
Kreditanstalt fu r  Wiederaufbau, which granted the companies a book value for 
these bonds over 10 years.67 Between the second half of 1949 and the first half of 
1950, the Kreditanstalt fu r  Wiederaufbau together with a consortium of 72 banks 
initiated a second bond programme. This programme coincided with the release of 
the Festgeldkonten (‘blocked accounts’) which comprised 10% of the accounts 
blocked since the currency reform. These accounts held about DM 490 million and 
it was hoped to attract some of this money for investment in these bonds. Under this 
programme two kinds of bonds were issued. A ’housing’ bond with a coupon of 
3.5% and a ‘reconstruction’ bond with a coupon of 5.5%. The bond for the housing 
programme was tax free, whereas the 5.5% bond was exempt from capital gains tax. 
Of the housing bond, DM 8 million could be placed in the market. Of the 
reconstruction bond, DM 35 million were placed among the public, and a further 
DM 23 million were held by the bank consortium.68
65 Giersch et al., The Fading Miracle, p. 83.
66 Adamsen, Investitionshilfe, p. 230.
67 Pohl, Wiederaufbau, p. 54.
68 Ibid., pp. 67-73.
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With an average contribution to gross investment of 3.5% during 1948-53, the 
total money involved in the programmes financed by the KfW was not large. The 
value in these funds rather lay in their strategic placement. In its initial phase, the 
KfW directed its attention especially to key sectors of the economy, trying to 
identify those projects which yielded an especially high national return because 
they helped to activate additional productive capacity in allied though separate 
industrial enterprises. Citing numbers from annual reports of the KfW published in 
1953 and 1955, Shonfield writes, ‘During the period when the normal German 
capital market was barely functioning, KfW supplied a significant proportion of the 
‘free funds’ used for industrial investment. From 1948 to 1953, the KfW issued 
loans amounting to some DM 5.5 billion, while the issue of ‘financial paper’ (i.e. 
bonds and shares) through the capital market produced a total of some DM 7 billion. 
By the mid 1950s, when the capital market had revived, the KfW was still making a 
significant contribution: its loans in 1955 amounted to nearly DM 1 billion, against 
market issues of DM 5.25 billion of financial paper.’69
Unfortunately no figures are available which would indicate the nature of the 
buyers of bonds issued before 1951. However, Table 4.13 based on Bomemann and 
Linnhoff provides some indication of who bought corporate bonds issued between 
1951 and 1958. Table 4.13 suggests that commercial banks and other business 
enterprises constituted the most important buyers of newly issued corporate bonds 
until 1955. This shows that banks were not only important providers of bank loans, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, but that they were also important as investors 
during the immediate post currency reform period, when most other economic 
subjects were still reluctant to invest in the capital market. However, between 1956 
and 1958 households became the single most important buyers of newly issued 
corporate bonds (and their importance as buyers is likely to rise if  one would 
include the indirect purchases of newly issued securities through banks). The strong 
rise of households as buyers of bonds in 1956 reflects the introduction of the ‘Lex 
Preusker’ which provided strong fiscal incentives (especially favouring smaller
69 Shonfield, Modem Capitalism, p. 277.
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income households) to buy bonds, in particular bonds issued for residential 
construction. This incentive scheme was in effect between in 1956 and 1957.70
Table 4.13 The Nature of Corporate Bond Buyers, Initial Sales of Newly Issued Securities, in
year public authorities commercial banks1 other business 
enterprises
households
1951 June-Dee. 13 78 9
1952 9 57 34
1953 16 69 15
1954 6 20 67 7
1955 9 21 70 -
1956 2 38 13 47
1957 3 32 16 49
1958 3 36 18 43
Note:1 Including indirect initial sales of newly issued securities to households, other business 
enterprises, and public authorities.
Source: F. O. Bomemann and H.-O. Linnhoff, ‘Die seit der Wahrungsreform begebenen Industrie- 
Anleihen’, Betriebswirtschaftliche Schriften, Heft 3 (1958), p. 23.
4.5.4. Illiquidity in the early bond market
Taxation was probably one of the most important causes for illiquidity in the 
early German bond market.71 Not only were tax rates high, the system was also very 
complicated and little transparent. A highly complicated system of taxation of 
income and securities made it very difficult for investors to calculate the potential 
return of an individual security. Furthermore, the different rates at which different 
bond issues were taxed made the nominal yield of a bond almost irrelevant to an 
investor as the tax structure was in general as such that bonds with higher nominal 
yields (more expensive to the issuer and generally issued by companies in private, 
uncontrolled sectors) offered a similar effective return as bonds with lower nominal 
yields and lower taxation. Bond issues with lower nominal yields were generally 
granted to companies in public and controlled sectors. In other words, taxation was 
used to tax different bond issues differently depending on how important the project 
seemed to the performance of the national economy. Furthermore, it is estimated 
that the interest ceilings of 5.5% for public bonds and of 6.5% for corporate bonds 
were about 1% to 1.5% below market rates, which were not allowed to develop 
under the Kapitalverkehrsausschu.fi (capital market committee). For instance, the
70 Stolper and Roskamp, ‘Planning a Free Economy, p. 399.
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housing bond which effectively yielded 3.5% offered too low a return to compete 
with the prevailing interest rates offered on savings deposits with 12 month notice 
which yielded 4.0% in 1949 and 4.5% in 1951 (see Table 5.6). In short, moderate 
nominal yields (man wollte den Wiederaufbau billig haben) and a complex tax 
structure with little transparency have been identified as the main causes for the 
illiquidity of the German bond market during the immediate post currency reform 
years.
Pohl also attributes the sluggish placement of housing bonds among the public 
to illiquidity, but he does not view the return these bonds offered as too low to be 
considered an attractive investment opportunity. According to Pohl, the 3.5% 
housing bonds offered an attractive yield due to there tax exempt status.72 However 
as mentioned above, while a 3.5% tax exempt bond yielded similar returns to bonds 
with higher coupons but facing higher taxation, it offered lower returns than, for 
instance, a 12 month time deposit. Borchardt and Buchheim interpret the weak 
demand for bonds issued by the Kreditanstalt fu r  Wiederaufbau as evidence for an 
illiquid capital market. Similar to Pohl, they do not view low returns as a cause for 
sluggish public demand in early bond issues. They argue that ‘offering inadequate 
interest rates was not the reason that the electricity companies failed to gain 
sufficient financing through the capital market. The return on their bonds was, at 6.5 
per cent on a twenty-year maturity, in fact quite good in comparison to the older 
bonds, which were still in circulation. Yet there was no large-scale shift away from 
older bonds.’73 Borchardt and Buchheim fail to mention that the quoted yield of
71 For a brief overview of the complex German tax system see below.
72 Pohl, Wiederaufbau, p. 73.
73 K. Borchardt and C. Buchheim ‘The Marshall Plan and Key Economic Sectors: A 
Microeconomic Perspective’, in C. S. Maier and G. Bischof (eds.), The Marshall Plan and 
Germany, (New York, 1991), p. 445. However, their observation that trading in the bond 
market was rather thin appears to be correct. The trading volume of bonds only amounted 
to roughly DM 200 million in 1953 as well as in 1954, reaching a volume of DM 2.6 
billion by 1965. In contrast, the trading volume of shares was considerably higher, 
increasing from DM 320 million in 1953 to DM 1.4 billion in 1954, peaking at DM 11.2 
billion in 1961, and amounting to DM 4.5 billion in 1965, see Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Deutsches Geld- undBankwesen\ Table 2.01, p. 307.
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6.5% represented a nominal return before tax reductions.74 As mentioned and further 
discussed below, the tax structure was such that differing nominal yields had similar 
effective yields, with bonds issued before the currency reform generally enjoying a 
more favourable tax treatment than bonds issued after the reform. Another reason 
Borchardt and Buchheim identify as possible cause for illiquidity of newly issued 
bonds was their sluggish public placement, with the consequence that most bonds 
were (inadvertently) tightly held. They write ‘because of market imperfections, 
potential buyers of electricity company bonds faced very high price risks in any 
shift away from older bonds. For that reason, new offers, even with relatively goods 
terms, could be absorbed only slowly.’75
In order to be able to make an informed statement about the relative 
attractiveness of securities, a careful analysis of the terms under which securities 
were issued and traded is necessary. This requires an understanding of the 
regulatory framework of the West German capital market and its tax treatment. 
Therefore, the remaining chapter will analyse the regulatory and tax environment 
under which the West German capital market operated and its effects on the 
attractiveness of securities.
4.6. Regulatory and tax issues affecting the capital market during the 
early post war period
Whereas along with the currency reform a market economy was established for 
most sectors and goods, the capital market entered the post war period facing a 
number of restrictions and interventions. The following tries to summarise various 
regulations, laws, interventions and discriminations the West German capital market 
was constrained by. Some of the restrictions dated back to 1931, others were 
implemented during the national socialist dictatorship, and a few more were added
74 For a complete list of bonds issued since 1949 and their characteristics see F. O. 
Bomemann and H.-O. Linnhoff, ‘Die seit der Wahrungsreform begebenen Industrie- 
Anleihen’, Betriebswirtschaftliche Schriften, Heft 3 (1958), Table 1.
75 See Borchardt and Buchheim, ‘The Marshall Plan’, p. 445.
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either upon request of the occupation authorities or on behalf of the West German 
government.
The reasons for capital market interventions during the late 1940s and the early 
1950s can be attributed to three main events. First, there was the lengthy process of 
converting all assets from Reichsmark into Deutsch Mark. The implications of the 
currency conversion on capital market development have been dealt with in chapter 
three. Second, there was the policy of partial price control, which triggered a 
number of public investment programmes aimed at cirumventing market forces. The 
third intervention was a necessary complement to make public investment 
programmes work. In order to prevent competition for funds between public 
investment programmes and free market investments, interest rate ceilings and tax 
discriminations were introduced among other measures. While the policy of partial 
price control and public investment programmes were discussed above, direct 
interventions obstructing the development of the capital market will be covered in 
the following section.
4.6.1. Legacies affecting the capital market
By the end of the 1920s, German banks’ deposits were comprised of about 40% 
foreign capital, which had to be repaid in foreign currencies.76 The large amount of 
foreign debt aggravated the liquidity crisis caused by the Great Depression and 
unleashed a banking crisis in July 1931. In response to this crisis, trading in futures 
was suspended and only reopened again in 1970. The suspension of futures trading 
had the effect of dampening the price levels of stocks and bonds as they depended 
on spot trading only. Also in reaction to the crisis, interest rates for newly issued 
bonds as well as for outstanding bonds were limited to 6% in December 1931. The 
policy of interest rate ceilings was later enforced under the Kapitalverkehrsgesetz 
(capital market transaction law) and remained in place until 1952. In the beginning
76 K. Hauser, ‘Kreditinstitute und Wertpapiermarkte in Deutschland - Perioden ihrer 
Entwicklung’ in M. Pohl (ed.), Bankhistorisches Archiv, Zeitschrift zur Bankengeschichte, 
Beiheft 14 (1988), p. 29.
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of 1932, interest rates on borrowing and lending were fixed by the 
Reichskommissar. Lending rates were normally 4.5% above the prevailing discount 
rate. This tight, though not rigid, control of interest rates on bank lending and 
borrowing was in place until 1967. As soon as the national socialist labour party 
came to power in 1933, securities issues had to be approved by a public authority 
and private issues were restricted in order to ensure capital market funds for public 
borrowing requirements. Again, the same policy for similar purposes was enforced 
by the Kapitalverkehrsausschufi (capital market committee) until the early 1950s. In 
March 1934, dividend payments were generally limited to 6% of nominal capital, 
with a few exceptions facing a limitation of 8%.77 Ceilings on dividend payments 
remained effective until the end of 1952.78 In 1935, the number of German stock 
exchanges was reduced from 21 to 9, and from 1938 securities could only be traded 
on the Heimatbdrse (the Reich was divided in economic councils, and companies’ 
shares were to be traded at the stock exchange within this council).79 From 1937 
foreign securities were no longer quoted on German stock exchanges. Under the law 
of foreign exchange control passed in 1938, international securities trading came to 
a complete halt. The final death blow to the capital market was delivered in 1943 
when the economic minister gained control over security prices.80 Those so called 
Stoppkurse were abolished shortly after the currency reform in August 1948.81 
When the national socialist regime was finally defeated, the German capital market 
was deprived of all market mechanisms. By controlling interest rates, dividend pay­
outs, security issues, and in the end even security prices the German capital market 
entered the post war period fully deprived of its function of allocating funds.
After the defeat of the national socialist regime, the West German authorities as 
well as the occupation authorities were slow in abolishing the above mentioned 
restrictions. To the contrary, with the introduction of the Kapitalverkehrsgesetz they
77 Ibid., p. 31.
78 Rudolph, ‘Effekten- und Wertpapierborsen’, p. 298.
79 F.-W. Henning, ‘Borsenkrisen und Borsengesetzgebung von 1914 bis 1945 in 
Deutschland’ in H. Pohl (ed.), Deutsche Borsengeschichte, (Frankfurt a. M., 1992), pp. 
276-277.
80 Ibid, p. 282.
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exploited the interventions introduced by the national socialists for their own 
purposes. With the introduction of the Kapitalforderungsgesetz (law for the 
encouragement of the capital market) in 1952, the German government made a first 
step towards capital market liberalisation by replacing interest rate restrictions on 
securities with discriminating taxation. With the assembly of the Zentrale 
Kapitalmarktausschufi (central capital market committee) in 1957, stringent public 
interventions were finally fully replaced by voluntary co-ordination. The changing 
attitude of public authorities towards the capital market is illustrated in greater 
detail by describing the three main laws and committees influencing the capital 
market development during the early post war period.
4.6.2. The K apitalverkehrsausschufi (the capital market committee)
The law on capital market transaction (Kapitalverkehrsgesetz) was in effect 
between September 1949 and December 1953. Under this law, the issue of bearer 
bonds and shares was subject to approval by the German government, whereas 
government bonds, bonds issued by the federal mail and by the federal rail were not 
subject to approval.82 For the appraisal of the individual proposals a special 
committee was established, the Kapitalverkehrausschufi (capital market 
committee).83 The Kapitalverkehrausschufi prescribed an upper limit of coupon 
rates of 5% for Pfandbriefe (mortgage bonds), of 5.5% for bonds issued by the 
Kreditanstalt fu r  Wiederaufbau, of 6% for government bonds, and of 6.5% for 
corporate bonds.84 The Kapitalverkehrsgesetz (capital market law) was passed in 
accordance with demands by the Bizone occupation authorities who demanded that 
domestic capital market funds were to be invested in accordance with the objectives 
pursued in the ECA programmes.85 Under the Kapitalverkehrsgesetz issues were
81 M. Bomemeyer, Die Finanzierung der westdeutschen Industrie iiber den Kapitalmarkt 
von 1948 bis 1957, (Dissertation, University of Bonn, 1962), p. 33.
82 Kirch, Neuordnung des Geldwesens, p. 54.
83 Until the introduction of the capital market committee in 1949, issue approvals were 
appraised by various governmental ministries and the central bank, see Bomemeyer, 
Finanzierung der westdeutschen Industrie, p. 38.
84 Kirch, Neuordnung des Geldwesens, p. 53.
85 Ibid., p. 53.
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denied ‘if either interest rates, initial offering prices or redemption prices differed 
substantially from conditions of similar securities, and if  an approval would raise 
fears of long term disruptions of price and interest patterns’.86 The 
Kapitalverkehrsgesetz impeded issues of corporate bonds and shares as it shielded 
the capital market from demands by the private sector so as to avoid squeezing 
credits for public investments and in particular the housing programme. In 1954, a 
new law on capital market transactions was passed and registered bonds were 
included in the list of securities being subject to approval.87 Under this revised law 
private issues were only permitted ‘if the economic conditions were viewed as 
satisfactory (wenn es die Leistungsfahigkeit der Wirtschaft zuliefi), if  they did not 
interfere with public issues, and if they were not repugnant to issue programs 
pursued by banks.88
4.6.3. The K apitalm arktfdrderungsgesetz (law for the encouragement 
of the capital market)
With the Kapitalmarktfdrderungsgesetz of December 1952 interest rate ceilings 
on bonds were removed and interventions took the form of discriminating taxation. 
The Kapitalmarktfdrderungsgesetz divided the securities market into three tax 
groups. The first group consisted of public bonds, including mortgage and 
municipal bonds insofar as they were intended for investments in social housing, 
corporate bonds with a coupon of 5.5% which had been issued before January 1952, 
and other bonds which were judicated worthy by the Kapitalverkehrausschufi and 
had been issued after March 1952.89 This group of bonds was exempt from any kind 
of earnings tax (income tax, corporate income tax, trade earnings tax and Notopfer 
Berlin [Levy for Aid to Berlin]). The second group included all mortgage and 
municipal bonds with a five year maturity, and a small number o f corporate bonds 
and convertibles with a five year maturity if  they had a coupon of 5.5% and if they 
had been issued before April 1952. This second group was subject to a lump sum
86 Ibid., p. 54.
87 Rudolph, ‘Effekten- und Wertpapierborsen’, pp. 297-298.
88 Kirch, Neuordnung des Geldwesens, p. 59.
89 Ibid., p. 64
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capital gains tax of 30%.90 All other securities including shares were subject to a 
lump sum capital gains tax of 60%.91 Nominal interest rates could be set freely and 
evolved in a way, which permitted similar effective yields for all fixed income 
securities despite differing taxation. This of course still impeded the corporate bond 
market as companies had to be able to afford interest payments, which offset the 
less favourable tax treatment in addition to a risk premium over public bonds. 
Furthermore, first time purchases of securities judicated worthy92 were eligible for 
premiums under the Kapitalansammlungsvertragen (capital accumulation contracts) 
which meant that income from these investments was not taxable.93 With the 
abolition of the Kapitalmarktforderungsgesetz in December 1954, the West German 
capital market was finally liberated from interest rate restrictions as well as 
distorting taxation.94 The role of the West German capital market in providing 
investment funds for a sample of public limited companies from 1954 onwards is 
analysed in the following chapter.
4.6.4. The Zentrale Kapitalmarktausschufl (central capital market 
committee)
The Zentrale Kapitalmarktausschufi assembled for the first time in February 
1957. The committee consisted of twelve members of various consortium banks and 
major issuing houses, with the central bank being allowed as permanent guest to the 
assemblies. The committee understood itself as self-regulatory authority exercising 
voluntary self control.95 The committee was established in order to co-ordinate the 
timing of security issues preventing temporary strains on the capital market. This 
form of timing of security issues contributed to the tendency of decreasing capital
90 Until May 1953, this second group was subject to trade earnings tax, church tax and 
Notopfer Berlin in addition to the lump sum tax of 30%, see Bomemeyer, Finanzierung der 
westdeutschen Industrie, p. 43.
91 Kirch, Neuordnung des Geldwesens, p. 65. Note that the decision of replacing 
progressive income tax rates with lump sum taxation made investments in these securities 
particularly attractive to earners of high income.
92 Which consisted of securities already enjoying favourable tax treatment.
93 From 1957 the purchase of shares in admitted investment funds were included into 
this scheme, see Reuss, Fiscal Policy for Growth, p. 112.
94 Rudolph, ‘Effekten- und Wertpapierborsen’, p. 298.
95 Ibid., p. 303.
139
market interest rates. The committee sometimes suggested slicing a large bond 
allowing a staggered issue.96 The work of the committee was seen as a success as it 
helped creating a capital market environment in which securities could be placed 
successfully.
4.6.5. Taxation and depreciation
The German government actively used taxation to channel and direct funds in 
industries considered important. Although the German authorities generally lowered 
the unsustainable high tax rates introduced by the occupation authorities, tax rates 
remained high, with the top marginal income tax rate remaining at around 50%. 
Indeed, the striking thing about the German case was that rising prosperity, which 
produced windfalls for the ministry of finance in the form of extra revenues both 
from income taxes and from sales tax, was not seized upon as a reason for cutting 
down the share of income claimed by the state. Such a policy was, for instance, 
pursued in Great Britain. According to Shonfield ‘the high level of German taxation 
was ... needed for a variety of subsidies to support one or another of the activities 
favoured by the state, and also to help in the finance of the nation’s capital 
investments at large.... Public savings financed nearly a third of [total investments]; 
in Britain it provided about one-tenth of a much smaller total national investment’.97 
No attempt was made to use tax policy to smooth the ups and downs of the business 
cycle, as for instance practised in Great Britain, embracing Keynesian ideas.
The number of tax changes and exemptions for capital formation are long and 
no attempt will be made to enumerate all changes and exemptions. Therefore, the 
following only covers most essential corporate and income tax changes, without 
getting into various tax concessions granted at different times for different securities 
to a different tax clientele. In any case, the enormous number of changes and 
exemptions in the West German tax system added to the unpredictability and 
intransparency of potential returns on capital market investments.
96 Bomemeyer, Finanzierung der westdeutschen Industry, pp. 39-40.
97 Shonfield, Modem Capitalism, p. 266.
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Before the Kleine Steuerreform (‘little tax reform’) in 1953, distributed profits 
were subject to the same tax rate as undistributed profits, with a corporate income 
tax of 50% between 1948 and 1951, and 60% thereafter. With the tax reform in 
1953, corporate income tax on distributed profits was reduced from 60% to 30%, 
unless the distribution exceeded 8% of nominal capital. For undistributed profits the 
60% corporate income tax remained.98 The favourable treatment of distributed 
profits together with the lifting of dividend pay-out restrictions in 1952 were first 
steps towards the encouragement of profit distributions. The tax reform of 1953 also 
partly reversed a law passed by the occupation authorities right after the war, which 
had increased income taxes (except corporation tax) to a maximum of 95% for 
incomes above DM 60,000 (later changed to above DM 250,000). With the Kleine 
Steuerreform the average income tax as well as the maximum rate was reduced by 
15%.99
In the Grofie Steuerreform (‘great tax reform’) of 1954, corporate income tax 
on undistributed profits was reduced from 60% to 45%, while corporate income tax 
on distributed profits remained at 30%.100 Furthermore, special depreciation 
allowances which were granted to companies benefiting from the investment aid 
programme and to all other companies under paragraph 7 of the income tax law 
were abolished by the Grofie Steuerreform.101 Moreover, the income tax rate for the 
highest personal income bracket was reduced from 70% to 55%. At the same time 
the underlying amount for the highest income bracket was raised from incomes 
above DM 423,000 to incomes above DM 614,000. In 1958, corporate income tax 
on undistributed profits was increased from 45% to 51%, whereas corporate income 
tax on distributed profits was further reduced from 30% to 15%. The quite 
considerable split between a 51% and a 15% tax on profits according to whether 
profits were distributed or not was one of the major methods of attacking self
98 Ibid., p. 46 and Reuss, Fiscal Policy for Growth, p. 118.
99 By 1958 the maximum income tax rate was reduced to 53%, see Reuss, Fiscal Policy 
for Growth, p. 83-84.
100 Bomemeyer, Finanzierung der westdeutschen Industry, p. 46.
101 Ibid, p. 47.
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financing and ‘presaged the attempts of the administration to create investment by a 
capital market nourished by public savings.’102
Until the change in paragraph 7 of the income tax law in 1951, companies were 
allowed accelerated depreciation (degressive Abschreibung) of up to 50% of the 
purchase price within the first two years after the acquisition of capital goods with a 
life span of ten years or more.103 ‘With this method of depreciation greater amounts 
could be written off in the first years than with the linear method, while in most 
cases from the fourth year on only small amounts could be written off. Since 
smaller depreciation amounts meant that taxable profits were higher, there was an 
incentive for the larger number of businesses using this method to expand their 
investment still further in order to benefit from the highest possible level of 
depreciation.’104 In 1952, the accelerated method allowed for a depreciation rate of 
22.5% of the remaining book value, between 1953 and 1957 the depreciation rate 
was 28.3%, and later the rate was 25%.105 Therefore, the accelerated depreciation 
method provided a powerful incentive to reinvest in new capital goods within five 
years. In addition to generous depreciation allowances granted between 1948 and 
1954, West German businesses were allowed special tax relief for replacement of 
assets damaged during the war, for residential housing construction, for building 
rented housing, for shipbuilding, and for repairing and reconstructing industrial, 
commercial and agricultural buildings. However, most of these measures were 
restricted after 1951 and ended soon thereafter.106 Note that most of the special tax 
allowances were restricted to investments in the housing sector.
4.7. Concluding remarks
The above analysis has shown that the decision of keeping part of the economy 
under price control created an environment, which made further public interventions
102 Reuss, Fiscal Policy for Growth, p. 118.
103 Roskamp, Capital Formation, p. 124.
104 Kramer, The West German Economy, p. 201.
105 Ibid., p. 201 and Roskamp, Capital Formation, p. 125.
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necessary. Although the bulk of ERP funds was used to finance investments in price 
controlled sectors, they were not sufficient (and according to the plans of the U.S. 
authorities were not intended to be sufficient) in providing those sectors with all 
their external funding requirements. In order to secure additional funding in the 
controlled sectors, German authorities applied several policies which influenced 
investment decisions and suppressed market mechanisms of allocating resources. 
These policies included interest rate ceilings, tax discrimination, special tax 
incentives, and special depreciation allowances. All these policies aimed at 
providing favourable access to funding for public investment programmes over 
private investment projects. However, the German authorities often tried to disguise 
interventions and to present them as private initiatives. For instance, the authorities 
required beneficiaries of the investment aid programme to issue bonds, instead of 
issuing ordinary government bonds to those companies which were forced to pay 
the investment aid levy.
Public interventions affected the demand as well as the supply of capital market 
instruments. It ensured that investments in controlled and public sectors were at 
least as profitable as in uncontrolled private sectors, whilst the cost of capital market 
funding was considerably lower for the controlled and govemmentally favoured 
sectors than for the uncontrolled private sectors. Additionally, the self financing 
ability of controlled sectors was improved by granting them generous depreciation 
allowances.
With hindsight it is arguable whether partial price controls were necessary, as 
fears of excessive inflation did not materialise. However as mentioned, the demand 
by the occupation authorities to keep certain sectors of the economy under price 
control was not so much based on economic considerations but rather derived from 
political considerations. Figures on the economic development of price controlled 
sectors in comparison to free market sectors suggest that price controlled sectors 
grew somewhat slower than the investment goods industry and the basic and
106 Kramer, The West German Economy, p. 202, citing paragraph (a) to (e) of § 7 of the 
income and corporate tax law.
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producer goods industry. Results on capacity utilisation suggest that sectors crucial 
to the performance of the overall economy such as coal mining, and iron and steel 
production reached capacity limits in the early 1950s. However, decreasing capacity 
utilisation thereafter indicates that bottlenecks failed to materialise. To what extent 
the absence of bottlenecks was due to increased efforts in providing funds for 
capital formation by the public sector or due to a steadier and more proportionate 
development of the economy remains unanswered. It is, however, hard to imagine a 
counterfactual scenario of how well the capital market would have avoided the 
development of bottlenecks, given that market forces had been given a chance to do 
the work of allocating investment funds.
Next to the government which was a major provider of funds in particular to 
sectors such as housing, infrastructure and utilities, banks played an important role 
in providing external funds, as they not only provided credit but were also important 
investors in capital market securities right from the start of the post currency reform 
period. Despite severe distortions of the capital market during the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, the capital market started to recover in the mid 1950s when most of the 
post war economic distortions were overcome and the public authorities allowed 
market forces to come into play. As subsidised investments in a few special sectors 
became less of a mandatory policy objective, the advantages of a free capital 
market, with the discipline of market interest rates became more and more 
dominant. Consequently, the self financing advantages were reduced, and soon 
limited to privileged persons.107 The role the capital market played, once market 
forces were allowed to operate, will be dealt with in the following chapter.
107 See Reuss, Fiscal Policy for Growth, 123.
144
5. The financing behaviour of West German public limited 
companies between 1952 and 1965
5.1. Introduction
What do we know about the financing behaviour of West German public 
limited companies during the early post World War II period which is often referred 
to as the period of economic miracle or Wirtschaftswunder? The most likely answer 
one receives to this question is that West German companies financed their 
investments predominantly with internally generated funds and in as much as they 
did rely on external funds they were provided by bank loans. Extraordinary high 
rates of retention, generous depreciation allowances and close bank company 
relationships are generally stated as reasons for the relative insignificance of capital 
market funds.1 The previous chapter has discussed public interventions and their 
role in allocating funds (in particular to politically favoured sectors) during the 
immediate post war period. This chapter will focus on the financing behaviour of 
West German public limited companies during the early post war period placing 
particular emphasis on the development of companies’ gearing ratios and when and 
to what extent companies chose one source of funding over another.
As has already been noted in connection with the currency reform, the early 
West German post war period has received little research attention with respect to 
capital structure. In as far as there exist studies which deal with the capital structure 
of West German companies the period analysed usually covers the mid 1960s/1970s 
until German reunification.2 The main revelation of these studies for the more recent 
decades is probably the finding that the financing behaviour of West German 
companies is rather similar to that in other industrialised countries, qualifying the
1 See for instance Baumgart et al., ‘Die Finanzierung der industriellen Expansion’, pp. 
34-36; Bomemeyer, Die Finanzierung der westdeutschen Industrie, pp. 2-3; Dannemann, 
Struktur und Funktionsweise des Kapitalmarktes\ p. 56; Giersch et al., The Fading 
Miracle, p. 83;
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claim that German companies rely to a greater extent on internally generated funds 
and bank loans than companies in comparable countries.3 Another line of research 
concentrates on the role of West German banks as provider of investment funds, 
their influence on companies as representatives on companies’ supervisory boards, 
and on the effects of large voting rights exercised by banks.4 The findings of this 
field of research tend to report mixed results on the importance of bank company 
relationships.5 In the following it is attempted to extend the findings of empirical 
studies investigating the funding behaviour of West German companies for more 
recent decades by analysing companies financing behaviour between 1952 and 
1965. Due to the failure of literature to produce consistent quantitative evidence of a 
predominant role of banks in West Germany, it was decided not to restrict the focus 
of the analysis on the role of banks in providing investment funds but to analyse the 
funding behaviour of companies without pre-imposing a view on the importance of 
one particular means or channel of financing.
2 With the exception of Henning, ‘Die Untemehmensfinanzierung in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, pp. 99-117; and J. Edwards and K. Fischer, Banks, finance 
and Investment, who cover the period of 1950 to 1989.
3 See for instance R. G. Rajan and L. Zingales, ‘What Do We Know about Capital 
Structure? Some Evidence from International Data’, The Journal o f Finance, Vol. L 
(1995), No. 5, pp. 1421-1460; J. Corbett and T. Jenkinson, ‘The Financing of Industry, 
1970-1989: An International Comparison’, Journal o f the Japanese and International 
Economies, Vol. 10 (1996), pp. 71-96; and Edwards and Fischer, Banks, Finance and 
Investment, p. 51. They all argue that the use of balance sheet data for international 
comparison of gearing ratios employed in earlier papers on West German capital structure 
overstated gearing ratios of German companies due to differing accounting valuation 
conventions.
4 See for instance J. Cable, ‘Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: 
The Role of West German Banks’ The Economic Journal, Vol. 95 (March, 1985), pp. 118- 
132; and G. Gorton and F. A. Schmid ‘Universal Banking and the Performance of German 
Firms’, NBER Working Paper, (1996), No. 5453.
5 See for instance J. Edwards and S. Ogilvie, ‘Universal Banks and German 
Industrialization: A Reappraisal’, Economic History Review, Vol. XLIX (1996), No. 3, pp. 
427-446; and C. Fohlin, ‘The Rise of Interlocking Directorates in Imperial Germany’, 
Economic History Review, Vol. LII (1999), No. 2, pp. 307-333, whose research cover the 
turn of the century, as well as Gorton and Schmid, ‘Universal Banking’ for the post war 
period, conclude that close company bank relationships do not affect companies financing 
behaviour or performance. To the contrary, Cable, ‘Capital Market Information’, and D. B. 
Audretsch and J. A. Elston, ‘Does Firm Size Matter? Evidence on the Impacts of Liquidity 
Constraints on Firm Investment Behaviour in Germany’ Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, Financial Economics Discussion Paper (1994), No. 1072, attribute an influence 
to the role of German banks.
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An analysis of capital structure during the early post war period seems 
particularly interesting because it was a time of exceptionally high growth rates 
while the economy was still recovering from distortions created by the war and its 
aftermath. Excessive oversupply of money had deprived the Reichsmark of its 
function as legal tender and hyper inflation could only be prevented by enforcing 
price controls and rationing. The currency reform of 1948, which was analysed in 
chapter three, was the first major step towards creating a functioning economic 
environment. Undoubtedly, the successful establishment of a stable monetary 
environment in connection with the price liberalisation of goods in most sectors had 
an essential positive impact on economic activity. However, with respect to 
companies’ balance sheets, the currency reform entailed substantial changes to the 
capital structure of companies. Triggered by the findings in chapter three, where it 
was established that the differing conversion of debt and equity constituted an 
external shock to companies’ capital structure, the following analysis provides 
detailed accounts of the development of companies’ gearing ratios. The situation 
created by the balance sheet conversion provides an excellent condition for testing 
whether companies can be observed to have moved to higher gearing ratios in order 
to offset the conversion effects. Arguing in support of capital structure theory, one 
would expect to observe this kind of behaviour if one agrees that the conversion left 
companies with a capital structure that did not resemble a company’s choice of 
leverage if the company had managed leverage at its own device. It follows that the 
low gearing ratio companies found themselves with after the conversion provided 
them with the opportunity to finance more of their investments with debt as would 
have otherwise been possible without causing increased danger of financial distress. 
Findings presented in Graphs 5.7 (a-d) support the notion that companies responded 
to the conversion effects by increasing their gearing ratios. Moreover, the findings 
suggest that there is a certain gearing bracket companies appear to strive for.
Other distortions experienced during the immediate post war period were due to 
territorial losses and the division of Germany into an Eastern and a Western part, 
which left West Germany as the truncated part of a formerly closely integrated 
economic unit. The agricultural sector and the iron and steel industry were most 
affected from these losses because the bulk of agricultural output was produced in
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the east as were raw materials crucial for iron and steel production. The situation 
was further aggravated by the severe destruction of infrastructure and residential 
housing which had difficulties coping with the great number of refugees entering 
West Germany. In order to overcome the distortions consequential to the lost war, 
the West German authorities together with the three western occupation authorities 
implemented a number of public investment programmes which channelled funds 
into those sectors which were considered most crucial to the economic recovery of 
West Germany. As discussed in the previous chapter, as long as public authorities 
considered parts of the economy in need of privileged funding, the capital market 
was hampered in providing funds to the private, uncontrolled sector. Whereas the 
previous chapter outlined the types of impediments that restricted the West German 
capital market, this chapter focuses on the role the capital market played in 
providing funds when most of these restrictions were lifted.
As it is commonly argued that German companies financed their investments 
predominantly via internally generated funds during the Wirtschaftswunder period it 
seems appropriate at this stage to raise a few historical arguments which question 
this assumption. As stated before, part of the attraction of the early West German 
post war period is that it is characterised by high economic growth and by an era of 
easing distortions. High growth demands for a large amount of investments and it 
seems difficult to believe that exceptionally high investment demands could be met 
sufficiently by internal funds. To the contrary, one would expect to observe a 
greater reliance on external funds during exceptional growth periods not at least 
because equity financing tends to be relatively cheap in as far as high growth rates 
are reflected in high share prices. Moreover, although the sample consists of 
established companies, most of these companies, as well as the West German 
economy as a whole, had experienced a setback which left individual companies 
and the economy as a whole in a less mature state than they would have been 
without the turmoil created by the war and its aftermath. Even though plants and 
machinery were generally maintained at rather high standards, lost territory in the 
east forced a number of companies to relocate their plants and seizure of other 
companies triggered a number of consolidations and break-ups all of which reduced 
the state of maturity of companies and required an extraordinary amount of financial
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funds. In light of the above, one might be inclined to question the claim that 
financial requirements could be met by internally generated funds. Indeed, findings 
in this chapter suggest that internally generated funds did not comprise a greater 
proportion of gross financial funding means during the early post war years than in 
later periods.
In summary the chapter sets out to investigate two ideas. First, the early post 
war period is characterised by strong economic growth. A period of high growth 
would tend to lead to greater reliance on external equity because it would be 
relatively cheap (given expectation of strong growth). Second, West German 
companies found themselves with low gearing ratios as result of the currency 
reform. It is expected to observe companies moving to higher gearing ratios. Thus, 
it is argued that an increase in gearing ratios during the investigated period can be 
partly attributed to the initial disequilibrium created by the currency reform. In the 
following, the chapter analyses the capital structure of a sample of West German 
public limited companies between 1952 and 1965. The findings seem to fall in line 
with results of studies for later periods, which suggest that internal funds are the 
most important source of finance, followed by debt and external equity.
The remaining chapter is outlined as follows. The next section introduces the 
sample of companies chosen the analysis is based on and its data sources. This is 
followed by a description of various capital structure variables. Subsequently, 
descriptive statistics on the relative importance of financial funds are reported, as is 
the development of gearing ratios. The chapter concludes by relating the findings of 
the thesis to previous studies on West German capital structure.
5.2. The sample
5.2.1. Sample description
In 1952, there were 2,893 West German public limited companies, which only 
accounts for about 0.1% of all West German companies. However, about 20% of 
the country’s turnover was produced by public limited companies in the early post
149
war years.6 Moreover, the concentration of economic power among large companies 
in Germany steadily increased. By 1960, the hundred biggest companies (most of 
which were public limited companies) generated nearly 40% of total industrial 
turnover and they employed one out of every three workers in the industrial sector.7 
Most of the 2,893 public limited companies were tightly held and only 420 public 
limited companies were listed on one of the German stock exchanges over the entire 
period under consideration. By taking a sample of 79 listed non financial 
companies, the study includes almost one fifth of all publicly listed West German 
companies. The choice of companies was largely predetermined by the availability 
of data. The quantity as well as the quality of information is sensitive to the nature 
of stock quotation and quickly deteriorates with decreasing size. Therefore, the 
sample is composed of relatively large West German firms. Nevertheless, the 
sample still varies considerably in size, with total assets ranging between DM 32.6 
million and DM 8.0 billion in 1965, and a sample mean of DM 916.8 million and 
median of DM 412.3 million.
The sample was chosen according to the following two selection criteria. In 
order to include a company in the sample, it had to report financial data sufficiently 
detailed to allow to make inferences to its capital structure and its shares had to be 
traded. Those two criteria tend to be fulfilled simultaneously, as non traded 
companies are likely to disclose less detailed financial statements where, for 
instance, the liability side consists of only two entries: shareholder’s equity and 
liabilities, without differentiating between bonds, bank loans and other liabilities. 
As mentioned, this selection criteria led to a bias in the sample towards bigger 
companies. Furthermore, most of the companies belong to the manufacturing 
industry. For instance, of the 79 companies listed in Appendix 1, only five (number 
17, 24, 36, 64 and 77) were related to infrastructure. As pointed out in the previous 
chapter, the German government was an active agent in planning and fostering the 
infrastructure sector, especially the transport and communications network, as well 
as housing and mining. These sectors, which were generally under state control,
6 Henning, ‘Die Untemehmensfinanzierung’, p. 99.
7 Shonfield, Modem Capitalism, p. 241.
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were largely financed by public funding rather than through bank loans or private 
security issues. Moreover, the sample criteria implies that the study consists entirely 
of public limited companies.
The reason for limiting the empirical analysis to public limited companies is 
twofold. First, only public limited companies are required to disclose information 
about themselves to a degree which makes an analysis of capital structure possible. 
Second, these disclosure requirements and their form of legal entity allow public 
limited companies to utilise the capital market to its full extent as they are able to 
choose between all kinds of external finance. Whereas public limited companies can 
finance investment requirements from internally generated funds, issuance of 
equity, or any form of debt, most other forms of legal entities are limited to internal 
finance and bank loans, as their legal form does not allow public equity issuance 
and the lack of appropriate disclosures on their performance and financial structure 
does not allow them to issue bonds. Whereas this approach allows to make 
inferences on the role of the capital market for public limited companies, no 
conclusions can be drawn concerning questions like what makes companies choose 
to go public or whether companies which decide to go public share a common 
criterion. Therefore, the study does not claim to draw conclusions about the 
financial structure of West German companies as a whole, as it analyses the role of 
the capital market for those companies utilising it, without making any inferences 
about the efficiency of the capital market in attracting companies.8
The analysis is based on a sample of public limited companies traded on at least 
one of the West German stock exchanges. Initially, financial reports on 96 financial 
and non financial companies were gathered for the years starting with 1952 and 
ending with 1965. The choice of the companies included in the sample was based 
on quoted companies listed in the German financial newspaper, the Handelsblatt. 
From the original sample of 96 companies, banks and insurance companies were
8 The poor performance of the German capital market in attracting companies is 
indicated by the fact that the percentage of turnover produced by public limited companies 
decreased over the post war period to 10% in the mid 1980s. See Henning, ‘Die
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excluded from the analysis, as their balance sheets are not comparable to non 
financial companies’ balance sheets. For instance, their leverage is strongly 
influenced by investor insurance schemes such as deposit insurance, their debt like 
liabilities are not strictly comparable to the debt issued by non financial companies, 
and regulations such as minimum capital requirements affect their capital structure.9 
The exclusion of financial companies amounts to a loss of ten companies, five 
banks and five insurance companies. One company (DEGUSSA) had to be excluded 
because it is allowed to cast gold bars which makes it a hybrid between a financial 
and a non financial company, which in turn is reflected in a balance sheet following 
the structure of financial institutions. One company (IG-Farben) had to be excluded 
as it was in the process of unwinding and its production was taken on by companies 
which evolved from this former conglomerate. Another two companies were 
excluded because their share prices were quoted in foreign currencies. Further three 
companies had to be excluded due to inadequate data disclosure. This leaves a 
sample of 79 non financial public limited companies on which the following 
analysis is based.10 For 12 of these 79 companies one or several years were missing 
either because the company became a listed company some time after 1952 or 
because the series of reports in Hoppenstedt were incomplete. Six companies came 
into existence in their current form some time after 1952. For five companies only 
consolidated data was available for a few years. The remaining gaps are due to short 
reports which led to lack of data in the case of one company for a few years. In the 
case that no more than one year was missing, the missing year was constructed by 
taking the average of the preceding and the succeeding year. If  the gap was wider 
than one year no attempt was made to fill the data gap. All but one of the 79 
companies are public limited companies over the whole period they are included in 
the analysis. The exception is Volkswagen which changed its status from a limited 
liability company to a public limited company in I960.11 Moreover, all the
Untemehmensfinanzierung’, p. 99 and Edwards and Fischer, Banks, Finance and 
Investment, p. 94.
9 Rajan and Zingales, ‘What Do We Know about Capital Structure?’, p. 1424.
10 The names of companies included in the sample are listed in Appendix 1.
11 Initially, it was planned to include Bosch in the analysis as the only company which 
kept its status of a limited liability company over the entire period as its disclosure 
procedures allowed the company to make use of the capital market in every aspect other
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companies in the sample were founded either in the second half of the nineteenth 
century or in the early twentieth century. However, due to the disentanglement of 
companies such as IG-Farben and Vereinigte Stahlwerke, a number of companies 
analysed only came into existence in their current form in the early 1950s.
The analysis covers a period of fourteen years, starting with 1952 and ending in 
1965. The year 1952 was chosen as the starting year for the analysis as it was the 
first year in which all public limited companies had converted their balance sheets 
from Reichsmark into Deutsch Mark. The year 1965 was chosen as last year of the 
empirical analysis for two reasons. First, it represents the last year of the 
Wirtschaftswunder period as West Germany faced her first depression in 1966/67 
since the introduction of the Deutsch Mark in 1948. Second, in 1966 the 
Corporation Act of 1965 was enforced, under which the accounting rules for the 
valuation of plant, equipment, inventories, and profits were tightened.12 This makes 
a comparison of the years before this reform and since then only to a limited extent 
possible.
5.2.2. Sources of data
The main data source for the empirical analysis are various issues of the 
Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, Verlag Hoppenstedt (handbook of 
public limited companies published by Hoppenstedt).13 The handbook is compiled 
from annual reports of West German public limited companies. As such it contains 
information on West German public limited companies including companies’ 
balance sheets, their profit and loss statements, and dividend payments. It also 
contains a brief history of companies’ development and a short management report 
on business decisions. Furthermore, it includes information on company holdings, 
contracts, and ownership structure. However, German public limited companies
than the issue of shares. However, due to some difficulties in comparing Bosch’s financial 
statements with that of public limited companies it was decided to drop the observations on 
Bosch from the data set.
12 Audretsch and Elston, ‘Does Firm Size Matter?’, p. 12.
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were not required to publish cash flow statements and as such Hoppenstedt does not 
report cash flow statements.14 The analysis is based on unconsolidated financial 
statements as not all companies reported consolidated statements. Moreover, the 
compilation of consolidated statements shows little consistency. Some companies 
only include direct subsidiaries in their consolidation, others also include companies 
in which they hold ‘considerable’ stakes, where it appears that companies were 
rather free in choosing what they considered considerable holdings and therefore 
included in their consolidated statements. Companies are of course free to choose 
the period of their accounting year, and often the chosen year does not coincide with 
the calendar year. Therefore, companies’ fiscal years do not overlap perfectly. The 
procedure of designating company reports to a specific year follows the conduct 
utilised by Hoppenstedt. This main data source provided by Hoppenstedt which 
provides all relevant accounting data is complemented with information on 
companies’ share prices. Information on share prices has been gathered quarterly 
and taken from the German financial newspaper the Handelsblatt. The Handelsblatt 
reports continuous quotations for the stock exchange in Dtisseldorf and daily 
quotations for the remaining West German stock exchanges.15
5.2.3. The use of West German accounting data
There are well known problems associated with the use of accounting data. It is 
often stated that the conservatism of German accounting in valuing assets and the 
possibility of accumulating hidden reserves increases these problems for the 
German case. However, the conversion of balance sheets initiated a revaluation of 
assets which in turn triggered a disclosure of hidden reserves. One might even argue 
that shareholder equity’s tended to be overstated as the discrepancy created by the
13 This handbook has been published every year since 1896 and contains information on 
all public limited companies operating in West Germany.
14 Even today, cash flow accounting and the statement of cash flows is somewhat unique 
to the external reporting requirements of the United States and those countries that closely 
follow U.S. accounting standards.
15 After the Second World War, Berlin lost its role as main German stock exchange 
(Leitbdrse). Until the 1980s, when Frankfurt became the most active West German stock
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different conversion of assets and liabilities (in the form of debt) was offset by 
restating shareholder’s equity. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that 
German companies entered the post currency reform period with a relatively small 
amount of hidden reserves.16
Another difficulty the analysis was faced with lies in the fact that the quality of 
profit and loss statements deteriorates when going back in time, with sales figures 
and annual net profit (Jahresiiberschufi) only being reported from 1960 onwards. 
Perhaps the greatest restriction when dealing with early post war German 
accounting data is the lack of annual net profit figures. The lack of annual net profit 
figures means that there is no measure for companies’ performance (in the form of 
earnings per share), no assessment of the investment potential of common stocks (in 
the form of price/earnings ratios), nor a comparison of profits earned by a company 
to the investments made by the company’s stockholders (in the form of return on 
equity). Unfortunately, companies did not report annual net profit figures before 
1960/1961 (depending on their fiscal years), when the reform of the German stock 
corporation law (Aktienrechtsreform) of 1959 came into effect, which compelled 
companies to publish annual net profit figures.17 With the reform of the German 
stock corporation law of 1959, the information given on companies’ profits 
improved as companies were obliged to not only state net profit after deduction of 
reserves but also to report gross profit figures before retention. Under German 
accounting annual net profit reflects the company’s profit within the accounting 
period, whereas net income is generated by subtracting (adding) appropriations of 
earnings from (to) annual net earnings as proposed by the managing board.18 As
exchange, the exchanges in Dusseldorf and Frankfurt were the most liquid ones, see 
Rudolph, ‘Effekten- und Wertpapierborsen’, p. 293.
16 Shareholder’s equity is defined as the difference between the total balance sheet value 
of the company’s assets and the total balance sheet value of the company’ liabilities. The 
components of shareholder’s equity are discussed in greater detail below.
17 The law also required public limited companies that their profit and loss statements 
contain sales figures, and gross interest expenses and interest income figures. Before the 
law companies only reported net interest payments (the aggregation of interest expenses 
and interest income).
18 The proposed appropriation of earnings normally consists of allocations to 
(withdrawals from) earning reserves and provisions, where no more than half of annual net 
profit can be transferred to earning reserves, and where amounts which must be transferred
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such net income reflects no more than the value which managers consider 
dispensable, and therefore offer to distribute among shareholders, who in turn can 
decide on the use of net income.19 In practice, most of the reported net income is 
distributed as dividend payments to shareholders.20 At first it was contemplated to 
construct annual net profit figures in order to overcome the lack of annual net profit 
figures for the years preceding 1960/61, by reversing the appropriation, adding 
annual changes in reserves to net income. However, retentions reported in the 
income statement and changes in reserves stated in the balance sheet can differ 
significantly as companies may use reserve accounts to shift earnings between 
periods. Therefore, the results of this exercise were considered too spurious to be 
treated as reliable proxies of annual net profit figures.
5.3. Definition of financial sources
Companies generate assets from three sources: (1) retained funds generated 
through profitable operations, (2) borrowings, and (3) issuing equity securities. The 
different components of these sources are described in some detail below.
5.3.1. Liabilities
Most companies in the sample provide a detailed account o f the nature of their 
liabilities. Therefore, it is possible to disaggregate companies’ liabilities with
to legal reserves and any loss brought forward must first be deducted from the annual net 
profit, see Brooks and Mertin, Neues deutsches Bilanzrecht = New German Accounting 
Legislation, (Dusseldorf, 1986), E 87. The amounts that companies are either required or 
choose to transfer from retained earnings to a more permanent account are not available for 
dividends. It is often argued that managers have an incentive to understate net income to 
reduce the demand from shareholders for dividends.
19 H. E. Buschgen, ‘Aktienanalyse und Aktienbewertung nach der Ertragskraft’, in H. 
Rittershausen (ed.), Beitrage zur Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Vol. 2, (Wiesbaden, 1962), pp. 
168-169.
20 Except to the extent that these are excluded from distribution to the shareholders based 
on statutory or company resolutions, see Brooks and Mertin, Neues deutsches Bilanzrecht, 
E 87.
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respect to their nature and maturity.21 Liabilities are grouped in two main categories: 
interest bearing debt and non interest bearing debt. For the purpose of the analysis, 
the former are further subdivided into ‘capital market debt’, ‘long term private 
debt’, and ‘short to medium term private debt’. Capital market debt consists of 
bonds and convertibles. Long term private debt includes long term bank loans, 
mortgages, loans provided by public authorities or the bank for reconstruction, and 
other long term investment credits (Darlehen und langfristige Investitionskredite). 
Medium and short term private debt includes medium and short term bank loans, 
other medium and short term loans (Darlehen und Investitionskredite), and drafts. 
Non interest bearing debt generally constitutes current liabilities and is summarised 
into one component referred to as ‘other liabilities’ which contains advances from 
customers, accounts payable, liabilities due to affiliated companies and other 
liabilities including tax and social security liabilities. It is general practise that only 
interest bearing debt is considered when establishing a company’s leverage. Non 
interest bearing liabilities are considered in relation to working capital, where 
working capital is defined as current assets less current liabilities.
5.3.2. Shareholder's equity
Shareholder’s equity (Eigenkapital) comprises contributed capital and earned 
capital and represents the residual interests of the stockholders or the book value of 
the company. As such, the stockholder’s equity section can be viewed as the 
difference between the total balance sheet value of the company’s assets and the 
total balance sheet value of the company’ liabilities. Contributed equity (or external 
equity) consists of common stock, preferred stock, and additional paid-in capital. 
The major component of earned capital (or internal equity) is retained earnings, a 
measure of assets that have been generated through a company’s profitable 
operations and not paid to the owners in the form of dividends. Retained earnings 
consist of subscribed capital (gezeichnetes Kapital), capital reserves
21 Although West German companies were not yet obliged to report liabilities according 
to their maturity in the 1950s and 1960s, most companies listed their debt obligations 
according to maturity.
157
(Kapitalrucklage), revenue reserves (Gewinnriicklage), profit/loss brought forward, 
and profit/loss for the year. Revenue reserves, in turn, contain legal reserves 
(gesetzliche Riicklagen), reserves for own shares {Riicklagen fiir eigene Anteile), 
statutory reserves (satzungsmafiige Riicklagen), and other revenue reserves (andere 
Gewinnriicklagen). Capital reserves are generated by share premiums capturing the 
amount received in excess of the nominal value when issuing shares or debentures.22 
In short, shareholder’s equity consists of external equity contributions and internally 
generated funds.
5.3.3. Provisions (accrued tiabilities) and value ad justm ents
Provisions, also called accrued liabilities (Riickstellungen), are set up for 
uncertain liabilities and for anticipated losses from uncompleted transactions. 
Accrued liabilities are established for a wide array of uncertain liabilities. They 
include provisions for pensions, taxation, anticipated losses related to incomplete 
contracts, possible future losses on inventories, bad debts, and other contingencies. 
As suggested by the variety of possible provisions, they often amount to a large 
position on the liability side of companies’ balance sheets. Provisions for pensions 
generally constitute the single most important provision as most German companies 
retain pension funds in the form of provisions for their employees. These funds 
which can run into millions of Deutsch Mark can be used as an important alternative 
source of financing.23 Although provisions may be released when the reason for
22 Companies normally have legal or contractual requirements to sustain specified levels 
of reserves. The following rules apply to German public limited companies: ‘As long as 
legal reserves and capital reserves together amount to less than one tenth of nominal 
capital, the twentieth part of annual net income has to be transferred thereto. Furthermore, 
if legal reserves and capital reserves are below the tenth part of nominal capital, they may 
only be used to absorb net or accumulated losses which can not be covered by retained 
earnings brought forward from the previous year or by the release of other revenue 
reserves.’ See J. P. Brooks and D. Mertin, Neues deutsches Bilanzrecht, E 88.
23 Audretsch and Elston, ‘Does Firm Size Matter?’, p. 6. Corbett and Jenkinson, ‘The 
Financing of Industry’, also mention the difficulties arising from pension provisions which 
they address on page 83 in the following way, ‘A feature of the German system of pension 
provision is that an important part of pension arrangements is provided by employers, 
partly by insurance companies and pension funds and partly by direct claims of employees 
on firms. This latter feature means that employee contributions are a significant source of 
finance for firms. These contributions to company pension funds are included in the
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establishing them has disappeared, companies often do not reduce their provisions 
in the event that previously uncertain liabilities dissolve.24 To the extent that 
provisions are kept without any underlying uncertain liabilities they are a source of 
hidden profits, and therefore part of equity rather then liabilities. A further 
specificum of provisions is that they are generally established out of internally 
generated funds. Due to the frequent overfunding of provisions for future and 
uncertain liabilities and due to the fact that provisions tend to be generated from 
internal funds, the analysis treats provisions as part of internal equity rather than 
liabilities.25 As such provisions are added to the internal funds component 
throughout the analysis.
Having discussed the different components which constitute the liability side of 
a balance sheet, leaves one component reported on the liability side called value 
adjustment (Wertberichtigung). Under German accounting value adjustments are 
made to offset overvaluations of assets, helping to keep reported values in line with 
existing facts. In other words, value adjustments capture a decrease in asset value on 
the liability side instead of writing down the value of the asset on the asset side. 
They neither fall in the category of accruals nor cost expirations. Companies may 
use value adjustments in situations when they revalue assets but do not desire the 
income effect of the revaluation to affect income of the current period. As such 
value adjustments can be viewed as a form of reserves. Therefore, internal funds 
consist of reserves, net income, provisions and value adjustments.
5.4. Development of financial sources in relation to total assets
The following sections are based on the analysis of the above described sample 
of 79 non financial West German public limited companies. Graph 5.1 provides an
internally generated funds category because they are indeed generated within the firm, but 
as they carry with them a liability in the form of commitments to pay pensions to 
employees in the future they are clearly not equivalent to other forms of internal finance.’
24 Brooks and Mertin, Neues deutsches Bilanzrecht, E 39.
25 Edwards and Fischer, Banks, Finance and Investment, pp. 53-58 consider provisions 
as separate source of finance to overcome the difficulty of deciding whether to treat them 
as internally generated funds or debt.
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overview of the relative importance of financial sources in percentage of total assets 
between 1952 and 1965. Graph 5.1 presents the mean ratio of internal funds, shares, 
bonds and convertibles, long term private debt, medium and short term private debt, 
and other liabilities to total assets for each year. Internal funds consist of reserves, 
net income, provisions and value adjustments. Shares represent the book value of 
shares outstanding. Bonds and convertibles represent the book value of capital 
market funds. Private debt defines all interest bearing debts other than capital 
market debt and is divided into long and short to medium term debt, following the 
above definitions. Other liabilities comprise all non interest bearing liabilities.
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Graph 5.1 displays a number of interesting results. Despite using the widest 
possible definition of internal funds including provisions and value adjustments, 
internal funds comprise little more than one third of total assets. More precisely, 
internal funds comprised 35.2% of total assets in 1952 and 37.9% of total assets in 
1965, with the proportion of internal funds over total assets peaking at 38.9% in 
1959. The proportion of shares outstanding (in book value) to total assets 
experienced the strongest contraction, decreasing by almost 10% from 33.1% in 
1952 to 24.3% in 1965. Capital market debt grew in percentage of total assets until 
1958 when it comprised as much as 4.6% of total assets and declined thereafter. 
Nevertheless, capital market debt ended the period accounting for almost twice as 
much of total assets than at the beginning of the period, or 2.8% of total assets in 
1965 compared to 1.5% in 1952. Long term private debt grew rather consistently 
over the whole period increasing in percentage of total assets from 7.7% in 1952 to 
14.5% in 1965. Short to medium term debt as well as non interest bearing liabilities 
decreased slightly as percentage of total assets from 3.5% to 2.4% and from 18.6% 
to 17.5%, respectively. Loans explicitly classified as bank loans in the financial 
reports which constitute part of the private debt component and are not displayed 
separately in Graph 5.1 comprised on average 4.2% of total assets between 1952 
and 1965. If one considers a wider definition of bank loans including debt 
components which are not explicitly referred to as bank loans but are likely to 
contain loans granted by banks such as items referred to as investment credits and 
loans (Darlehen), then bank loans under this wider definition amounted on average 
to 8.7% of total assets, increasing form 6.8% in 1952 to 11.6% in 1965.26
Comparing the findings of Graph 5.1 with results reported by Huth suggests 
that capital market funds comprised a greater proportion of financial funds during 
the early post war period than during the later post war period.27 Huth finds that
26 Darlehen contain Schuldscheindarlehen (borrower’s notes) which are often granted by 
insurance companies. Borrower’ notes can be sold, with the borrower’s consent, to another 
party.
27 A. H.-J. Huth, Industriefinanzierung in Deutschland und Frankreich, (Wiesbaden, 
1996), pp. 59-62. The study by Huth is based on commercial balance sheets of a sample of 
German public limited companies compiled by the Statistische Bundesamt. As such his 
findings are reasonably comparable to the findings of the present study. However, some
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shares outstanding relative to total assets amounted to around 16% between 1981 
and 1991. In comparison, Graph 5.1 suggests that the proportion of shares 
outstanding to total assets amounted on average to 27.3% between 1952 and 1965, 
although decreasing from 33.1% in 1952 to 24.3% in 1965. With respect to bonds, 
Huth finds that bonds over total assets comprised an infinitely small proportion of 
0.01% by 1991, whereas Graph 5.1 suggests that bonds and convertibles constituted 
on average 3.1% of total assets between 1952 and 1965. Indeed, the proportion of 
long term external funds over total assets was about twice as high during the early 
post war period when it moved around 40% than during the 1980s when long term 
external funds amounted to around 20% of total assets.28
Table 5.1 Sample Mean of Various Capital Structure Variables (in DM million)
sample mean 1952 1965 growth in %
internal funds 85.5 350.3 310%
Shares outstanding (book value) 67.4 189.8 182%
Bonds & convertibles 4.1 47.2 1,051%
long term private debt 16.9 122.2 623%
short term private debt 7.2 17.6 144%
non interest bearing liabilities 37.8 151.9 302%
total assets 223.8 916.8 310%
Source: Various issues of Hoppenstedt. Own calculations based on the above described sample.
Table 5.1 reports the sample means of individual funding components in 
million Deutsch Mark as well as their growth rates over the period. For instance, it 
shows that companies had on average DM4.1 million worth of bonds and 
convertibles on their balance sheets in 1952 growing by 1,051% to DM47.2 million 
in 1965. This compares to an increase in total assets of 310% which grew on 
average from DM223.8 million in 1952 to DM916.9 million in 1965. Table 5.1 
shows that whilst capital market debt represented the smallest proportion of total 
assets in 1952 it constituted on average a greater component than short term private 
debt in 1965, with capital market debt growing more than seven times more than 
short term private debt between 1952 and 1965. Long term private debt also grew 
considerably, increasing on average by 623% over the period. If one considers 
capital market and long term private debt jointly, the volume of long term debt 
outstanding grew on average by 707%, more than twice as much as total assets. The
caution is appropriate as Huth’s sample comprises a larger number of public limited 
companies than the present study, implying that it contains more smaller companies.
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increase in the amount of long term debt outstanding may be viewed as evidence in 
support of the earlier stated argument that companies were in need of funds for 
long-dated assets to overcome distortions created by the war and its aftermath as 
long-dated assets are generally funded by long term funds. In addition, as pointed 
out in chapter three long term debt had experienced a relatively strong devaluation 
during the currency reform which allowed companies to take recourse to long term 
debt funding without over-stretching their balance sheets. The increase in the 
relative importance of long term debt seems to be offset by a decrease in the relative 
importance of shares outstanding and short to medium term debt which grew by 
182% and 144%, respectively. In other words, the composition of long term 
external funds (shares, long term private debt and capital market debt) was shifting 
towards debt, whilst the relative importance of long term external funds remained 
relatively unchanged, comprising 39% of total assets in 1952 as well as in 1965, and 
fluctuating between 38% and 42% of total assets over the period. Internal funds and 
non interest bearing liabilities grew roughly in line with total assets increasing by 
just over 300%.
5.5. An analysis of the development of gearing ratios
As already stated in the course of deciding whether provisions are to be treated 
as debt or equity, the boundaries between debt and equity are not always clear. 
However, compared to today’s financial markets with its range of hybrid 
instruments, the differences between debt and equity were still relatively distinct in 
early post war Germany. Debt and equity can be distinguished in a variety of ways 
including timescale, risk profile, form and source of funding. In this analysis, debt is 
defined as a source of finance where the creditor has the right to receive regular 
instalments in the form of interest payments charged on the amount of debt 
outstanding and in the form of repayment of outstanding debt. Therefore for funding 
to be considered debt, the principle of ultimate repayment has to apply. 
Furthermore, only interest bearing liabilities are considered when calculating the 
debt to equity ratio. This approach follows the standard procedure of calculating the
28 Ibid., p. 59.
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gearing ratio. Equity, in turn, is defined as permanent investment in the company 
and the shareholder has no guarantee of any return. Financial returns may be 
achieved in two forms. Either through dividends paid by the company or through 
capital gains in the case of share price increase which is normally not paid by the 
company but by the new purchaser of the shares. According to this definition, 
preferences shares (which are in our case always unredeemable) are classified as 
equity funding because investment is permanent, whereas convertibles, which imply 
the right of repayment either in the form of cash or equity, are classified as debt, and 
as equity to the extent and when they are converted into equity.29 This approach 
follows the balance sheet treatment of convertibles. As the process of conversion 
from bond to equity normally takes place over a period of time, ceteris paribus, the 
debt equity ratio decreases as this conversion occurs.
Table 5.2 provides summary statistics of the analysis of total debt to 
shareholder’s equity, where total debt contains all interest bearing debt components 
and shareholder’s equity consists of subscribed capital (book value) and internally 
generated funds. Table 5.2 suggests a steady increase in companies’ gearing ratio, 
with both the mean and the median gearing ratio about doubling over the period. 
However, the typical deviation from the mean is also increasing as shown by the 
reported standard deviation which increased by around 0.15 over the period. The 
consistent minimum of zero leverage reported in Table 5.2 is somewhat misleading. 
As already mentioned a few smaller companies did not provide a detailed break up 
of their debt components in which case all their debts were summarised as liabilities 
and had to be classified as ‘other liabilities’ which does not enter into the defined 
total debt component.
Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of the Total Debt to Shareholder’s Equity Ratio
year 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
mean 0.33 0.50 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.46 0.50 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.61
median 0.20 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.37 0.39 0.49 0.48 0.44 0.48
max 1.42 11.39 1.34 1.71 1.61 2.31 3.18 3.11 3.08 1.85 2.03 2.83 2.97 2.69
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
standard deviation 0.35 1.30 0.34 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.52 0.54 0.51
Source: Various issues of Hoppenstedt. Own calculations based on the above described sample.
29 K. Ward, Corporate Financial Strategy (Oxford, 1993), pp. 174-175.
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In order to obtain a more detailed picture of the changing distribution of gearing 
ratios over time, Graphs 5.2 (a-d) show the frequency at which companies fall into 
various gearing brackets. As pointed out in chapter three, the total debt to total 
equity ratio changed in the course of the currency reform from 41:59 before the 
conversion to 13:87 after the conversion.30 Graph 5.2 (a) confirms this observation 
as it shows that 49% of companies in the sample emerged from the balance sheet 
conversion with a gearing ratio of smaller or equal to 0.2 and 86% of companies 
reported a gearing ratio of smaller or equal to 0.6 in 1952. Graph 5.2 (a) also shows 
that companies were quick in increasing their leverage, with a sharp increase in the 
number of companies occupying gearing brackets in the 0.4 as well as the 0.8 range. 
The general trend of moving to higher gearing ratios is also indicated by Graphs 5.2 
(b) and (c) which suggest a continuous migration of companies into higher brackets. 
Findings shown in Graph 5.2 (d) indicate a reverse in the trend of companies 
moving into higher gearing brackets. Graph 5.2 (d) shows an increasing number of 
companies clustering around a gearing ratio of between 0.4 and 0.6. It appears that 
the increase in the number of companies occupying this particular gearing bracket 
was driven both by companies with a lower gearing increasing their leverage as well 
as by companies which previously occupied higher brackets reducing their leverage.
Whereas 49% of sample companies had a gearing ratio o f lower than 0.2 in 
1952, only 37% of companies remained at this low ratio in 1955 and by 1965 only 
19% of sample companies had a gearing ratio of smaller than 0.2. Furthermore, 
although Graphs 5.2 (a-c) show a continuous trend of companies moving into higher 
gearing brackets, the majority of companies observed a gearing ratio of no greater 
than 0.6 over the entire period. Findings suggested in Graph 5.2 (d) reinforce the
30 H. Lipfert, ‘Wandlungen von Kapitalstruktur und Finanzierungsformen deutscher 
Industrie-Aktiengesellschaften’, in F. Neumark (ed.), Strukturwandlungen einer 
wachsenden Wirtschaft, Schriften des Vereins fur Socialpolitik, Neue Folge, Vol. 30/11 
(1964), pp. 581 points out that the equity to total assets ratio is generally high after a 
currency reform. According to his calculations, equity comprised 62% of total assets after 
the currency reform in 1924, and 82% after the 1948 currency reform. With economic 
recovery, this ratio decreased to 48% in 1952 and to 36% in 1966. In contrast to the 
development of equity, the proportion of debt is increasing after a currency reform. This 
development is caused by the uneven devaluation of monetary and accounting assets 
during the currency reform, with a relatively high devaluation of debt compared to a 
relatively low assets and equity devaluation.
166
notion that there exists a certain gearing bracket a majority of companies centres 
around as it shows a clustering of companies occupying a gearing bracket of 
between 0.4 and 0.6. Unfortunately, the period covered by Graph 5.2 (d) is arguable 
too short as to draw any definitive conclusions on companies’ long-term gearing 
behaviour. It would be interesting to analyse whether the findings on gearing ratios 
for the years 1962-1965 could be replicated by using a similar approach for 
subsequent periods.
Graph 5.2(a) The Development of Gearing Ratios between 1952 and 1954
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Graph 5.2(b) The Development of Gearing Ratios between 1955 and 195735
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Graph 5.2(c) The Development of Gearing Ratios between 1958 and 1961
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Graph 5.2(d) The Development of Gearing Ratios between 1962 and 1965
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Table 5.3 reports findings on subsamples in order to establish whether gearing 
ratios vary with respect to size. The subsamples were created by dividing the sample 
into deciles by total assets. This leaves each subsample containing eight companies. 
Table 5.3 presents the median gearing ratio for the smallest, the largest, and the 
medium size percentile. It shows that companies in the smallest size percentile were 
significantly less leveraged than companies in the other two percentiles. Gearing 
ratios for companies in the largest percentile fluctuated between 0.35 and 0.54, with 
the exception of 1952 when the median gearing ratio o f companies occupying the 
largest size percentile was 0.11. Interestingly, companies in the medium size 
percentile report a continuous increase in their leverage, whilst companies in the
other two percentiles display a more stable gearing behaviour. This leaves the
medium percentile with an average gearing ratio of 0.66 for the entire period 
compared to an average gearing ratio of 0.42 for companies in the largest percentile 
and of only 0.13 for companies in the smallest percentile.31 Table 5.3 strongly 
suggests that gearing ratios differ with respect to size, with medium sized 
companies displaying the highest gearing ratios.
Table 5.3 Comparison o f Gearing Ratios for Three Subsamples each Containing Eight Companies 
median of 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 period
mean
largest size 0.11 0.39 0.47 0.48 0.54 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.41 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.45 0.51 0.42
percentile
smallest size 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.13
percentile
medium size 0.29 0.37 0.41 0.53 0.61 0.64 0.62 0.79 0.62 0.87 0.60 0.68 1.03 1.17 0.66
percentile__________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Various issues of Hoppenstedt. Own calculations based on the above described sample.
Dividing the sample into deciles, leaves rather small subsamples with only eight 
companies in each subsample. To test whether the results reported in Table 5.3 also 
hold for larger subsamples, the findings of an alternative subsample are reported in 
Table 5.4. Table 5.4 compares the median leverage ratios of companies in the 
smallest, the largest, and the medium size percentile where each subsample holds 
twenty companies.
31 The gearing ratios reported for companies in the smallest percentile are likely to be 
understated as a number of smaller companies did not provide a break-down of their 
liabilities which led to classifying all their liabilities as ‘other liabilities’ which in turn are 
not included when calculating a company’s leverage.
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Table 5.4 Comparison o f Gearing Ratios for Three Subsamples each Containing Twenty Companies 
median of 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 period
mean
largest size 0.21 0.30 0.39 0.48 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.65 0.46 0.56 0.63 0.63 0.57 0.55 0.50
percentile
smallest size 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.16
percentile
medium size 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.43 0.52 0.48 0.74 0.58 0.60 0.81 0.75 0.78 1.00 0.58
percentile__________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Various issues o f Hoppenstedt. Own calculations based on the above described sample.
The general results suggested by Table 5.3 seem to be supported by Table 5.4 
which reports findings on gearing ratios for enlarged subsamples. The gearing ratios 
of the lowest quartile are little affected by the increase in sample size and fall 
significantly behind the gearing ratios observed for companies in the other two 
percentiles. Companies in the medium size percentile report the highest leverage, 
although the difference in leverage for companies in the largest and companies in 
the medium size percentile is narrowing when analysing bigger subsamples. This 
suggests that the top end of companies in the largest percentile tended to be less 
levered than their somewhat smaller counterparts which are only included in the 
wider definition of the largest size percentile.
In summary, findings on the development of gearing ratios suggest that 
companies tended to increase their leverage during the early post war period, albeit 
from (artificially) low levels. Furthermore, whilst the majority of companies 
observed a gearing ratio of below 60% over the entire period, a subsample of mostly 
medium sized public limited companies displayed a more aggressive gearing 
behaviour. To attribute the finding of a general increase in leverage solely to the fact 
that Germany has a ‘bank based’ system where companies rely on bank loans when 
they are in need of external funding seems to be too simplistic. At the beginning of 
the chapter a few historical arguments were put forward which suggest that one 
would expect companies to increase their gearing ratios in order to counterbalance 
the situation created by the currency reform when liabilities were considerably more 
devalued than equity. Recognising the effect the currency reform had on the balance 
sheet structure of West German public limited companies, together with the finding 
that companies display a tendency to cluster around a certain gearing bracket 
suggests that companies actively manage their balance sheet and that they took 
advantage of their post currency reform balance sheet situation. According to capital
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structure theory one would expect companies to increase their gearing ratios not at 
least because the balance sheet conversion lowered their leverage to levels which 
provided them with the opportunity of financing a greater proportion of investments 
with debt than would have otherwise been possible without risking financial 
distress.32
5.6. Sources of finance
Whilst the previous sections reported the relative development of different 
stocks of funds, this section tries to illuminate the importance of various financial 
sources to finance investments. In order to determine the contribution of different 
funding sources in any given year, the change in the stock of each individual source 
of funding is calculated, representing the numerator. The denominator is calculated 
as the change of the sum of all individual funding sources. As such the contribution 
of each individual source of funding is determined by calculating the yearly change 
of the individual funding source over the yearly change of the sum of all funds. In 
mathematical terms, the figure of a particular source of finance to fund gross 
investments in one year is computed as follows:33
<=1965 .
Z  i,
*=1953
*=1965
E / ,
*=1953
where ijt denotes the average amount of finance of type j  in year t, and It denotes 
the average total finance in period t, that is the average of the change in the sum of 
the different types of finance ijt in each year.
32 For a discussion of literature on the existence of optimal capital structure see chapter 
two.
33 This approach follows Edwards and Fischer, Banks, Finance and Investment, pp. 59- 
60.
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As before information on the stock of the individual financial sources was 
derived from financial statements of the above described sample of companies 
provided by Hoppenstedt for successive years. Figures reported in Table 5.5 on 
shares as source of finance include changes in share capital due to capital increases 
out of retained earnings (Kapitalerhdhung aus Gesellschaftsmittel), increases in 
share capital due to capital subscribed in kind (Kapitalerhdhung gegen 
Sacheinlagen), and share capital increases due to the conversion of convertibles. 
Capital increases out of retained earnings are reported when reserves are converted 
into ‘share equity’ (Grundkapital). Increases in shares outstanding due to capital 
increases subscribed in kind approximate for financial investments as they generally 
represent share issues to finance the purchase of stakes in other companies. Share 
increases due to the conversion of convertibles into shares do not generate new 
investment funds and as such have no direct bearing on new funding sources other 
than it would allow companies to raise additional debt on the back of an increased 
equity base without over-leveraging. In light of the inclusion of share capital 
increases out of retained earnings, figures reported in Table 5.5 tend to overstate the 
importance of shares and understate the importance of internally generated funds as 
source of investment funds.34
To what extent increases in the book value of shares outstanding were driven 
by share increases out of retained earnings, capital subscribed in kind and 
conversion of convertibles is indicated by Graph 5.3. Whilst Table 5.5 reports the 
average relative contribution of individual funding sources to gross investment, 
Graph 5.3 displays the sum of shares issued by the sample companies in any given 
year. In other words, Graph 5.3 reports the sum of the absolute changes in the 
volume of shares outstanding for the above described sample of public limited 
companies in any given year. Furthermore, Graph 5.3 differentiates between 
different kinds of share issues as the first column reports the total annual change in
34 Share issues out of retained earnings can be best understood as a form of distribution 
of profits. Existing shareholders are offered these shares in proportion of their existing 
holdings without having to pay for them. Companies choose this form of profit distribution 
in order to benefit from tax advantages. Creditors to the company welcome this form of 
profit distribution as retained earnings converted into shares cannot be distributed as 
dividends.
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the volume of shares outstanding, the second column excludes share issues out of 
retained earnings and share increases due to the conversion of convertibles, and the 
third column excludes share increases out of retained earnings, conversion of 
convertibles and capital subscribed in kind. Therefore, the third column should 
closely approximate the total annual volume of rights issues to finance (physical) 
investments. In addition, Graph 5.4 reports the total volume of net debt issued by 
the sample companies in any given year by calculating the sum of the annual 
changes in the volume of debt outstanding.35
The sources of funds reported in Table 5.5 are based on the definitions 
established above, with the contribution of internally generated funds as source of 
finance being captured by the average annual change in reserves, net income, 
provisions and value adjustments over the average annual change in total funds. 
This means that when and to the extent that reserves are converted into share capital 
it is reflected in a decrease in internal funds as source of finance and an increase in 
shares as source of finance. Debt comprises all forms of interest bearing debt and is 
divided into capital market debt, long term private debt and short to medium term 
private debt, with a decrease in convertibles due to conversion into equity being 
reflected in a decrease in capital market debt as source of finance and an increase in 
shares as source of finance. Changes in non interest bearing debt is not considered 
in the total funds calculation as non interest bearing debt is considered part of 
working capital rather than a source of funds to finance investment capital. 
Furthermore, Table 5.5 reports gross sources of finance which represents the 
contribution of different funding sources to finance physical and financial 
investments. In contrast, net sources of finance capture solely funding in physical 
assets.
According to Table 5.5 the sample of 79 non financial public limited companies 
financed on average 50.3% of their gross investments with internally generated 
funds between 1953 and 1965. Investigating the different subperiods, it appears that 
internal funds became a more prominent means of financing in the 1960s than in the
35 Where net debt is defined as debt issued minus debt retired in any given year.
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1950s as internal funds accounted on average for almost 80% of gross sources of 
funding between 1962 and 1965 compared to less than 40% between 1953 and 
1961. Moreover, internally generated funds constituted a positive gross source of 
finance in all years other than in 1958 which shows a negative contribution of 
71.3%. The negative contribution of internal funding as gross source of finance in 
1958 could be related to the introduction of the new German stock corporation law 
(Aktienrechtsrefrom) which was passed in 1959 and came into effect in 1960/61.36 
The new stock corporation law required public limited companies to prepare a more 
detailed financial statement. In particular, it required public limited companies to 
publish profit figures reflecting a company’s profit within its accounting period. In 
other words, companies were required to report annual net profit figures in addition 
to net income figures. Therefore, it appears that the significant negative contribution 
o f internal funds as gross source of finance in 1958 reflects companies’ attempt to 
manipulate their financial statements ahead of the introduction of this new law. A 
close read of the individual financial statements reveals that the frequency as well as 
the volume of reserves converted into share equity (share capital increases out of 
retained earnings) was significantly higher around the time of the introduction of the 
new stock corporation law than in any other years between 1953 and 1965.
With regards to the importance of share issues as gross source of finance, Table 
5.5 shows that new share issues accounted on average for 6.2% of gross source of 
funding between 1953 and 1965. It seems interesting to note that the sample 
companies sample relied to a significantly greater extent on new share issues as 
sources of funding during the subperiod of 1953 to 1957 when share issuance 
accounted for 15.2% of gross financial sources than for the subperiod of 1958-61 
when share increases accounted for 0.0% of gross new funding and for the 
subperiod of 1962-65 when they accounted for 1.0%. An analysis on an annual 
basis reveals that the two later subperiods contain three consecutive years of 
negative share equity contributions in 1961, 1962 and 1963 which significantly 
affects the average reported for these subperiods. Furthermore, Graph 5.3 suggests
36 Whether this law affected a company’s financial statement for the first time in 1960 or 
in 1961 depended on the company’s fiscal year.
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that particularly during the early 1950s increases in shares outstanding resulted from 
acquisitions financed with share issues. This observation coincides with the decision 
by the occupation authorities to relinquish control over companies in strategic 
industries and to break up conglomerates into smaller entities. Most notably IG 
Farben and the Vereinigten Stahlwerke were broken up into a number of smaller 
entities. The break up of these companies coincided with an active acquisition and 
consolidation market.37
The busy rights issuing activity during the second half of the 1950s may have 
been a consequence of the abolition of discriminatory taxation of securities in 
1954.38 With 27 of the 79 sample companies issuing shares in 1955, it appears that 
the discriminatory taxation policy had created a backlog in share financing which 
companies were eager to overcome as soon as this kind of taxation was abolished. 
The greatest volume of rights issues occurred in 1960, when share prices were at 
their peak. This holds true even if  one discounts for the share issuance by 
Volkswagen in 1960 which constituted a share capital increase out of retained 
earnings and is represented by the spike captured by the data series which reports 
the total increase of shares outstanding as shown in the first column of Graph 5.3.
37 The occupation authorities required the break up of a number of companies in 
exchange for giving up control over the companies. For instance, the chemical 
conglomerate I.G. Farben was broken up into Bayer, BASF and Hochst, and the 
Vereinigten Stahlwerke were broken up into a number of smaller iron and steel companies.
38 By introducing discriminatory taxation, the West German authorities tried to ensure 
that investable funds were channelled in approved areas. Under this system of taxation, 
returns on share movements faced a considerable higher taxation than returns on most 
fixed income securities. See chapter four for details.
Table 5.5 Gross Sources of Finance of 79 West German Non Financial Public Limited Companies, 1953-1965 (in percentage)
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
internal funds 36.4 76.2 45.2 7.7 15.6 -71.3 58.0 65.7 100.4 49.8 40.5 58.8 170.5
bonds & convertibles 4.0 -0.1 1.5 3.1 31.9 -2.4 -42.1 -2.2 -2.2 -14.7 22.9 -2.4 -68.1
long term private debt 23.8 28.6 28.5 65.8 34.3 107.8 40.4 15.7 98.1 51.4 44.2 -0.6 34.8
short term private debt 32.5 -12.7 6.6 -4.8 -0.1 57.9 8.9 7.3 -40.2 19.3 1.0 34.2 -45.7
shares outstanding 3.2 8.0 18.2 28.2 18.3 8.0 34.7 13.5 -56.2 -5.9 -8.6 10.1 8.4
1953-1957 1958-1961 1962-1965
internal funds 36.2 38.2 79.9
bonds & convertibles 8.1 -12.2 -15.6
long term private debt 36.2 65.5 32.4
short term private debt 4.3 8.5 2.2
shares outstanding 15.2 0.0 1.0
1953-1965
internal funds 50.3
bonds & convertibles -5.4
long term private debt 
short term private debt 
shares outstanding
44.1
4.9
6.2
Source: Various issues of Hoppenstedt. Own calculations based on the above described sample.
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Graph 5.3 also displays the mean development of market prices for shares and 
the mean of share offering prices. It shows that during the currency conversion most 
share prices were set at around DM100. The first considerable share price increase 
coincided with the abolishment of the Kapitalmarktforderungsgesetz and the 
consequent return to an uninhibited capital market in 1955.39 The second surge in 
share prices occurred between 1958 and 1960. Possible reasons for the significant 
increase in share prices during this period which go beyond explanations based on 
strong economic growth might have been the full convertibility of the Deutsch 
Mark since 1958, the second reduction of taxes on distributed profits from 30% to 
15% in 1958, the successful co-ordination of share issues by the central capital 
market committee since 1957, and the ‘kleine Aktienrechtsreform’ (‘little reform of 
German stock corporation law’) at the end of 1959 which improved the 
transparency of companies’ balance sheets and profit and loss statements. The 
consecutive decline in share prices after 1960 coincided with a number of political 
uncertainties overshadowing the period, namely the start of the construction of the 
Berlin Wall in 1961, the crisis over Cuba which peaked in 1962, the assassination of 
U.S. president Kennedy in 1963, and the increased involvement of the U.S.A. in the 
Vietnam conflict in 1964. In contrast to the sharp increase in market share prices, 
mean share offering prices remained rather low and stable centring around DM100 
between 1953 and 1958 and around DM200 thereafter. The reason for this rather 
stable development of offering prices reflects the fact that the reported offering 
prices represent prices for rights issues. In a rights issue existing shareholders are 
offered (part of the) new shares at a favourable rate, often considerably below the 
initial share price at which shares are offered to new investors.
According to Table 5.5 capital market debt constituted a negative gross source 
of finance after 1957, whilst it accounted on average for 8.1% of gross sources of 
finance between 1953-57. When considering the period of 1953 to 1965, capital 
market debt constituted on average a negative contribution of 5.4%. Long term 
private debt accounted on average for 44.1% of gross sources of finance between 
1953 and 1965 and constituted the single most important gross source of finance
39 See details on the Kapitalmarktforderungsgesetz in chapter four.
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during the subperiod of 1958 to 1961. Relating the findings on long term private 
debt in Table 5.5 with the development of interest rates outlined in Table 5.6 and 
Graph 5.4, it appears that companies responded to the interest rate cuts in 1958 and 
in 1961 by relying more heavily on long term private debt as it constituted around 
100% of gross sources of finance in those two years. The fluctuation of short term 
private debt on an annual basis reflects the fact that short term loans tend to be 
comparatively expensive and are generally used as bridge facilities. When analysing 
the subperiods, short term loans accounted on average for 4.9% of gross sources of 
finance during the entire period of observation, ranging from 2.2% during the 
subperiod of 1962 to 1965 to 8.5% during the preceding subperiod of 1958 to 1961.
In addition to the findings presented in Table 5.5 on the debt financing 
behaviour of the 79 public limited companies between 1953 and 1965, Graph 5.4 
reports the sum of the annual changes in the total volume of capital market debt, 
long term private debt and short to medium term private debt outstanding. It reports 
the net issuance behaviour of all companies comprising the sample and suggests 
that the issuance of capital market debt exceeded retirements for all years other then 
1960 and 1961. An analysis of the individual company reports reveals that the size 
of bond issues increased over time whilst the number of companies issuing bonds 
decreased. For instance, 13 companies in the sample issued bonds in 1953 which led 
to a DM153 million increase in the volume of bonds outstanding. A similar increase 
of DM187 million in 1965 was issued by only three companies. Convertibles were 
hardly ever chosen as financial instruments. With the exception of four rather big 
convertibles issues in 1964 and 1965, when three companies issued convertibles in 
1964 and one company in 1965.
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Another interesting revelation suggested by Graph 5.4 represents the finding 
that the volume of long term private net debt financing increased significantly from 
1961 onwards. Between 1961 and 1965, the sample of public limited companies 
raised on average DM978 million in long term private debt each year compared to 
an annual average of DM376 million in long term private net debt issuance between 
1953 and I960.40 This finding coincides with the fact that the average discount rate 
between 1961 and 1965 was almost 600 basis points lower than the average 
discount rate between 1953 and 1960. Therefore, findings indicate that companies 
utilised a low cost interest rate environment to raise long term debt as Graph 5.4 
suggests an inverse correlation between interest rates and debt issuance.41 In 
particular, the consecutive hikes in interest rates, as suggested by Graph 5.4 and 
reported in the notes to Table 5.6, during the second half of 1959 and the first half 
of 1960 corresponds with a virtual absence of new long term private debt issues in 
1960. In contrast, the sample companies reported the single biggest increase in their 
net volume of long term private debt outstanding in 1961, as they raised almost 
DM1.6 billion in that year which benefited from a rate cut policy with the discount 
rate being cut in three steps from five percentage in November 1960 to three 
percentage in May 1961.
40 These figures refer to net debt issuance, subtracting debt retirements from debt 
issuance.
41 As pointed out in the notes to Table 5.6, most loans were subject to interest rate caps 
o f 4.5% over the prevailing discount rate until 1965. Only loans with a life span o f four 
years or more were exempted from interest rate caps.
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Table 5.6 Development of Selected Interest Rates and Yields, 1949-1967 (in percentage, yearly 
average)_______________ _______________ __________________ ____________________
Year central bank interest capital market debtor interest creditor interest
rates interest rates
discount lombard effective equity costs for discount fixed term savings deposits
rate * rate yield on 
bonds1
return2 contract 
loans in 
current 
account3
credit 
(between 
DM 5000 
and DM
deposits 
with a 3 
months 
maturity6
20,000)4 legal 
period of 
notice
12 months 
period of 
notice8
1949 4.47 5.47 8.97 6.97 2.67 2.50 4.00
1950 4.36 5.36 8.86 6.86 2.61 2.54 4.04
1951 6.00 7.00 1.1 10.50 8.50 3.88 3.00 4.50
1952 5.23 6.23 2.0 9.73 7.73 3.71 3.00 4.50
1953 3.73 4.73 2.9 8.23 6.23 2.79 3.00 4.27
1954 3.19 4.19 2.7 7.88 5.69 2.50 3.00 4.13
1955 3.20 4.20 6.1 3.1 7.85 5.70 2.53 3.00 4.00
1956 4.77 5.77 6.3 4.2 9.27 7.27 4.16 3.31 5.10
1957 4.37 5.37 7.1 4.6 8.87 6.87 4.19 3.50 5.45
1958 3.27 4.27 6.5 3.3 7.78 5.77 2.94 3.17 4.67
1959 3.03 4.03 5.8 2.2 7.53 5.53 2.13 3.00 4.00
1960 4.44 5.44 6.3 2.0 8.94 6.94 3.10 3.75 4.88
1961 3.20 4.20 5.9 2.5 7.70 5.70 2.50 3.50 4.31
1962 3.00 4.00 6.0 3.4 7.50 5.50 2.25 3.25 4.00
1963 3.00 4.00 6.1 3.2 7.50 5.50 2.25 3.25 4.00
1964 3.00 4.00 6.2 3.1 7.50 5.50 2.25 3.25 4.00
1965 3.66 4.66 6.8 3.9 8.16 6.73 2.58 3.52 4.65
1966 4.59 5.74 7.8 4.8 9.09 7.59 3.50 4.50 5.50
1967 3.40 4.21 7.0 3.5 7.71 55.32 72.82 7 3.57 74.58
Notes: * Between the end of 1950 and 1965, there was a total of 21 changes in discount rates. 
Between 1950 and 1954, the discount rate was steadily lowered, mostly in 0.5% intervals, to reach a 
low of 3% in May 1954. After consecutive increases in the discount rate, with the first rate rise in 
August 1955, the discount rate peaked at 5.5% in May 1956, only to be lowered to 5.0% four 
months later in September 1956. Between 1957 and 1959, there was a total of five rate cuts which 
brought the discount rate down to 2.75% in the beginning of 1959. In September 1959, rates were 
raised to 3%, followed by a further rate increase a month later to 4%, and another increase in June 
1960 to 5%. Between November 1960 and May 1961, rates were lowered three times, taking the 
discount rate down to 3% where it remained for three and a half years, or until January 1965, when 
the discount rate was raised to 3.5%. In August 1965, the discount rate was increased to 4%. 1 Yield 
on bonds outstanding (coupon payments as a percentage of the security’s market price). 2 Calculated 
on grounds of last dividend payments at the end of each year. 3 These rates also applied for other 
loans but for instalment loans and loans for personal use. Loans with a life span of four years and 
more were no subject to fixed interest rates (Zinsbindung). The nominal rate of contract loans was 
generally 4.5% above the discount rate, overdraft loans were generally 6% above the discount rate. 
Until 1965, the loan commitment fee for contract loans is included in the above rates. 4 Until 28 
February 1965, interest rate for bills above DM 20,000 were 0.5% lower, and interest rates for bills 
below DM 5,000 were 0.5-1.0% higher. From 1 March 1965 onwards interest rates did not depend 
on the amount of the bill but it was differentiated between bills rediscountable at the Bundesbank 
and bills which were not, for which it was possible to charge up to 1.5% higher interest. The figures 
above present the rates for bills rediscountable at the Bundesbank. 5 Bills rediscountable at the 
Bundesbank between DM 5,000 and DM 20,000. 6 Between 1949 and 1966 fixed-term deposits 
with a maturity of 90 to 179 days. Higher interest rates were paid for deposits greater than DM 
50,000, and again higher rates for deposits greater than DM 1 Mill between 1 September 1949 and 
19 November 1958. 7 From 1966 onwards, only deposits below DM 1 Mill. Deposits greater than 
DM 1 Mill and with a maturity of at least 3 months were no longer subject to fixed interest rates 
after 1 July 1966. 8 Between 1949 and 1964, deposits of notice of 12 months to 4 years (after 1964 
12 months to 2 XA years). After 1 March 1965, deposits with at least 2 Vi years notice were no longer 
subject to fixed interest rates. Since 20 November 1958, these deposits could only be withdrawn 
after an initial six month qualifying period had passed.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen, Table 2.02, p. 279
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5.7. Reflection on literature discussing the financing behaviour of 
companies
Over the past years, the financing behaviour of companies has received 
considerable research attention. Most studies which analyse the financing behaviour 
of companies cover the period from the 1970s onwards.42 Difficulties in obtaining 
data for earlier periods may be one of the reasons for a lack of empirical studies on 
the funding behaviour of German companies during the early post war period. The 
thesis has attempted to fill this research gap by presenting findings on the funding 
behaviour of a sample of 79 West German companies between 1953 and 1965. As 
described above the sample consists entirely of public limited companies and is 
biased towards larger companies in the iron and steel, chemical, mining, gas, 
electricity, car, construction and the wholesale and retail trades sectors, excluding 
companies in sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, services, and finance. 
Consequently, the study does not claim that the reported findings are representative 
for the population of German companies.43 However, one might be able to make 
some inferences about the relevance of the presented findings by comparing them to 
findings reported by previous studies on the financing behaviour of companies. The 
remaining section discusses the findings of a number of empirical studies which 
analyse the financing behaviour of companies during more recent decades in order 
to establish how their results compare to the findings reported above. Although 
differences in methodology and data sources do not allow a strict comparison of 
findings, it might provide some insights whether German companies display a 
consistent trend in their funding behaviour over the entire post war period. The 
following section starts with a summary of findings reported by Edwards and 
Fischer whose methodology was partly followed in the financial statement analysis 
presented above.44
42 See chapter one and two for a list o f references.
43 Until 1987 only public limited companies and a very small number o f limited liability 
companies and partnerships were required to publish annual financial statements. 
Therefore, little information is available on the individual financing behaviour o f German 
non public limited companies before 1987.
44 Edwards and Fischer, Bank, Finance and Investment, chapter four and in particular 
Table 4.6 which is reproduced in Table 5.7 below.
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Edwards and Fischer rely on a number of different data sources to analyse the 
financing behaviour of German companies during the post war period. The 
following comparison of results focuses on findings reported in Table 4.6 of their 
book Bank, Finance and Investment in Germany as these results are based on annual 
financial statements and the sectors included in the sample largely coincide with the 
sectors covered in the analysis above. Edwards and Fischer obtained their sample 
from the Bundesbank, which in turn collected the sample based on financial 
statements submitted by companies whose signatures appear on the bills of 
exchange offered to the Bundesbank by credit institutions. A great advantage of the 
sample is the fact that it contains different legal forms of companies, however it is 
biased towards larger companies, covering companies in manufacturing, mining, 
gas, electricity and water supply, construction, the wholesale and retail trades, and 
transport and communications. The data source provides information on balance 
sheets, profit and loss statements, and sources and uses of funds of various broad 
categories of companies.45 The findings generated from this data set are reproduced 
in Table 5.7 below.
Table 5.7 shows the gross and net source of finance for investments by public 
limited companies, limited liability companies, partnerships and sole 
proprietorships for the period of 1965 to 1971. The sources of finance over the 
period are calculated as simple averages of their shares in the total finance of each 
legal form in each year. The results suggest a rather similar funding behaviour of 
the sample companies with the exception of public limited companies as Edwards 
and Fischer find that public limited companies relied more heavily on internally 
generated funds to finance investments than their counterparts with other legal 
entities. It seems interesting to note that results presented in Table 5.5 based on this 
thesis’ sample of 79 public limited companies for the period of 1953 to 1965 fall in 
line with Edwards and Fischer’s results on companies with a legal form of entity 
other than public limited. For instance, their sample of West German public limited 
companies financed on average 64.9% of gross investments with internally
45 For further details on the data source see Edwards and Fischer, Bank, Finance and 
Investment, pp. 88-90.
187
generated funds between 1965 and 1971, whilst companies with other legal entities 
financed on average between 50.6% and 55.5% of gross investments via internally 
generated funds. In comparison, the sample companies of this study relied on 
average to 50.3% on internal funds to finance gross investments between 1953 and 
1965. With regards to debt as gross source of finance, Edwards and Fischer find that 
their sample of public limited companies financed on average 27.7% of gross 
investments by raising new debt, significantly lower than the 43.6% reported in 
Table 5.5 for the period of 1953 to 1965. Again, findings presented by the thesis fall 
more closely in line with Edwards and Fischer’s results on non public limited 
companies, as their findings suggest that limited liability companies financed on 
average 40.6% of gross investments with debt, partnerships 44.5%, and sole 
proprietors 48.7% between 1965 and 1971.
Table 5.7 Sources of Finance of Different Legal Forms of Enterprise, 1965-1971 (in percentage)
public limited 
companies
limited liability 
companies partnerships
sole
proprietors
Gross sources
internal funds 64.9 50.6 55.5 51.3
of which: capital increase by 
partnerships and sole proprietors 11.1 13.1
new equity 7.4 8.8 - -
new debt 27.7 40.6 44.5 48.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Net sources
internal funds 92.2 76.6 79.2 73.9
of which: capital increase by - - 15.5 18.8
partnerships and sole proprietors 
new equity -1.8 8.2 -3.5 -2.4
new debt 9.6 15.2 24.3 28.5
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
average number of enterprises from 
which sources and uses of funds data 
obtained 879 3,851 11,138 6,712
Source: Edwards and Fischer, Banks, Finance and Investment, Table 4.6 on p. 90.
Table 5.7 also reports Edwards and Fischer’s results on net sources of finance. 
Net sources of finance exclude funding used for financial investments and as such 
only consider investments in physical assets.* According to Table 5.7 new equity 
shows a negative contribution to net sources of finance for all legal entities other
46 Table 5.5 does not report net sources o f finance due to a lack o f data on uses o f funds 
which would allow a calculation o f net sources. Therefore, the thesis could only make 
indirect inferences about the extent o f financial investments as Graph 5.3 reports increases 
in share capital excluding increases due to capital subscribed in kind, which provides some 
indication on the importance o f share issues to finance financial investments.
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than limited liability companies. In comparison, new equity shows a positive 
contribution in the single digits when considering gross sources of finance. Results 
by Edwards and Fischer also suggest that debt as source of finance diminishes 
considerably when considering net instead of gross sources of finance and that 
public limited companies financed less of their investments with debt than other 
legal entities, see Table 5.7. According to Edwards and Fischer ‘the smaller use of 
debt finance by AGs was not a result of AGs having access to the share market, but 
rather due to heavier use of internal funds by AGs.’47 Table 5.7 shows that internal 
funding increases considerably in importance when considering investments in 
physical investments alone rather than investments in physical and financial 
investments. Edwards and Fischer find that internal funds comprised over 90% of 
public limited companies’ net sources of finance, whilst German companies with 
other legal forms of entity relied to approximately 75-80% on internal funds as net 
source of finance between 1965 and 1971. In summary, Edwards and Fischer find 
that public limited companies relied to a greater extent on internally generated funds 
both considering net and gross sources of finance than other legal forms between 
1965 and 1971. In contrast, findings reported in Table 5.5 suggest a more similar 
funding behaviour of the sample of public limited companies during 1953 and 1965 
and Edwards and Fischer’s sample of non public limited companies for the 
adjoining period of 1965 to 1971, see Table 5.7.
One possible reason for the difference of results on gross sources of finance 
reported in Table 5.5 and Table 5.7 for public limited companies may be the 
difference in sample size. Unfortunately, Edwards and Fischer do not explicitly 
state how many companies their sample comprises. However, it can be assumed that 
their study incorporates more than 79 companies. Furthermore, as the sample of 79 
companies is bias towards larger companies, it can be assumed that their sample 
contains a greater proportion of smaller companies.48 In order to determine whether 
differences in results for public limited companies suggested by Table 5.5 and Table
47 Edwards and Fischer, Bank, Finance and Investment, . p. 92.
48 It must be mentioned that Edwards and Fischer point out that despite the relative large 
number o f companies in their sample, the average size o f companies in their sample is
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5.7 are due to differences in the underlying sample, Tables 5.8 and 5.9 compare the 
ratio of internal funds to total assets for various subsamples of the 79 companies 
analysed above. Table 5.8 and 5.9 suggest that public limited companies in the 
smallest size percentile relied to a greater extent on internally generated funds than 
companies in the medium and the largest size percentile. This observation supports 
the assertion that Edwards and Fischer’s finding on the greater reliance of public 
limited companies on internal funds might be driven by the financing behaviour of 
the smaller public limited companies in their sample. In other words, it appears that 
small public limited companies are more liquidity constraint than larger public 
limited companies or other legal forms of entity.49 Unfortunately, no explanations 
which go beyond pure speculation can be provided which would underpin the 
argument that small public limited companies had greater difficulties in raising 
external debt or equity than their bigger counterparts or similar sized companies of 
another legal form of entity. However, the findings suggest that further research in 
this area might provide insights into why relatively few German companies decided 
to go public in the post war period.
Table 5.8 Median Ratios of Internal Funds to Total Assets for Three Subsamples Each Containing 
Eight Companies (in percentage)____________________________________________________
median of 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 period 
mean
largest size 
percentile
29.8 29.5 34.2 31.8 29.3 27.6 29.0 38.3 34.5 38.7 39.1 36.0 38.8 34.0 34.1
smallest size 
percentile
33.7 38.0 42.3 41.9 39.2 50.8 43.8 41.3 33.7 35.7 36.4 38.0 39.2 39.0 39.1
medium size 
percentile
37.6 28.8 39.6 30.2 31.0 29.5 33.3 32.3 30.1 36.3 34.0 27.7 29.1 26.5 30.6
Source: Various issues of Hoppenstedt. Own calculations based on the above described sample.
larger than that o f the overall population o f German companies. See Edwards and Fischer, 
Bank, Finance and Investment, p. 88.
49 Audretsch and Elston, ‘Does Firm Size Matter’ p. 14 find some evidence that smaller 
German public limited companies are more liquidity constraint than their bigger 
counterparts for the period between 1977 and 1985. J. A. Elston, ‘Investment, Liquidity 
Constraints and Bank Relationships: Evidence form German Manufacturing Firms’, Centre 
for Economic Policy Research, Financial Economics Discussion Paper (1996), No. 1329, p. 
18 finds for the later period of her study that German public limited companies with close 
ties to large banks exhibit investment functions which are less sensitive to liquidity 
constraints than independent firms.
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Table 5.9 Median Ratios of Internal Funds to Total Assets for Three Subsamples Each Containing
Twenty Companies (in percentage)
median of 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 period 
mean
largest size 
percentile
35.4 34.8 36.6 33.7 34.3 31.1 34.3 37.6 34.5 35.3 35.1 33.4 37.9 36.2 34.9
smallest size 
percentile
33.7 38.0 40.8 36.7 38.4 36.8 39.0 41.6 35.9 34.0 34.3 33.7 35.5 37.7 36.8
medium size 
percentile
26.6 31.7 34.7 31.7 34.5 33.6 34.4 32.8 30.1 36.3 33.7 31.8 34.7 30.9 33.2
Source: Various issues of Hoppenstedt. Own calculations based on the above described sample.
The remaining section highlights findings of a few empirical studies which 
analyse the funding behaviour of companies for more recent decades. Before 
turning to the individual studies it should be pointed out that their underlying data 
sets differ considerably with respect to source, size and composition of the sample, 
and methodology. Although these differences restrict the comparability of results, it 
seems worthwhile to establish how the findings reported so far compare to results 
on the funding behaviour of companies in different countries for more recent 
decades. A particular attention will be drawn to what extent the above reported 
findings support the observation highlighted by recent literature that internal funds 
are the preferred source of finance across time and countries and the observation 
that internal financing has shown a tendency to increase over time.
The latter claim of a trend towards greater importance of internal funds is 
highlighted by Corbett and Jenkinson, who compare the financing behaviour of 
companies across four countries between 1970 and 1989.50 Figures reported by 
Corbett and Jenkinson represent net sources of finance based on a wide sample of 
companies and are based on national income accounts. According to Corbett and 
Jenkinson, West German companies financed 68.6% of net investments with 
internal funds between 1970 and 1974. Between 1975 and 1979, the proportion of 
internal funds to net sources of finance rose to 82.8%, between 1980 and 1984 
internal funds amounted to 79.8%, and between 1985 and 1989 the internal funds 
component rose again, amounting to 89.1% of net investments. In comparison, 
Table 5.5 suggests that internally generated funds accounted for 36.2% of gross 
sources of finance between 1953 and 1957, increasing to 38.2% for the period of
50 Corbett and Jenkinson, ‘The Financing of Industry’, pp. 79-87.
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1958 to 1961 and to 79.9% between 1962 and 1965. Although the different 
methodology employed by Corbett and Jenkinson and the thesis limits a direct 
comparability of results, the thesis supports Corbett and Jenkinson’s observation 
that internal funding increased in importance over time. This assertion is further 
supported by results reported by Dannemann, who finds that German companies 
financed 69.8% of their net investments with internal funds between 1952 and 1956 
compared to Corbett and Jenkinson’s finding that German companies financed on 
average 80.6% of net investments with internal funds between 1970 and 1989.51 Due 
to the fact that Dannemann’s analysis is also based on data from national accounts 
his results seem to be reasonable comparable to results reported by Corbett and 
Jenkinson. Moreover, Corbett and Jenkinson find that the trend towards internal 
funding can also be observed in the U.S., the United Kingdom and Japan. They also 
find that contrary to common perception the internal funds component was more 
prevalent in the United Kingdom and the U.S. than in Germany and Japan between 
1970 and 1989. They report that the United Kingdom financed on average 97.3% of 
net investments with internally generated funds and in the U.S. internal funds 
comprised 91.3% of net investments between 1970 and 1989 while in Germany 
80.6% of net investments were provided with self financing, and Japan relied on 
average to only 69.3% on internal funds over the same period.52
Mayer compares the capital structure of companies in eight countries between 
1970 and 1985 using flow of funds data. His results suggest that between 1970 and 
1985, West German non financial companies financed on average 55.2% of gross 
investments (and 70.9% of net investments) via internally generated funds.53 As a 
reminder, Table 5.5 reports for the sample analysed in this thesis that internal 
funding comprised on average 50.3% of gross financial sources between 1953 and 
1965. Again, due to differences with respect to data source and methodology, one 
should be cautious about comparing Mayer’s results with results reported by the
51 Dannemann, Struktur und Funktionsweise des Kapitalmarktes, Table 16.
52 Corbett and Jenkinson, ‘The Financing o f Industry’, Table 1.
53 C. Mayer, ‘Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development’, in: R. 
G. Hubbard, Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, (Chicago, 
1990), Table 12.3 and Table 12.1. His results are based on flow o f funds figures provided 
by the OECD.
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thesis. Nonetheless, the similarity in findings is striking. It also seems interesting to 
compare Mayer’s findings, whose sample comprises non financial companies of 
various legal entities, with results by Edwards and Fischer’s on the importance of 
internal funding for different legal entities between 1965 and 1971. Their findings 
which are reproduced in Table 5.7 fall in line with Mayer’s findings on the 
importance of internal funds for gross as well as net investments for all legal entities 
other than public limited. In particular, Table 5.7 shows that limited liability 
companies, partnerships and sole proprietors financed on average between 50.6% 
and 55.5% of gross investments and between 73.9% and 79.2% of net investments 
with internal funds between 1965 and 1971, compared to Mayer’s results that 
internal funds accounted for 55.2% of gross investments and 70.9% of net 
investments between 1970 and 1985. Mayer also finds that the United Kingdom and 
the U.S. relied to a greater extent on internal funds than Germany and Japan.54 
Moreover, results by Mayer suggest that bank loans were the second most important 
source of finance after retained earnings in all countries investigated in his study. 
With West German companies relying to 21.1% on loans as gross source of finance, 
while companies in the United Kingdom relied to 21.4% on loans, companies in the 
U.S. to 23.1%, and companies in Japan to 40.7%.55 In summary, Mayer observes 
that between 1970 and 1985 companies in all eight countries relied most heavily on 
internal funds to finance investments, and that private debt was the dominant form 
of external finance.
Recent empirical literature on the funding behaviour of companies has 
highlighted two central observations. First, internal funding is the preferred source 
of finance across time and countries. Being the cheapest form of finance, one would 
expect to observe this funding behaviour. Results presented in Table 5.5 support 
this observation for the early post war period as findings suggest that German public 
limited companies financed on average most of their gross investments with internal 
funds between 1953 and 1965. Second, it has been observed that internal financing
54 With internal funds as net (gross) source o f financing amounting to 102.4% (72.0%) in 
the United Kingdom, 85.9% (66.9%) in the U.S., and 57.9% (33.7%) in Japan. See Mayer, 
‘Financial Systems’, Table 12.1 and Table 12.3.
55 Ibid., Table 12.3.
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has shown a tendency to increase over the post war period. In as far as a comparison 
across studies is admissible, findings of the thesis support the assertion that there is 
a trend towards an increasing reliance on internal funding to finance investments. 
However, as highlighted in Table 5.5, the relative importance of different funding 
sources can fluctuate greatly on an annual basis.
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6. Summary and concluding remarks
The objective of the thesis was to trace the development of the West German 
capital market and to analyse the financing behaviour of a sample of West German 
public limited companies during the early post war period. A comprehensive 
analysis of the 1948 currency reform showed that the currency reform discriminated 
against different forms and holders of monetary assets as different devaluation 
methods were applied depending on the type of asset and on the status of the owner 
or borrower of the respective asset. This discriminating conversion procedure led to 
a significant redistribution of wealth within the West German economy. In 
particular, it endowed banks and public authorities, which were the biggest 
borrowers before the currency reform, with ample financial means to provide 
funding. While banks were operational from the beginning of the post currency 
reform period, the lengthy process of converting balance sheets and establishing the 
rightful owners of securities handicapped the capital market. Securities could only 
be traded after their rightful owners had been identified, and a company could only 
issue a security after it had converted its balance sheet.
The incorporation of issues such as the conversion of balance sheets and the 
securities validation law not only shed light on the effects the currency reform had 
on the development of the West German capital market, it also provided an 
alternative interpretation of the financing behaviour of companies during the early 
post war period. Companies emerged from the balance sheet conversion with 
artificially low gearing ratios as monetary assets were significantly more devalued 
than real assets. Furthermore, the balance sheet conversion induced companies to 
disclose hidden reserves. Findings on the conversion of balance sheets allowed to 
reconcile the fact that companies increased their gearing ratios during the early post 
war period with arguments suggested by capital structure theory. One would expect 
companies to increase their gearing ratios for at least two reasons. First, it can be 
argued that the conversion left companies with a capital structure that did not reflect 
a company’s choice of capital structure had it been able to manage it at its own 
device. Second, the low gearing ratio companies found themselves with after the 
conversion provided them with the opportunity to finance more of their investments
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with debt as would have been possible otherwise without causing increased danger 
o f financial distress. This interpretation of findings differs from the conventional 
interpretation discussed at the beginning of the thesis as it incorporates the fact that 
West German companies entered the post war period with historically low gearing 
ratios. In other words, the thesis argues that companies not just simply preferred 
debt over equity but that they were hying to ‘optimise’ their leverage. Indeed, an 
analysis of the development of gearing ratios in chapter five suggests that 
companies first increased their leverage to then cluster around a certain gearing 
bracket.
The analysis of the currency reform showed that the currency reform negatively 
affected the development of the capital market, whereas it endowed banks with 
generous compensation claims which enabled them to establish a powerful position 
as provider of external funds right from the start of the post reform period. While it 
is not obvious whether public authorities were fully aware of the consequences the 
different speed of conversion of monetary and real assets had on the development of 
financial institutions, a number of policy measures were identified which were 
clearly directed at distorting the role of the capital market in providing investment 
funds. By maintaining interest rate ceilings and by introducing discriminatory 
taxation, public authorities influenced investment decisions and eliminated market 
mechanisms of allocating resources in order to ensure favourable access to capital 
market funds for investment programmes favoured by the public authorities. This 
form of intervention effectively divided the capital market into two sectors as it 
ensured that investments in govemmentally favoured sectors were at least as 
profitable as in uncontrolled private sectors, while the cost of capital market funding 
was considerably lower for the controlled and govemmentally favoured sectors than 
for the uncontrolled private sectors. In other words, the West German capital market 
had to serve as an ‘extended arm’ for public investment efforts during the first post 
currency reform years. Public authorities defended the restrictions they imposed on 
the capital market on the grounds that price controlled sectors could not finance 
urgently required investments if  they had to pay market interest rates. A 
comprehensive analysis of the development of price controlled sectors compared to 
uncontrolled sectors in chapter four questions the claim that price controlled sectors
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were in need of subsidised funding. Nevertheless, it remains unanswered whether 
public investment efforts prevented price controlled sectors to turn from potential 
into real bottlenecks or whether perceived bottlenecks failed to cause severe 
problems due to a steady and proportionate growth of the overall economy.
The resurgence of the capital market in the 1950s right after public authorities 
allowed market forces to come into play, seems particularly impressive considering 
the severe restrictions the capital market had endured since the early 1930s. 
Findings on the financing behaviour of a sample of public limited companies 
suggest that capital market funds were relatively more important in the immediate 
post reform years than in later periods. Nonetheless, internal funds were the most 
important funding source during the early post war period. A comparison of results 
presented in the thesis with findings presented by other studies for later periods 
suggest that internal funds comprised the most important source of finance during 
the entire post war period. The thesis also supports the claim that internal funds 
showed a tendency to increase as proportion of total funding over the post war 
period. This finding might be best explained by historical circumstances. One 
would expect companies to rely to a lesser extent on internally generated funds at a 
time when high growth rates coincide with a period of repositioning than at later 
stages when companies had accumulated funds and the economy had regained more 
mature structures. In other words, the early post war period is characterised by 
relatively strong economic growth, while companies still suffered from distortions 
created by the war and the following economic turbulences, with both factors 
pointing to extraordinary investment requirements. Although strong growth 
(together with modest wage increases) may suggest that companies were able to 
generate healthy profits which allowed them to finance a large extent of their 
investments with internally generated funds, the thesis suggests that during the early 
1950s companies were still recovering from turbulences caused by the war and the 
delayed currency reform. It appears that companies were in need of excess 
investment in order to reposition themselves in the changed circumstances which is 
reflected in a relatively high reliance on external funds during this period.
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Next to the government which was a major provider of funds in particular to 
sectors such as housing, infrastructure and utilities, banks played an important role 
in providing external funds, both as providers of credit and as investors in capital 
market securities, particularly at the beginning of the post currency reform period. 
Banks fulfilled an important function as investors and monitors in an economic 
situation where private investment in capital market securities was sluggish (due to 
high taxation and the state pensions system), and technologies were relatively well 
understood. Additionally, as export demand was greatest for products of the 
manufacturing sector, which according to arguments presented in chapter two was 
well served by a bank oriented financial system, as it was a competitive and well 
established sector, the prevailing West German financial system reinforced the 
comparative advantage of the manufacturing sector by providing them with 
adequate financial services. The strong position banks accomplished as financial 
intermediaries was surely favoured by public policies which discriminated against 
the development of the capital market. However, to what extent public authorities 
were aware that their policies discriminated against the capital market, and therefore 
how actively they supported the development of a bank oriented system is difficult 
to answer. As much one is inclined to give credit to the bank oriented financial 
system for contributing to strong growth in West Germany during the 
Wirtschaftswunder period, the bank dominated system seems to have inhibited 
technological changes over the more recent decades as it appears an inferior system 
when it comes to foster innovative activities. However, over recent years Germany 
has recognised the need to adapt its financial system in order to satisfy the changing 
demand of companies as well as investors. The changes in the financial sector are 
likely to have broad consequences. It forces companies to be more responsive to 
outside shareholders, and more concerned with rates of return on capital. As the 
corporate governance role of banks declines and as the pension system is 
restructured, a shift in financial assets can be observed away from bank deposits to 
wider share ownership.
The West German experience was unique, as it was significantly different from 
what one might call the normal growth of other Western countries during the early 
post war period. However, the experience of West Germany during the early post
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war period may provide new insights concerning the interaction of financial 
institutions and economic growth. It is hoped that the thesis has contributed to a 
better understanding of the faults and merits of fostering one financial system over 
another. As it is important to identify the strengths and weaknesses of competing 
financial systems, before deciding on policies which may favour the development of 
a more bank oriented or a more capital market oriented system. In as far as the 
reconstruction period of post war Germany can be applied to the situation 
experienced in former communist countries, the study may serve as reference for 
discussion on the development of financial systems in post communist Europe.
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Appendix 1
Total Assets in DM
name total assets 1952 total assets 1965
1 AdlerwerkeAG 53 089 000 64 930 000
2 Allgemeine Elektricitats-Gesellschaft AEG-Telefunken AG 598 521 000 2 174 355 000
3 Andreae-Noris Zahn AG 26 320 000 89 679 000
4 Aschaffenburger Zellstoffwerke AG 134 496 000 215 394 000
5 BASF Badische Anilin- & Soda-Fabrik AG 805 995 000 4 205 981 000
6 Beiersdorf AG 37 304 000 143 734 000
7 Bemberg, J. P. AG 34 910 000 130 521 000
8 Berger, Julius AG 13 452 000 54 324 000
9 BMW Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 82 190 000 342 923 000
10 Buderus'sche Eisenwerke AG 128 607 000 378 332 000
11 Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur AG 76 509 000 138 823 000
12 Chemie-Verwaltungs-AG (re-established in 1955) 250 464 000
13 Continental Gummi-Werke AG Hannover 219 683 000 671 413 000
14 Daimler-Benz AG 292 187 000 2 223 266 000
15 Demag AG 237 281 000 624 863 000
16 Deutsche Babcock& Wilcox AG 113 030 000 366 109 000
17 Deutsche Continental-Gas-Gesellschaft AG 56 855 000 193 985 000
18 Deutsche Edelstahlwerke AG 289 620 000 623 976 000
19 Deutsche Erdol-AG 273 315 000 1 128 583 000
20 Deutsche Linoleum-Werke AG 55 467 000 171 324 000
21 Dierig, Christian AG 103 904 000 110 288 000
22 Dortmund-Horder Huttenunion AG 339 043 000 1 107 044 000
23 Dortmunder Actien-Brauerei AG 25 721 000 77 431 000
24 Elektrische Licht- und Kraftanlagen AG 34 810 000 32 598 000
25 Eschweiler Bergwerks-Verein AG 218 605 000 548 352 000
26 Farbenfabriken Bayer AG 915 189 000 4 422 266 000
27 Farbwerke Hoechst AG 590 091 000 4 232 666 000
28 Feldmiihle AG 102 513 000 557 888 000
29 Felten & Guilleaume Carlswerk AG 178 755 000 375 718 000
30 Ford-Werke AG 88 829 000 2 563 993 000
31 Gelsenkirchner Bergwerks-AG (re-established in 1953) 1 963 425 000
32 Glanzstoff AG 187 603 000 623 522 000
33 Goldtschmidt, Thomas AG 53 607 000 133 729 000
34 Gutehoffnungshutte AG 104 265 000 306 415 000
35 Hambomer Bergbau AG (re-established in 1953) 258 777 000
36 Hamburgische Electricitats-Werke AG 380 534 000 1 895 655 000
37 Handelsunion AG (re-established in 1954) 236 599 000
38 Harpener Bergbau AG 387 746 000 545 779 000
39 HochTief AG 39 195 000 393 000 000
40 Hoesch AG (re-established July in 1952) 1 847 706 000
41 Holzmann, Philipp AG 80 065 000 244 056 000
42 Htittenwerk Oberhausen AG 375 882 000 1 205 860 000
43 Hiittenwerke Siegerland AG 161 563 000 205 029 000
44 Ilseder Hiitte AG 199 774 000 808 711 000
45 John Deere-Lanz Verwaltungs-AG 86 837 000 309 465 000
46 Kali-Chemie AG 136 412 000 428 720 000
47 Karstadt AG 158 911 000 887 510 000
48 Kaufhof AG 127 906 000 819 762 000
49 Klockner-Bergbau AG 145 426 000 117 971 000
50 Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz AG 239 192 000 968 834 000
51 Klockner-Werke AG 256 284 000 1 428 620 000
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name total assets 1952 total assets 1965
52 MAN Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Niimberg AG 355 602 000 1 136 713 000
53 Mannesmann AG 450 256 000 3 010 100 000
54 Metallgesellschaft AG 310 579 000 1 205 235 000
55 Niederrheinische Bergwerks-AG 40 676 000 172 463 000
56 Niederrheinische Hiitte AG 138 203 000 253 586 000
57 NSU Motorenwerke AG 63 325 000 273 885 000
58 Orenstein-Koppel und Liibecker Maschinenbau AG 116 764 000 261 223 000
59 Paulaner-Salvator-Thomasbrau AG 23 775 000 40 550 000
60 Phoenix Rheinrohr AG 391 305 000 1 878 543 000
61 PreussagAG 214 063 000 735 828 000
62 Rheinpreussen AG fur Bergbau und Chemie 222 712 000 427 645 000
63 Rutgers werke und Teerverwertung AG 56 361 000 270 688 000
64 RWE Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk AG 2 219 589 000 8 042 565 000
65 Salamander AG 80 832 000 232 921 000
66 Salzdetfurth AG 122 805 000 276 114 000
67 Schering AG 81 790 000 462 071 000
68 Siemens AG 684 740 000 2 932 456 000
69 Stahlwerke Siidwestfalen 134 173 000 412 364 000
70 Stolberger Zink AG fur Bergbau und Hiittenbetrieb 69 693 000 120 035 000
71 Stollwerk, Gebriider AG 22 997 000 40 688 000
72 Siiddeutsche Zucker-AG 162 416 000 379 771 000
73 Thyssen, August Hiitte (re-established in 1953) 3 006 538 000
74 Varta AG 151020 000 455 558 000
75 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke AG 154 853 000 412 393 000
76 Volkswagenwerk AG 302 018 000 2 996 080 000
77 Wasserwerk f. das nordliche westfalische Kohlenrevier AG 60 499 000 158 434 000
78 Wintershall AG 271 014 000 658 862 000
79 Zellstofffabrik Waldhof AG 188 941 000 335 713 000
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